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A person’s health not only influences her chance of surviving to adulthood and her life expectancy, but
also her economic decisions, her productivity, and her well-being. Since a healthy population is a major
factor in economic development, it is important to understand the determinants of individuals’ health-
related decisions and outcomes. The three essays that comprise this dissertation make advancements
in this direction and focus on the Indian subcontinent. The first and second essays analyze how intra-
household decision making affects individuals’ health outcomes and welfare, with a special attention
towards within family gender inequality. The third essay studies how exposure to historical medical
facilities affects individual health outcomes across generations.
From a methodological point of view, this dissertation highlights the advantages of combining eco-
nomic models with data from a wide range of sources, theory with empirics. I employ both quasi-
experimental and structural estimation methods, using the former to uncover relevant causal links and
policy levers, and the latter to estimate deep parameters, overcome data limitations and perform counter-
factual policy analysis. More broadly, with this work I stress the importance of research in development
economics being open to a variety of methodologies and empirical approaches.
The ratio of women to men is particularly low in India relative to developed countries. It has recently
been argued that close to half of these missing women are of post-reproductive ages (45 and above),
but what drives this phenomenon remains unclear. In the first essay, titled Why Are Older Women
Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty, I provide an explanation for
this puzzle that is based on intra-household bargaining and resource allocation. I use both reduced-
form and structural modeling to establish the critical connections between women’s bargaining position
within the household, their health, and their age. First, using amendments to the Indian inheritance
law as a natural experiment, I demonstrate that improvements in women’s bargaining position within
the household lead to better health outcomes. Next, with a structural model of Indian households,
I show that women’s bargaining power and their ability to access household resources deteriorate at
post-reproductive ages. Thus, at older ages poverty rates are significantly higher among women than
men. The analysis indicates that gender inequality within the household and the consequent gender
asymmetry in poverty can account for a substantial fraction of missing women of post-reproductive
ages. Finally, I demonstrate that policies aimed at promoting intra-household equality, such as improving
women’s rights to inherit property, can have a large impact on female poverty and mortality.
The first essay contributes to a wide literature showing that a relevant determinant of the household
decisions and outcomes is the relative bargaining position of the decision makers. Although this link is
well-accepted in this literature, intra-household bargaining power is de facto an unobserved variable. In
the second essay, joint with Arthur Lewbel and Denni Tommasi and titled Women’s Empowerment and
Family Health: A Two-Step Approach, we propose a novel two-step approach to overcome this data
limitation and to directly assess the causal link between women’s empowerment and family health. In the
first stage, we structurally recover a dollar-based measure of women’s intra-household empowerment,
with a clear interpretation provided by economic theory; in the second stage, we identify the causal
effect of women’s decision power relative to men’s on household members’ health. We demonstrate that
women’s bargaining power improves their own health outcomes, while not affecting their spouses’.
When we turn to children, we find that improvements in women’s position within the family does not
affect their weight or height, but it increases their likelihood to receive vaccinations.
The determinants of individuals’ health, however, go beyond the family, and trace back to historical
developments. In the third essay, joint with Federico Mantovanelli and titled Long-Term Effects of
Access to Health Care: Medical Missions in Colonial India, we examine the long-term effect of access
to historical health facilities on current individual health outcomes. To this aim, we construct a novel
and fully geocoded dataset that combines contemporary individual-level data with historical information
on Protestant medical missions. We exploit variation in the activities of missionary societies and use an
instrumental variable approach to show that proximity to a Protestant medical mission has a causal
effect on individuals’ health status. The investigation of potential transmission channels indicates that
the long-run effect of access to health care is not driven by persistence of infrastructure, but by changes in
individual habits regarding hygiene, preventive care and health awareness, which have been bequeathed
over time.
Important policy implications can be drawn. First, policies aimed at promoting gender equality within
families, such as improving women’s property and inheritance rights, can have positive spillovers on
women’s health, poverty and mortality, and can boost health investments in children. Second, as the
population in India and in other developing countries ages, gender asymmetries among the elderly
need to be further investigated and promptly addressed by the development practitioners. Third, intra-
household inequalities, between genders and across ages, should be taken into account when measuring
poverty and evaluating the effect of policies to alleviate it. Finally, in light of the existence of long-run
effects, the expansion of health care access in India should become an even more prominent goal for
policy makers, as it can beneficially affect both current and future generations.
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Chapter 1
Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The
Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty
1.1 Introduction
There are far more men than women in India relative to developed countries. Following seminal work by
Amartya Sen (1990; 1992), this fact has been dubbed the missing women phenomenon.1 Sex-selective
abortion and excess female mortality at early ages related to parental preferences for sons have been
identified as important determinants of missing women and biased sex-ratios.2 Recent work by Anderson
and Ray, however, indicates that excess female mortality in India persists beyond childhood and that
the majority of missing Indian women die in adulthood. While they do not dispute the presence of a
severe gender bias at young ages and the role played by maternal mortality, Anderson and Ray (2010)
demonstrate that close to half of missing women in India are of post-reproductive ages, i.e., 45 and
1Coale (1991) estimates that over 23 million of Indian women who should be alive are missing.
2See e.g., Sen (1990) and DasGupta (2005).
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above (see figure 1.1).3 Unlike the missing girls phenomenon, excess female mortality at older ages in
India has not received much attention and remains a puzzle.
I seek to explain this puzzle by examining the critical connections between women’s age, intra-
household bargaining, and health, while taking the link between health and mortality as given. Using
reduced-form and structural methods, I identify one crucial mechanism – the decline in women’s bar-
gaining position during post-reproductive ages – that can account for 82 percent of the missing women
in the 45-79 age group. The decrease in women’s bargaining power is reflected in their diminished
ability to access household resources. As a consequence, at older ages poverty rates are significantly
higher among women than men. I call this fact excess female poverty and show that the age profile
of excess female poverty matches the profile of excess female mortality in figure 1.1 nearly exactly at
post-reproductive ages.
My analysis proceeds in two steps. First, by using amendments to the Indian inheritance law as a
natural experiment, I analyze the relationship between women’s bargaining power and their health. I
focus on the Hindu Succession Act (HSA) amendments that equalized women’s inheritance rights to
men’s in several Indian states between 1976 and 2005. Using data from the 2005-2006 National Family
Health Survey (NFHS-3), I show that women’s exposure to these reforms increases their body mass index
and reduces the probability of them being anaemic or underweight by strengthening their bargaining
power. Next, I examine whether older women are missing in India because their bargaining position
weakens at post-reproductive ages. To test my hypothesis, I set out a household model with efficient
bargaining to structurally estimate women’s bargaining power and investigate its determinants. At post-
3They estimate a total of 1.7 million excess female deaths in year 2000 alone (0.34 percent of the total female population), 45
percent of which occurred at the age of 45 and above. In contrast, they find that close to 44 percent of China’s missing women
are located “around birth". For each age category, Anderson and Ray (2010) compare the actual female death rate in India to
a reference female death rate. The latter is one that would be obtained if the death rate of males in India were to be rescaled
by the relative death rates for males and females (in the same category) in developed countries. They compute missing women
as the product between the difference between the actual and reference death rates and the female population in each age
group. Figure 1.1 displays estimates from Anderson and Ray (2010), table 3, p. 1275. These results are further investigated
and confirmed in Anderson and Ray (2012). These findings are consistent with a striking non-monotonic pattern of sex-ratios
over age. See section A.1 in the Appendix for more details.
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Figure 1.1: Missing Women by Age Group (Anderson-Ray, 2010)
reproductive ages, I find evidence of a substantial decline in women’s bargaining position and in their
ability to access household resources.
I model Indian households using the collective framework, where each family member has a separate
utility function over goods and the intra-household allocation of goods is Pareto efficient. In line with
the Indian family structure, I consider both nuclear and non-nuclear households. I measure women’s
bargaining power as their resource share, i.e., the fraction of the household’s total expenditure consumed
by women.4 I identify household members’ resource shares through Engel curves (demand equations
holding prices constant) of clothing items that are consumed exclusively by women, men or children,
using a methodology developed in Dunbar et al. (2013). I estimate the model with detailed expenditure
data from the 2011-2012 National Sample Survey (NSS) of Consumer Expenditure and use these struc-
4See e.g., Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), Browning et al. (2013), and Dunbar et al. (2013).
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tural estimates to outline the profile of women’s bargaining power over the life-cycle. During women’s
core reproductive ages the allocation of resources between women and men is symmetric. However,
women’s resource shares relative to men’s decline steadily at post-reproductive ages, when women get
as low as 60 percent of men’s resources.
Due to the lack of NSS data on health outcomes, I cannot examine the relationship between re-
source allocation and mortality in the structural model.5 As morbidity and mortality rates are higher in
poverty, however, I indirectly explore the link between intra-household allocation, health, and mortality
by studying how gender inequality within the household affects aggregate measures of welfare.6 I use
the model predictions to compute individual level expenditures that take into account unequal intra-
household allocation. I compare these per-capita expenditures to poverty thresholds to calculate gender
and gender-age specific poverty rates. By contrast, standard per capita poverty measures assume equal
sharing and ignore intra-household inequality. My poverty estimates indicate that at all ages there are
more women living in poverty than men, but the gap between female and male poverty rates widens
dramatically at post-reproductive ages. For individuals aged 45 to 79, poverty rates are on average 80
percent higher among women than men. This result provides additional support for my hypothesis that
intra-household inequality can explain excess female mortality. Using a simple model to relate my find-
ings to the Anderson and Ray’s estimates, I then demonstrate that a considerable proportion of missing
women at older ages can be attributed to intra-household gender inequality.
My structural estimates are consistent with the existing reduced-form evidence of the importance
of inheritance rights in shaping women’s position within the household.7 I find that exposure to the
Hindu Succession Act amendments increases women’s resource shares by 0.2 standard deviations. These
5In Chapter 2, we address the NSS data limitations on health outcomes by performing an out-of-sample prediction on the NFHS
data to directly investigate how resource shares affect health production.
6The World Health Statistics report (2015) lists poverty as one of the major determinants of health. Moreover, according to WHO
(1999) the likelihood of death before at adult ages is about 2.5 times higher among the poor than among the non-poor.
7See e.g., Roy (2008) and Heath and Tan (2014), who show that women’s exposure to the HSA reforms improves self-reported
measures of autonomy and negotiating power within their marital families.
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reforms were enacted in different states at different times between 1976 and 2005 and only applied to
Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Jain women who were not married at the time of implementation. A large
fraction of Indian women, especially of older ages, is therefore excluded. I perform a counterfactual
exercise and calculate women’s resource shares in the hypothetical scenario of all women (of all religions
and ages) benefiting from these reforms. I demonstrate that granting universal equal inheritance rights
can reduce the number of women living in extreme poverty by 10 percent and the number of excess
female deaths at post-reproductive ages by up to 26 percent.
The contribution of this paper is fourfold. First, this study is the first to show that excess female mor-
tality at older ages in India can be explained by asymmetries in intra-household bargaining and resource
allocation. While Anderson and Ray (2010, 2012) raise awareness about this phenomenon, little work
has been done to understand possible channels generating excess female mortality in adulthood in India,
especially at older ages. Milazzo (2014) argues that excess mortality among women aged 30 to 49 could
be partly explained by son preference, while a recent working paper by Anderson and Ray (2015) shows
that excess female mortality between the ages of 20 and 65 is particularly severe among unmarried
women and widows. My analysis departs from previous works in that it provides an original explanation
for missing women at older ages (45 to 79) while employing both reduced-form analysis and structural
modeling. The structural model allows me to perform counterfactual experiments and to examine the
roles of son preference and widowhood within a full model of household bargaining. Second, while the
effect of changes in Indian inheritance laws on women’s outcomes has been studied previously (e.g.,
Roy (2008, 2013), Deininger et al. (2013), and Heath and Tan (2014)), no work focused explicitly on
women’s health and access to household resources. Third, this is the first attempt to formally outline the
profile of women’s intra-household bargaining power over the life-cycle in a developing country. Fourth,
to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to provide measures of gender-age specific poverty
that take into account unequal resource allocation within the household.
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Important policy implications may be drawn from this analysis. As the population in India and in
other developing countries ages, gender asymmetries among the elderly need to be further investigated
and promptly addressed. Moreover, policies aimed at promoting equality within households, such as
improving women’s rights to inherit property, can have positive spillovers on female health, poverty and
mortality. Finally, intra-household inequalities should be taken into account when measuring poverty
and evaluating the effect of policies to alleviate it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the related literature
and discusses further the contributions of this paper. Section 1.3 presents the reduced-form results and
establishes a positive causal link between women’s intra-household bargaining power and their health.
Section 1.4 discusses the household model, the identification of resource shares and the structural esti-
mation results. Section 1.5 outlines the age profiles of female bargaining power and poverty and relates
them to the phenomenon of excess female mortality at post-reproductive ages. Section 1.6 presents the
counterfactual policy analysis. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to several strands of literature: the previous research on the missing women phe-
nomenon, the existing studies on poverty among the elderly in South Asia, the work on inheritance
rights and the Hindu Succession Act amendments in particular, and the literature on intra-household
allocation and bargaining power.
Since it was first addressed by Amartya Sen in 1990, the phenomenon of missing women has been
widely studied. It refers to the fact that in parts of the developing world, especially in India and China,
the ratio of women to men is particularly skewed. Coale (1991) estimates a total of 60 million missing
females in the world at the beginning of the nineties, with India accounting for more than one third
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of them. In 2010, 126 million women were missing from the global population, with China and India
accounting for 85% of this bias in sex ratios (Bongaarts and Guilmoto (2015)). The literature has
traditionally related this fact to son preference and several works have provided empirical evidence
of sex-selective abortion, female infanticide and excess female mortality in childhood (see DasGupta
(2005) for an overview of this literature). Jha et al. (2006) find strong evidence of selective abortion of
female fetuses in India. Moreover, the introduction of ultra-sound technologies at the end of the 1980s
has been found to be associated with even more skewed sex-ratios and preferential prenatal treatment
for boys (Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010); Bharadwaj and Lakdawala (2013)).8 Finally, Oster (2009) and
Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011) show that gender differences in child mortality are associated with
differential health investment between genders.9
A notable exception to this literature is the recent work by Anderson and Ray (2010; 2012; 2015),
who indicate that close to half of missing women in India die at older ages. The plight of widows
in the Indian subcontinent has been previously investigated by Jean Drèze and coauthors in a series
of papers (Drèze et al. (1990); Chen and Drèze (1995); Drèze and Srinivasan (1997)). Moreover,
previous work on the conditions of the elderly in South Asia suggests that women’s bargaining power and
access to household resources may indeed be key to explain the phenomenon of missing women at post-
reproductive ages. Kochar (1999), for example, finds that medical expenditure on the elderly in rural
Pakistan is negatively affected by their declining economic contribution to the household. Moreover,
Roy and Chaudhuri (2008) show that older Indian women report worse self-rated health status, higher
prevalence of disabilities, and lower healthcare utilization than men. While the health disadvantage and
8While access to ultra-sound has reduced gender gaps in post-neonatal child mortality, Anukriti et al. (2015) demonstrate that this
decline is not large enough to compensate for the increase in the male-female sex ratio at birth due to sex-selective abortions.
9Discrimination against girls in India has also being investigated by directly looking at how household consumption patterns
varies with the gender composition of children. Most of these works use the so called Engel curve approach - not to be
confused with the structural approach of identification of resource shares based on Engel curves estimation that I implement
in this paper -, which consists on regressing budget shares of a set of goods on log per-capita expenditure, log household size,
the shares of various age-sex groups and other relevant household characteristics. Among others, Subramanian and Deaton
(1990) find evidence of gender discrimination in rural Maharashtra for 10-14 year olds, Lancaster et al. (2008) find empirical
evidence of gender bias in rural Bihar and Maharashtra for the 10-16 age group, while Zimmermann (2012) finds that gender
discrimination in education expenditures between boys and girls increases with age.
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lower utilization among women cannot be explained by demographics, they find that gender differentials
disappear when controlling for economic independence.
Women’s bargaining power and its changes are difficult to measure and often unobservable. Legal
reforms aimed at improving women’s property rights, inheritance rights in particular, have been widely
used in the literature to assess the relationship between bargaining power and women’s outcomes. Mine
is the first paper that focuses on health outcomes, measures of undernourishment and anaemia in par-
ticular, and on access to household resources. Deininger et al. (2013) find evidence of an increase of
women’s likelihood of inheriting land following the introduction of Hindu Succession Act (HSA) amend-
ments that equalized women’s inheritance rights to men’s in several Indian states. Moreover, Roy (2008)
shows that women’s exposure to the HSA reforms improves their bargaining power and autonomy within
their marital families and Roy (2013), Deininger et al. (2013), and Bose and Das (2015) indicate that it
increases female education.10 Heath and Tan (2014) show that the HSA amendments increase women’s
labor supply, especially into high-paying jobs.11 Finally, Jain (2014) shows that HSA reforms mitigate
son preference, and might be effective in reducing mortality differences between boys and girls in rural
India.12
A remarkably diverse literature has focused on intra-household resource allocation and bargaining
power. On one hand, several papers have tested empirically whether households behave in accordance
with the unitary model, which assumes that the household acts as a single decision unit maximizing a
common utility function.13 On the other hand, a number of papers have focused on developing tech-
10Unintended negative consequences of these reforms have been studied as well. Rosenblum (2015), for example, shows that the
HSA amendments increase female child mortality, which is consistent with parents wanting to maximize their bequest per son.
Anderson and Genicot (2015) show that HSA reforms are associated with a decrease in the difference between female and
male suicide rates, but with an increase in both male and female suicides.
11While analyzing possible underlying mechanisms, they also find some preliminary evidence of health improvements following
the implementation of HSA amendments.
12Legal reforms in other countries have been studied as well. La Ferrara and Milazzo (2014), for example, exploit an amendment
to Ghana’s Intestate Succession Law and compare differential responses of matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups, finding
that parents substitute land inheritance with children’s education. Harari (2014) analyzes a law reform meant to equalize
inheritance rights for Kenyan women and shows that women exposed to the reform are more educated, less likely to undergo
genital mutilation, and have higher age at marriage and at first child.
13Most of this empirical literature focus on testing the income pooling hypothesis, i.e., that only household income matters for choice
outcomes and not the source of the income. See e.g., Attanasio and Lechene (2002), who examine the effect of large cash
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niques by which household level consumption data may be used to recover information about individual
household members. Building on Chiappori (1988a, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988), the vast majority
of these studies concentrate on the estimation of collective household models, in which the household is
characterized as a collection of individuals, each of whom has a well defined objective function, and who
interact to generate Pareto efficient allocations, while the exact intra-household bargaining protocol is
left unspecified. Identification of individuals’ resource shares (or sharing rule), defined as each member’s
share of total household consumption, is particularly appealing, as it provides a measure of individuals’
intra-household bargaining power. Although a series of papers focus on the identification of changes in
resource shares as functions of factors affecting bargaining power (Browning et al. (1994), Browning
and Chiappori (1998), Vermeulen (2002)), a more recent strand of the literature deals with the identifi-
cation of the level of resource shares, which is my main object of interest (Lewbel and Pendakur (2008),
Browning et al. (2013), Dunbar et al. (2013)). Dunbar et al. (2013), for example, identify individuals’
resource shares using Engel curves of assignable clothing and find that Malawian children have higher
rates of poverty than their parents, despite commanding a quite large share of household resources.
With few exceptions, limited work has used this type of approach to investigate intra-household alloca-
tion at older ages.14 To my knowledge, no previous work has investigated the age profile of women’s
intra-household bargaining power and its implications for poverty in a developing country.
1.3 Bargaining Power and Health: A Reduced-Form Analysis
While plausible, that an increase in the bargaining power of women inside the household positively
affects their health outcomes is not an obvious fact. Women, for example, may divert resources to
transfers in rural Mexico (PROGRESA/Oportunidades conditional cash transfers), and Duflo (2003), who analyzes a reform in
the South Africa social pension program for the elderly. They both find empirical evidence against the unitary model.
14To analyze how intra-household allocation is affected by retirement and health status of elderly in the US, Bütikofer et al.
(2010) estimate a collective model with data on married couples and widows/widowers between ages 50 and 80. Cherchye
et al. (2012b) analyze consumption pattern of Dutch elderly households between 1978 and 2004 and find that traditional
poverty rates seem to underestimate poverty among widows.
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children when their position improves, so that no effect could be detected on their own health.
A woman’s right to inherit land and other property is often claimed to be a significant determinant of
women’s economic security and position within the household (World Bank (2014)). I investigate the
existence of a causal positive effect of intra-household bargaining power on women’s health by exploiting
legal reforms equalizing women’s inheritance rights to men’s. I compare health outcomes of women who
were exposed to these reforms to those of women who were not. Research in the medical field indicates
that low body mass index (BMI), especially BMI below the underweight cutoff of 18.5, and anaemia
are associated with an increased risk of mortality.15 Evidence of improvements in these health outcomes
following an increase in women’s bargaining power would provide empirical validation to my hypothesis
that intra-household resource allocation can explain excess female mortality.
Inheritance rights in India differ by religion and, for most of the population, are governed by the Hindu
Succession Act (HSA). The HSA was first introduced in 1956 and applied to all states other than Jammu
and Kashmir and only to Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains. It therefore did not apply to individuals of
other religions, such as Muslims, Christians, Parsis, Jews, and other minority communities.16 It aimed
at unifying the traditional Mitakhshara and Dayabhaga systems, which were completely biased in favor
of sons (Agarwal (1995)), and established a law of succession whereby sons and daughters would enjoy
(almost) equal inheritance rights, as would brothers and sisters. Gender inequalities, however, persisted
even after the introduction of the HSA. On one hand, in case of a Hindu male dying intestate, i.e.,
without leaving a will, all his separate or self-acquired property, devolved equally upon sons, daughters,
widow, and mother. On the other hand, the deceased’s daughters had no direct inheritance rights to
joint family property, whereas sons were given direct right by birth to belong to the coparcenary.17
15See e.g Visscher et al. (2000), Thorogood et al. (2003), and Zheng et al. (2011).
16While most laws for Christians formally grant equal rights from 1986, gender equality is not the practice, as the Synod of
Christian Churches has being arranging legal counsel to help draft wills to disinherit female heirs. The inheritance rights of
Muslim women in India are governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937, under which daughters
inherit only a portion of what the sons do (Agarwal (1995)).
17All persons who acquired interest in the joint family property by birth are said to belong to the coparcenary. The Hindu Women’s
Right to Property Act of 1937 enabled the widow to succeed along with the son and to take a share equal to that of the son.
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The Indian constitution states that both federal and state governments have legislative power over
inheritance. In the decades following the introduction of Hindu Succession Act, state governments
enacted amendments equalizing inheritance rights for daughters and sons. Kerala in 1976, Andhra
Pradesh in 1986, Tamil Nadu in 1989, and Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994 passed reforms making
daughters coparceners. These reforms only applied to Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain women, who were
not yet married at the time of the amendment. A national-level ratification of the amendments occurred
in 2005.
To study the link between women’s bargaining position and health, I consider the following baseline
specification:
yirsc = βHSAA Exposedirsc + X
′
irscγ+αr +αc +αs +αrs +αrc +αsc + εirsc (1.1)
where yirsc is the outcome of interest for woman i, of religion r, living in state s and born in year c (BMI
or an indicator variable for being underweight or severely, moderately or mildly anemic). HSAA Exposedirsc
is an indicator variable equal to one if woman i got married after the amendment in state s and is Hindu,
Buddhist, Sikh or Jain. X ′irsc is a vector of individual and household level covariates, including women’s
education, number of children in the household, a household wealth index, and indicator variables for
having worked in the past year, for living in rural areas and for being part of disadvantaged social
groups. The model includes cohort and state fixed effects, a religion dummy equal to 1 if a woman is
Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, and zero otherwise, and religion-cohort, cohort-state, and state-religion
fixed effects.18 β is the parameter of interest and represents the treatment effect of being exposed to
HSA amendments, i.e., to an exogenous variation in women’s intra-household bargaining power. In the
baseline specification, standard errors are clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level. Results
The widow was entitled only to a limited estate in the property of the deceased with a right to claim partition. A daughter,
however, had virtually no inheritance rights.
18The fixed effects are based on 28 states, 35 cohorts and 2 religious categories.
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are robust to clustering the standard errors at the state, cohort-state, and at the cohort-state-religion
level.
I estimate the model via OLS using a sample of married women of age 15 to 49 from the 2005-
2006 National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3). The average body mass index in the estimation sample
lies within the normal range (18.5 to 23). Nonetheless, 26 percent of the women in the sample is
underweight. Moreover, anaemia appears to be an endemic problem, with 50 percent of women in the
sample suffering from mild anaemia, 16 percent from moderate anaemia and 2 percent from severe
anaemia.19 Finally, one out of six women in the sample have been exposed to the HSA amendments.
Table 1.1 presents the estimation results. The first three columns focus on BMI outcomes, over the full
sample (column 1), a sample restricted to women considered underweight or normal weight according
to the WHO cutoffs (column 2), and a sample restricted to women overweight and obese (column 3).
The sample breakdown aims at addressing potential concerns related to the non-monotonicity of the
relationship between BMI and health: while increases in BMI correspond to better health for individuals
below the overweight cutoff, the opposite holds true for individuals above it. Exposure to HSA amend-
ments is associated with an increase in women’s BMI by 0.15 when the entire sample is considered, and
by 0.25 when only underweight and normal weight range individuals are included. As expected, no
significant effect can be detected when only overweight and obese women are included in the analysis.
Column 4 to 7 report the linear probability models estimation results. All specifications indicate that
women exposed to HSA amendments have better health outcomes, as they are 4 percent less likely to be
underweight, about 1 percent less likely to be severely anaemic, 3 percent less likely to be moderately
anaemic, and 3 percent less likely to be mildly anaemic.20
19Section A.3 contains more details on the data and on the use of BMI and anaemia as health measures. Table A.4 presents some
descriptive statistics.
20To address the well known limitations of linear probability models, I estimate a maximum-likelihood probit model. Table A.2
in the Appendix shows the marginal effects of being exposed to HSA amendments on binary health outcomes. The marginal
effects are computed at the average value of the independent variables. As the number of observation is much larger than the
number of fixed effects the incidental parameter problem associated with estimating a probit model with fixed effects may be
limited (Greene et al. (2002), Fernández-Val (2009)). Results are unchanged.
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Table 1.1: HSA Amendments and Women’s Health
Body Mass Index Pr(Anaemia)
All Sample BM I ≤ 23 BM I > 23 Pr(BM I ≤ 18.5) Severe Moderate Mild
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
HSAA Exposed 0.149∗ 0.250∗∗∗ -0.161 -0.0395∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗
(0.0774) (0.0556) (0.132) (0.0101) (0.00315) (0.00897) (0.0109)
N 81,534 57,607 23,927 81,534 77,777 77,777 77,777
Mean Dependent Variable 21.42 19.24 26.69 0.2648 0.0154 0.1559 0.5298
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NFHS-3 data. Married women of age 15 to 49 included in the sample. All specifications include a religion
dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, state and cohort fixed effects, and state-religion, state-cohort, and religion-cohort
fixed effects. Individual controls include women’s years of schooling, number of children under 5 in the household, a household wealth index, and
indicator variables for having worked in the past 12 months, for living in rural areas and for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or
Other Backward Classes. Mild anaemia includes moderate and severe anaemia, and moderate anaemia includes severe anaemia. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level (3,753). Sampling weights applied.
I perform a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the reduced-form results. First, as
exposure to the HSA amendments is determined by each woman’s year of marriage, I address concerns
about the potential endogeneity of treatment by excluding from the analysis women who got married
right around the reforms, by estimating an intent-to-treat effect using a measure of eligibility to HSA
amendments that exploits variation in women’s year of birth, religion and state, and by using an in-
strumental variable approach. I show that the potential endogeneity of the time of marriage is not the
driving force behind my findings. Second, I assess how exposure to HSA amendments by the wife of
the head of household affects expenditure patterns. I show that my results are not driven by changes in
unearned income or wealth as the overall level of expenditure is unaffected. I find, however, that expo-
sure to HSA amendments increases food budget shares, which represents an empirical rejection of the
income pooling hypothesis and, in turn, of the unitary model (Attanasio and Lechene (2010)). Finally, I
perform two falsification tests and confirm the validity of my identification strategy. Section A.3 in the
Appendix contains the full set of results, together with additional details about the empirical strategies.
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1.4 A Structural Analysis of Bargaining Power
Is it possible to measure bargaining power? What are the determinants of intra-household resource
allocation? How does women’s position vary over the life-cycle? I provide answers to these questions in
a structural framework. In the spirit of Dunbar et al. (2013), I model the households in the collective
framework and include children in the analysis. To better capture the Indian family structure, I extend
their model to include households with more than one adult man and one adult woman. In a slight
abuse of terminology, I define nuclear households with only one male of age 15 and above and one
female of age 15 and above, and non-nuclear those with more than one adult male or more than one
adult female.21
1.4.1 A Collective Model of Indian Households
Let households consist of individuals of three different types t: adult males, m, adult females, f , and
children c. F , M and C are the number of adult females, adult males and children, respectively. House-
holds differ according to a set of observable attributes, such as composition, age of household members,
location, and other socio-economic characteristics. Household characteristics may affect both prefer-
ences and bargaining power within the household. Any characteristics affecting bargaining power and
how resources are allocated within the household, but neither preferences nor budget constraints, are
defined as distribution factors (Browning et al. (2014)). For simplicity of notation, I omit household
characteristics and distribution factors while discussing the model and identification.
Each household consumes K types of goods with prices p = (p1, ..., pK). Household total expenditure
y is set equal to household income, so there is no borrowing or lending. h = (h1, ..., hK) is the vector
of observed quantities of goods purchased by each household, while x t = (x1t ..., x
K
t ) is the vector of
21In contrast, a nuclear family is usually defined a family group consisting of a pair of adults and their children, independent of
the age of household members.
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unobserved quantities of goods consumed by an individual of type t = f , m, c. I allow for economies
of scale in consumption through a linear consumption technology, which converts purchased quantities
by the household, h, in private good equivalents, x . This specific technology assumes the existence of a
K × K matrix A such that h= A(F x f +M xm + C xc).22
Each member has a monotonically increasing, continuously twice differentiable and strictly quasi-
concave utility function over a bundle of K goods. Let Ut(x t) be the sub-utility function of individual
of type t over her consumption. I assume Ut(x t) to be the same for all household members of type t,
i.e., common to all adult men, all adult women and all children, respectively. As further discussed in
section 1.4.2, the choice of restricting the utility functions among individuals of the same type to be the
same is data driven. For the same reason, I assume that within a household individuals of the same type
are treated equally.23 Each type t individual’s total utility may depend on the utility of other household
members, but I assume each type’s utility function to be weakly separable over the sub-utility functions
for goods, i.e. U˜t = U˜t[Ut(x t), U−t(x−t)].
Each household maximizes the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, U˜ , featuring the relative
weights of the utility functions of its members:




22Suppose that the two members of a nuclear household with no children ride together a motorcycle and, therefore, share
the consumption of gasoline, half of the time. Then the consumption of gasoline in private good equivalents is 1.5 times the
purchased quantity of gasoline at the household level. Assuming the consumption of gasoline does not depend on consumption
of other goods, the kth row of A would consist of 2/3 in the kth column and zero otherwise, such that hk = 2/3(x f + xm). 2/3
represents the level of publicness of good k within the household. If the two members ride the motorcycle together all the time,
Ak = 1/2. For a private good, which is never jointly consumed, Ak = 1.
23This is an admittedly strong assumption. Distinguishing between individuals of the same type would be possible only if private
assignable goods were observable for each individual within types. To the best of my knowledge, no such data is available
for India. In estimation, however, all the preference parameters and the resource shares are allowed to vary with a set of
household characteristics, including composition. Thus, everything else equal, women’s resource shares in a household where
the wife of the head of household and a daughter in law coexist would be different from the resource shares in a household
with a wife of the head of household and an unmarried daughter above 15.
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where µt(p/y) are the Pareto weights. The household program is as follows:
max
x f ,xm,xc ,h
U˜(U f , Um, Uc , p/y) such that h= A(F x f +M xm + C xc)
y = h′p (1.3)
The solutions to this program provide the bundles of private good equivalents, x t . Pricing those at the
shadow prices A′p gives the resource share λt = ΛtT , that is the fraction of household total resources that
are devoted to each individual of type t.
Pareto weights are traditionally interpreted as measures of intra-household bargaining power: the
larger is the value of µt , the greater is the weight that type t members’ preferences receive in the
household program. Browning et al. (2013) show that there exists a monotonic correspondence between
Pareto weights and resource shares. Moreover, they argue that the latter is a more tractable measure of
bargaining power, as it is invariant to unobservable cardinalizations of the utility functions.
Following the standard characterization of collective models, I assume the intra-household allocation
to be Pareto efficient.24 Thus, the household program can be decomposed in two steps: the optimal
allocation of resources across members and the individual maximization of their own utility function.
Conditional on knowing λt , each household member chooses x t as the bundle maximizing Ut subject to a
Lindahl type shadow budget constraint
∑
k Ak p
k x kt = λt y .
25 By substituting the indirect utility functions
Vt(A′p,λt y) in equation (1.3), the household program simplifies to the choice of optimal resource shares
subject to the constraint that total resources shares must sum to one.
I define a private good to be a good that does not have any economies of scale in consumption - e.g.,
24See e.g., Chiappori (1988a, 1992), Browning et al. (1994), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Vermeulen (2002), Lewbel and
Pendakur (2008), Browning et al. (2013), and Dunbar et al. (2013). While some papers provide evidence in favor of the
collective model (e.g., Attanasio and Lechene (2014)), some others works have cast doubt on the assumption that households
behave efficiently (e.g., Udry (1996)). In Appendix A.6, I use auxiliary data on singles to show that the assumption of Pareto
efficiency cannot be rejected in this context.
25This result follows directly from the second welfare theorem in an economy with public goods. See Browning et al. (2013) and
Browning et al. (2014) for more details.
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food - and a private assignable good to be a private good consumed exclusively by household members of
known type t - e.g., women, men or children clothing. The household demand functions for the private
assignable goods, Wt , are given by:
Wt(y, p) = Tλt wt(A
′p,λt y) = Λt wt(A′p,λt y) (1.4)
where t = f , m, c, T = F, M , C , and wt is the demand function of each type t household member when
facing her personal shadow budget constraint.
Women’s total resource share, Λ f = Fλ f , is my main object of interest, as it represents the share
of total household expenditure consumed by women and provides a measure of the overall bargaining
power of adult females.
1.4.2 Identification of Resource Shares
I identify type t individuals’ resource shares using Engel curves of assignable clothing and the method-
ology developed in Dunbar et al. (2013). An Engel curve describes the relationship between the pro-
portion of household expenditure spent on a good (budget share) and total expenditure, holding prices
constant. Dunbar et al. (2013) demonstrate that resource shares are identified under observability of
private assignable goods, semi-parametric restrictions imposing similarity of preferences over the private
assignable goods, and the assumptions that resource shares are independent of expenditure (at least at
low levels of y).26 As I observe type-specific assignable goods, I am only able to retrieve type-specific
resource shares.
For simplicity, I assume that each household member has Muellbauer’s Piglog preferences over assignable
26Menon et al. (2012) show that for Italian households resource shares do not exhibit much dependence on household expen-
diture, therefore supporting identification of resource shares based on this particular assumption. Moreover, Cherchye et al.
(2012a) use detailed data on Dutch households to show that revealed preferences bounds on women’s resource shares are
independent of total household expenditure. Finally, this restriction still permits resource shares to depend on other vari-
ables related to expenditure, such as measures of wealth (in this case land ownership and presence of a salary earner in the
household).
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clothing at all levels of expenditure.27 Under this assumption, the Engel curves for these goods are lin-
ear in the logarithm of household expenditure. In a slight abuse of notation, the demand functions for
assignable clothing can be written in Engel curve form. In each household with children they are as
follows: 













where Wt(y) is the budget share spent on type t ’s assignable clothing and y is the total household
expenditure. αt and βt are combinations of underlying preference parameters, while Λt is the share of
overall resources devoted to type t members (t = f , m, c). In the case of households without children,
the system contains only two Engel curves, one for adult women’s assignable clothing and one for adult
men’s assignable clothing.
Identification of resource shares is obtained by imposing similarities of preferences on private assignable
goods across household members and across households. These restrictions allow to identify individual
resource shares by comparing household demands for private assignable goods across people within
households and across households. In particular, provided that β f = βm = βc = β , the slopes of the
Engel curves in equation (1.5) can be identified by a linear regression of the household budget shares
Wt on a constant term and ln y . βΛt is the slope of type t ’s private assignable good Engel curve. The
slopes are proportional to the unknown resource shares, with the factor of proportionality set by the
constraint that the resource shares must sum to one (Λ f +Λm +Λc = 1).
It is important to note that budget shares on assignable clothing and resource shares are different
objects. Moreover, the relative magnitude of assignable clothing budget shares does not necessarily
determine the relative magnitude of resource shares. In particular, that Wf > Wm > Wc does not imply
27Dunbar et al. (2013) discuss identification of type t individuals’ resource shares using Engel curves in a more general framework.
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Wf >Wm, Λm > Λ f
Figure 1.2: Assignable Clothing Engel Curves: An Illustrative Example
that Λ f > Λm > Λc , and vice-versa. The following example may help clarifying this point.
An Illustrative Example. Consider the simple case of a nuclear household with no children
(F = M = 1 and C = 0), with total household expenditure equal to 5,000 Rupees and observable budget
shares for female and male clothing equal to 1.7 and 1.4, respectively. Let the Engel curves for assignable
clothing be as in figure 1.2. The relationship between assignable clothing budget shares (Wf and Wm, on
the vertical axis) and the logarithm of the total expenditure devoted to each type t household member
(Λt y , on the horizontal axis) is linear under the functional form assumptions discussed above.28 By
inverting these Engel curves, I can identify two points on the horizontal axis, equal to ln(500) (≈ 6.21)
and ln(4, 500) (≈ 8.41). These, together with the constraint that the resource shares must sum to
one, make it possible to compute individuals’ resources shares at any level of y . At a total household
expenditure of 5,000 Rupees, Λ f = 0.1 and Λm = 0.9.
28The Engel curves displayed in figure 1.2 feature the average intercepts and slopes obtained by estimating the model using data
on households without children under 15. In estimation, intercepts and slopes of the private assignable goods Engel curves
are allowed to vary with several observable household characteristics (see section 1.4.4). Table A.3 in the Appendix reports
descriptive statistics of the predicted Engel curve slopes. While the estimated slopes are, on average, negative, the maximum
estimated slopes are positive.
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The graph depicts a situation where Wm < Wf and Λ f < Λm. In this specific numerical example,
resources are split extremely unequally between the two household members, with the woman getting
only 10 percent of the total household expenditure, whereas the budget share spent on female assignable
clothing Wf is about 20 percent larger than the share spent on male clothing Wm.
1.4.3 Data
The 2011-2012 National Sample Survey (NSS) of Consumer Expenditure (68th round) contains detailed
data on expenditure of about 102,000 households, together with information about household char-
acteristics and demographic and other particulars of household members (about 463,000 individuals).
Unfortunately, it does not include any health outcome, which prevents the direct investigation of the
relationship between individuals’ resource shares and their health.
Households are asked to report how much they spent on food, clothing, bedding, and footwear, during
the month prior to the survey. The detailed breakdown of clothing expenditure allows me to identify
expenditure on clothing items that are assignable to specific types of household members, i.e., adult
women, adult men and children. I define expenditure on women assignable clothing as the sum of ex-
penditures on saree, shawls, chaddar, and kurta-pajamas suits for females. For men assignable clothing,
I combine expenditure on dhoti, lungi, kurta-pajamas suits for males, pajamas, and salwar. For children,
I use expenditure on school uniforms and infant clothing.
The survey also provides information about women’s year of birth (but not year of marriage), state of
residence, and religion. I construct a variable capturing women’s eligibility to the Hindu Succession Act
(HSA) amendments as the interaction between an indicator variable for being Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or
Jain, and an indicator variable equal to one if a woman was 14 or younger at the time of the amendment
in her state and to zero if she was 23 or older.29 For simplicity, I focus on the eligibility of the wife of the
29I use 14 and 23 as they are the 10th and 90th percentiles of women’s age at marriage in the NHFS-3 sample discussed in section
1.3. This variable is therefore fully determined by each woman’s religion, year of birth and state. See Heath and Tan (2014).
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Table 1.2: NSS Consumer Expenditure Survey - Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev.
Expenditure (Rupees):
Total Expenditure 87,450 8,105 6,775 5,034
Expenditure On Non-Durable Goods 87,450 7,692 6,539 4,575
Expenditure On Durable Goods 87,450 413 107 1,148
Budget Shares:
Food 87,450 37.83 37.89 9.84
Female Assignable Clothing 87,376 1.31 1.12 1.11
Male Assignable Clothing 87,376 1.61 1.34 1.37
Children Assignable Clothing 87,376 0.50 0 0.76
Household Characteristics:
I(HSAA Eligible) 74,228 0.12 0 0.33
No. Adult Females 87,450 1.68 1 0.85
No. Adult Males 87,450 1.76 1 0.92
I(Children Under 15) 87,450 0.65 1 0.48
No. Children Under 15 87,450 1.32 1 1.26
Fraction Of Female Children 57,202 0.45 0.5 0.39
I(Daughter in Law) 87,450 0.20 0 0.40
I(Unmarried Daughter) 87,450 0.23 0 0.42
I(Widow) 87,450 0.15 0 0.35
Avg. Age Men 15 to 79 87,166 37.78 36 10.52
Avg. Age Women 15 to 79 87,340 36.96 35 10.15
Avg. Age Gap 15 to 79 (Men - Women) 87,082 0.89 3 11.15
Avg. Age Children 0 to 14 57,202 7.57 8 3.97
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain) 87,450 0.79 1 0.41
I(Sch. Caste, Sch. Tribe or Other Backward Classes) 87,450 0.69 1 0.46
I(Salary Earner) 87,450 0.30 0 0.46
I(Land Ownership) 87,450 0.89 1 0.31
I(Female Higher Education) 87,450 0.12 0 0.32
I(Male Higher Education) 87,450 0.19 0 0.39
I(Rural) 87,450 0.61 1 0.49
I(North India) 87,450 0.31 0 0.46
I(East) 87,450 0.20 0 0.40
I(North-East) 87,450 0.14 0 0.35
I(South) 87,450 0.22 0 0.41
I(West) 87,450 0.12 0 0.33
Budget shares are multiplied by 100. Budget share on food includes expenditures on cereals, cereals sub-
stitutes, pulses and products, milk and products, egg, fish and meat, vegetables, fruits, and processed food.
Tea, coffee, mineral water, cold beverages, fruit juices and shake and other beverages, salt and sugar, edible
oil and spices are not included. Women’s assignable clothing includes expenditures on saree, shawls, chad-
dar, and kurta-pajamas suits for females; men’s assignable clothing includes expenditures on dhoti, lungi,
kurta-pajamas suits for males, pajamas, salwar, and cloth for coats, trousers, and suit and for shirt, pajama,
kurta, and salwar; children’s assignable clothing includes expenditures on expenditure on school uniforms
and infant clothing. I(Higher Education Women) and I(Higher Education Men) are indicator variable for
higher education (diploma or college) completed by at least one woman or man in the household. North
India includes Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Chandigarh, Uttaranchal, Haryana, Delhi, Ra-
jasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. East India includes West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa,
A & N Islands, and Chattisgarh. North-East India includes Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. South India includes Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh,
Kerala, Lakshadweep, and Pondicherry. West India includes Gujarat, Goa, Maharashtra, Daman & Diu, and
D & N Haveli.
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head of household and any effect should be interpreted as an intent-to-treat effect.
From these data, I select a sample of 87,450 households as follows. I exclude households with no
women or no men above 15 years of age (1.4 percent of the full sample), households in the top 1 percent
of expenditure to eliminate outliers, households with a female head (3 percent) and households with
head or head of household wife under 15 (0.2 percent). Moreover, for simplicity I exclude households
with more than 5 women, more than 5 men, or more than 5 children under 15 (10 percent). Finally,
as unusual purchases of clothing items and non-standard expenditure patterns may occur for festivities
and ceremonies, I exclude households reporting to have performed any ceremony during the past month
(1.7 percent). For most of the items, e.g., food, the data refer to expenditure occurred during the month
prior to the survey. For a few items, e.g., clothing, the survey contains information about expenditure
occurred over the year prior to the survey. I convert annual into monthly figures for ease of comparison.
Unless otherwise specified, budget shares are computed as percentage of total household expenditure,
including durables.
Table 1.2 contains some descriptive statistics. On average, household total expenditure is equal to
8,105 Rupees (approximately 125US$). Food represents more than one third of the total expenditure,
while assignable clothing budget shares are much smaller. 12 percent of households are eligible to
the HSA amendments (HSAA), according to the definition of eligibility discussed above. The average
number of adult females and males is 1.68 and 1.76 respectively. Daughters in law are present in 1 out
of 5 households; unmarried daughters above 15 and widows are present in 23 percent and 15 percent
of households, respectively. Nuclear households represent only 35 percent of the sample; about 1 out of
3 households has no children under age 15. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics for
the subsamples of households with and without children under 15.
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1.4.4 Estimation Strategy
I implement the model empirically by adding an error term to each equation in system (1.5) and by
imposing similarity of preferences over private assignable goods, β = β f = βm = βc . Although not
required for the identification of the resource shares, I augment the system of Engel curves of private
assignable goods with the inclusion of the household level Engel curve for food. The inclusion of this
extra equation has a double motivation. On one hand, as the error terms are likely correlated between
the equations, it may improve efficiency. On the other hand, it makes it possible to test whether the
food Engel curve is downward sloping in this context.30 Since the error terms may be correlated across
equations, I estimate the system using non-linear Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method. Non-
linear SUR is iterated until the estimated parameters and the covariance matrix settle. Iterated SUR is
equivalent to maximum likelihood with multivariate normal errors.
I take the following system of equations to the data:

Wf ood = α˜ f ood + β˜ f ood ln y + ε f ood




+ βΛ f ln y + ε f




+ βΛm ln y + εm




+ βΛc ln y + εc
(1.6)
where Λc = 1− Λ f − Λm. y is the total household expenditure (in Rupees) reported for the month
prior to the survey, and Wt and Wf ood are the budget shares spent on assignable clothing and food,
respectively. For households without children under 15, the system includes only the first three equations
and Λm = 1−Λ f .
I account for observable heterogeneity across households by specifying αt (t = f , m, c) and β as
30This prediction is known as the Engel’s law. Although the underlying preference parameters for food cannot be separately
identified, both the intercept and the slope of the additional equation in the system can.
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linear functions of observable household characteristics (preference factors, X ). Moreover, Λt , α˜ f ood and
β˜ f ood depend linearly on X and one distribution factor, d.
31 This characterization renders the system of
Engel curves non-linear. The vector X = (X1, ..., Xn) includes, among other variables, details about the
composition of the household, socio-economic characteristics, such as demographic group, religion and
land ownership, and polynomials in women’s age and in the age gap between genders. It also contains
region fixed effects (South, East, West, North-East, North, with West being the excluded category) and
a dummy variable for living in rural areas, which may capture unobserved geographical heterogeneity
and area specific characteristics, such as price levels.32 Although distribution factors are not required for
identification, I include eligibility of the wife of the head of the household to the HSA amendments as a
factor affecting resource allocation but not preferences.33
I estimate models for households with and without children below 15, jointly and separately. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the first sampling unit (2001 Census villages in rural areas and 2007-
2012 Urban Frame Survey blocks in urban areas). Results are robust to clustering standard errors at the
district level.
1.4.5 Estimation Results
Table 1.3 reports the estimated coefficients of the covariates (X1, ...Xn, d). I refer to these variables as
the potential determinants of women’s resource share, as they are related to bargaining power, but not
31Since resource shares cannot be disentangled from preference parameters in the food equation, intercept and slope are allowed
to depend on d as well. For each type t = f , m, c and T = F, M , C , total resource shares are specified as Λt = lt,0 + lt,1X1 +
...+ lt,nXn+ l˜ d, where n= 22 for households without children, and n= 25 for households with children. The same holds true
for α˜ f ood and β˜ f ood . αt , t = f , m, c and β are specified as linear functions of X where again n = 22 for households without
children, and n= 25 for households with children.
32The choice of including the region instead of state fixed effects is due to computational tractability.
33Legal reforms have been used in the literature as distribution factors. Chiappori et al. (2002), for example, use US divorce
laws as distribution factors to study intra-household bargaining and labor supply, while Voena (2015) examines how divorce
laws affect couples’ intertemporal choices in a dynamic model of household decision-making. Despite being permitted by the
Indian legislation, there is a strong social stigma of divorce in India, which renders it an inadequate distribution factor. As HSA
amendments reforms only applied to women who got married after the implementation, it is sensible to assume that they do
not determine shifts in bargaining power over time and that their effects can be analyzed using a static framework.
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necessarily in a causal sense.34 Column 1 reports the estimation results obtained when all households
are considered in estimation. In columns 2 and 3, I present the results obtained by estimating separate
models for households with and without children under 15.
As expected, households composition matters. Women’s resource shares increase with the number of
women in the household, and decrease with the number of men. Everything else equal, the presence of
an additional woman increases women’s resource shares by 3.9 percentage points in the overall sample,
by 3.3 percentage points in households with children and by 6.2 percentage points in households without
children. While the number of children per se does not seem to play a significant role, the fraction
of female children is positively related to Λ f : if all children are girls, women’s resource shares are
1.3 percentage points larger. This result is in line with the findings in Dunbar et al. (2013) and can
be attributed to the fact that adult women may be willing (or required) to forgo a higher fraction of
household resources in presence of male children, due to son preference. Moreover, the presence of a
widow in the household is associated with a smaller resource share for women, especially in households
without children, which confirms the previous work on the plight of widows in South Asia.35 Finally,
the higher is women’s age the lower is the fraction of household’s total expenditure devoted to women,
everything else equal.36 This finding is particularly relevant in households without children, which
suggest that women’s bargaining position inside the household may be tightly related to child rearing.
Household socio-economic characteristics also play an important role. In particular, being part of
Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, and other disadvantaged social classes is associated with higher
women’s bargaining power. The same holds true for residing in the North-East states, which is consis-
tent with the presence of a number of matrilineal societies and cultures (Khasi and Garo societies, for
example). In contrast, North Indian women seem to have a much lower bargaining power. Households
34The estimated coefficients of the covariates for men’s and children’s resource shares and for the preference parameters α˜ f ood ,
αt , t = f , m, c, β˜ f ood , and β are available upon request.
35See e.g., Drèze et al. (1990), Chen and Drèze (1995), Drèze and Srinivasan (1997), and the recent work by Anderson and Ray
(2015) on missing unmarried women.
36Women’s age, children’s age and age differences are divided by 100 for ease of computation.
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with more educated women and men devote a larger fraction of their resources to women, while the
presence of a salary earner (male, in most cases) is associated with lower women’s bargaining power.37
The estimated model confirms the importance of the Hindu Succession Act amendments (HSAA) in
shaping women’s bargaining position within the household. In households where the wife of the head
of household is eligible to these reforms, women’s resource shares are higher by 1.2 to 2.3 percentage
points, depending on the model considered for estimation. These results align with the findings in
Roy (2008) and Heath and Tan (2014) on the effects of HSA amendments on women’s autonomy and
bargaining power. Heath and Tan (2014) find that exposure to HSA amendments is associated with a
decrease of 6.6 percentage points in the probability that a woman has no say in household decisions,
an increase of 8.2 percentage points in the probability that a woman can go to the market alone, a
6.9 percentage point increase in the probability that a woman can go to a health facility alone, and
a 8.3 percentage point increase in the probability that a woman can travel outside the village alone.
As their results rely on self-reported measures of independence and decision-making power within the
household, a direct comparison of the magnitudes is not straightforward.
I test the hypothesis of equality of coefficients between the models in columns 2 and 3 and find the
likelihood ratio test statistics to be larger than the χ2 critical value. As the null hypothesis is rejected, in
the rest of the paper I focus on the results obtained estimating the two models separately.
I perform a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the structural estimates. All results
are included in section A.5 of the Appendix. While the findings discussed in this section are obtained
using total expenditure (on durable and non-durable goods), I show that they are confirmed when
estimating the system of Engel curves in terms of expenditure on non-durable goods only (table A.11).
Moreover, I estimate the system in (1.6) without the Engel curve for food, which follows more closely the
37While male labor force participation is almost universal, only one woman out of three in India does any non-domestic work and
an even smaller fraction is formally employed and work for salary (Fulford (2014) and Heath and Tan (2014)).
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Table 1.3: Determinants of Women’s Resource Shares
Adult Women’s Resource Share
All Households With Children Without Children
Sample < 15 Only < 15 Only
(1) (2) (3)
NLSUR NLSUR NLSUR
No. Adult Women 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0617∗∗∗
(0.00579) (0.00469) (0.00956)
No. Adult Men -0.0248∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0331∗∗∗
(0.00414) (0.00359) (0.00652)
No. Children -0.00209 0.00368
(0.00314) (0.00240)
Fraction of Female Children 0.0134∗ 0.0131∗∗
(0.00787) (0.00540)
I(Daughter in Law) 0.0125 0.00976 0.0218
(0.00886) (0.00704) (0.0175)
I(Unmarried Daughter above 15) -0.0000940 0.00971 -0.00647
(0.00911) (0.00794) (0.0164)
I(Widow) -0.00339 -0.0363∗∗∗ -0.0235
(0.0110) (0.00966) (0.0178)
I(HSAA Eligible) 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗ 0.0225∗∗
(0.00437) (0.00507) (0.00978)
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain) -0.0136 -0.0184∗∗ -0.0113
(0.0116) (0.00812) (0.0151)
I(SC, ST, Other Backward Caste) 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0681∗∗∗ 0.0590∗∗∗
(0.00885) (0.00844) (0.0125)
I(Salary Earner) -0.0195∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0170∗
(0.00664) (0.00492) (0.00972)
I(Land Ownership) -0.00719 0.00953 -0.0191
(0.0127) (0.00918) (0.0182)
I(Female Higher Education) 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗
(0.0123) (0.00884) (0.0155)
I(Male Higher Education) 0.0153∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0800∗∗∗
(0.00774) (0.00656) (0.0121)
I(Rural) -0.0389∗∗∗ -0.0314∗∗∗ -0.0398∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.00685) (0.0115)
Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79) 0.0140 -0.127∗∗∗ 0.00839
(0.0456) (0.0475) (0.0807)
Avg. Age Women 15 to 79 -0.376 -0.882 -2.064∗
(0.760) (0.758) (1.151)
(Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79))2 -0.165 0.110 -0.453∗∗
(0.145) (0.134) (0.193)
(Avg. Age Women 15 to 79)2 0.455 2.409 4.037
(1.778) (1.894) (2.722)
(Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79))3 0.00222 0.550 -0.772
(0.423) (0.689) (0.789)
(Avg. Age Women 15 to 79)3 0.106 -2.138 -2.501
(1.338) (1.534) (2.069)
Avg. Age Children 0 to 14 0.0331 -0.0133
(0.0698) (0.0678)
I(North) -0.0691∗∗∗ -0.0977∗∗∗ -0.0778∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0232)
I(East) -0.0116 -0.0241 -0.0168
(0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0252)
I(North-East) -0.00613 0.0581∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0248) (0.0297)
I(South) -0.0237 -0.0304∗ -0.0520∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0181) (0.0244)
Constant 0.368∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.101) (0.161)
N 73,642 47,159 26,546
LL -617,866.9 -376,832.2 -183,904.7
No. Parameters 318 318 188
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NSS 68th Round Consumer Expenditure data. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the first sampling unit level. Women’s age and age differences are divided by 100 to ease
computation. West India is the excluded region.
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analysis in Dunbar et al. (2013), and show that my results hold (table A.12). In addition, I demonstrate
that similar conclusions are obtained when estimating the model using data for households with one
individuals for each type (t = f , m, c) only (columns 1 to 3 of table A.13), and when estimating a model
for married couples with children, where dummies for the number of children are included as shifters
of resource shares and preference parameters (column 4 of table A.13).38 Finally, to check the validity
of the theoretical framework, I use auxiliary data on singles to empirically test the assumption of Pareto
efficiency (see section A.6 in the Appendix).
1.5 Why Are Older Women Missing?
That health and mortality risk are related is indisputable. Section 1.3 demonstrates that changes in
intra-household bargaining power affect women’s health, therefore validating my hypothesis that a weak
bargaining position can explain excess female mortality. In this section, I argue that older women are
missing in India because their bargaining power diminishes at post-reproductive ages. First, I use the
parameter estimates discussed in the previous section to predict resource shares and to trace out the age
profile of women’s bargaining power and access to household resources. Next, using these predictions,
I compute poverty rates that account for intra-household inequalities and outline the age distribution
of female poverty. Finally, I relate my findings to the age distribution of missing women estimated by
Anderson and Ray (2010) and determine what proportion of these missing women is attributable to
intra-household gender inequality and to the consequent gender asymmetry in poverty.
38This specification mirrors that estimated in Dunbar et al. (2013) using data from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey
(IHS2). They look at married couples with up to four children.
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1.5.1 Intra-household Allocation, Gender and Age
Using the estimates in table 1.3, and the analogous estimates for men and children, I predict women’s,
men’s and children’s resource shares for each household.39 Panel A and B of table 1.4 contain descriptive
statistics for the predicted resource shares obtained estimating the two models, without and with chil-
dren under 15, respectively. In column 1 and 2, I report the prediction and the corresponding standard
error for the reference household in each sample (nuclear households for which all other independent
variables are equal to their median values).40 Column 3 to 5 show the mean, the standard deviation, and
the median of the predicted values. These take into account the empirical distributions of the covariates
(X1, ..., Xn, d). All predicted resource shares fall within the 0 to 1 interval.
In both specifications, the resource share for women is lower than that for men: Λˆ f is slightly more
than half of Λˆm in reference households without children, and slightly more than two thirds of Λˆm
in reference households with children. Moreover, the distribution of households characteristics in the
sample matters. While the mean predicted shares confirm the presence of gender inequality within
households, some differences emerge. In households with children, women’ resource shares are on
average 67 percent of men’s. However, asymmetries are on average less extreme in household without
children under 15 with women’s resource shares being on average 80 percent of men’s.
In figure A.2 in the Appendix, households are sorted left to right by total expenditure and the estimated
women’s resource shares are plotted against y . Both in households with and without children, shares
look uncorrelated to expenditure. This finding lends empirical support to the assumption that resource
shares do not vary with the logarithm of total expenditure, which is required for identification.
39For each type t = f , m and T = F, M , total resource shares are computed as Λˆt = lˆt,0 + lˆt,1X1 + ...+ lˆt,nXn +
ˆ˜ld, where n = 22
for households without children, and n = 25 for households with children. Λˆm = 1− Λˆ f in households without children, and
Λˆc = 1− Λˆ f − Λˆm in households with children. In the same vein, the structural estimates allow me to predict βˆ , αˆ f ood , βˆ f ood ,
αˆt , t = f , m, c and therefore to investigate the shape of the Engel curves. Table A.3 in the Appendix contains some descriptive
statistics of the predicted Engel curve slopes. The average assignable clothing Engel curve slope is negative for all member
types - women, men, and children, while the maximum prediction is positive. For food, the model predicts downward sloping
Engel curves with no exceptions.
40See table A.1.
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Table 1.4: Predicted Resource Shares: Descriptive Statistics
Reference Household All households
Estimate Sd. Error Mean Sd. Dev. Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Without Children < 15 Only
Women’s Resource Share Λˆ f 0.3479 0.0218 0.4449 0.1167 0.4250
Men’s Resource Share Λˆm 0.6521 0.0218 0.5551 0.1167 0.5750
Panel B: With Children < 15 Only
Women’s Resource Share Λˆ f 0.2365 0.0164 0.3113 0.0727 0.3113
Men’s Resource Share Λˆm 0.3795 0.0339 0.4698 0.1545 0.5082
Children’s Resource Share Λˆc 0.3839 0.0347 0.2189 0.1061 0.1818
I exploit the cross-sectional variation in women’s age to investigate how female bargaining power
varies with age.41 For each a = 15, ..., 79, I compute Λˆaf as the mean predicted women’s resource share
among all households with women’s average age equal to a. Figure 1.3 shows the average predicted
women’s resource share against women’s age in households without children (panel A) and with children
(panel B). The solid line is a running mean, while the dashed lines display the 95 percent confidence
intervals for the smoothed values.
The reader should note the different vertical axis scales when comparing the two graphs: total re-
sources are divided among three types of individuals in households with children, while they are shared
among two types in households without children. In both cases, women experience a decay in their
resource shares over the life-cycle, but the timing seems to differ between the two groups. The pres-
ence of children smoothes out the decrease in women’s bargaining power, which is consistent with the
traditional view of women’s main purpose of caregiving and child rearing. At post-reproductive ages,
the model predictions indicate that women’s resource shares are as low as 0.36 in households without
41Browning et al. (2013) show that there is a monotonic relationship between standard measures of bargaining power, i.e., the
Pareto weights, and resource shares. In order to interpret changes in resource shares across ages as changes in bargaining
power I assume this relationship to be age invariant. The interpretation in terms of intra-household resource allocation,
however, does not require any additional assumption.
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children and 0.2 in households with children.
I check the robustness of my findings in several ways. First, I trace out the age profile of women’s
bargaining power in reference households, i.e., nuclear households with covariates set at their median
values, and show that it leads to similar conclusions (see figure A.3 in the Appendix). This result is
reassuring, as it shows that my findings are not driven by the correlation between women’s age and
other household characteristics. Second, I repeat my calculations focusing only on nuclear households.
For these households the women’s average age equals the age of the unique woman in the family (see
figure A.4). As my results are confirmed, I argue that the aggregation of adult females within a single
category is not the main driver of my findings. Finally, to confirm that I am indeed capturing changes
in bargaining power across ages, I exploit the variation in women’s eligibility to the Hindu Succession
Act reforms. For ease of interpretation, I focus on nuclear households only. I compare households
where the woman is eligible to the HSA amendments with those where the woman is not. As expected,
women’s resource shares are on average higher for women exposed to the reforms and this difference is
particularly significant at younger ages, where a larger fraction of women in the sample are eligible to
the amendments (see figure A.5).42
I investigate differences between genders by comparing the age profile of women’s and men’s re-
source shares. Figure A.6 in the Appendix displays the mean predicted women’s resource share among
all households with women’s average age equal to a = 15, ..., 79, together with the mean predicted
men’s resource share among all households with men’s average age equal to a = 15, ..., 79. The com-
parison between the profile of women’s and men’s resource shares over the life-cycle indicates that
intra-household allocation is biased towards men at all ages. Moreover, this asymmetry becomes more
prominent at post-reproductive ages. These findings hold when focusing on nuclear households only
(see figure A.7).
42As the amendments were enacted in different states at different times and applied only to women who got married after their
implementation, no woman above 50 is eligible in both samples (nuclear households with and without children).
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(A) Households Without Children, Λˆ f (B) Households With Children, Λˆ f
(C) Resource Share Ratio (Λˆ f /Λˆm)
Note: Mean predicted women’s resource share among households with women’s average age equal to a = 15, ..., 79 in panels A
and B. Mean predicted resource share ratio among households with women’s average age equal to a = 15, ..., 79 in panel C. The
solid line is a running mean. The dashed lines are the 95 percent pointwise confidence interval for the smoothed values.
Figure 1.3: Average Predicted Women’s Resource Shares and Age
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Women and men living in the same household, however, are often not of the same age. A perhaps
more insightful exercise is the investigation of the relationship between female bargaining power relative
to that of males over women’s age. In panel C of figure 1.3, I combine the estimation results for the two
models (with and without children) and plot the ratio between predicted resource shares for women and
men, Λˆ f /Λˆm, against women’s age. The combination of the two sets of estimates accounts for the fact
that the distribution of women’s age is different in households with and without children. Moreover, as
total resources are divided among three types of individuals in the former, while they are shared among
two types in the latter, it simplifies the interpretation of the results. A resource share ratio equal to 1
indicates no gender asymmetry in intra-household resource allocation, independent of the presence of
children: e.g., the ratio will take the same value in households with children where men and women
receive both 35 percent of total resources, and in households without children where men and women
receive both 50 percent. During the core reproductive ages of women, allocation of resources between
adult females and males is symmetric, even slightly biased towards women. However, women’s resource
shares relative to men’s decline steadily at post-reproductive ages. In households with women’s average
age above 45, the resource shares ratio is particularly skewed, with women getting as low as 60 percent
of men’s resources.
1.5.2 Poverty, Gender and Age
Understanding how intra-household gender inequality affects aggregate measures of well-being is of
primary policy interest. Moreover, as morbidity and mortality rates are higher in poverty, evidence of a
higher poverty incidence among women than men at older ages would provide additional support for my
hypothesis that intra-household inequality can explain excess female mortality. I use the model estimates
to construct poverty rates that take into account unequal resource allocation within the household. These
are different from standard poverty measures, in that they do not assume that each household member
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gets an equal share of household resources. Thus, I allow for the presence, within each household, of
individuals who live in poverty and of individuals who do not.
I compute person level expenditures as the product between total household expenditure and the indi-
vidual resource shares, as predicted by the model: λˆt y =
Λˆt y
T
(t = f , m, c, T = F, M , C). I then construct
poverty head count ratios by comparing person level expenditures to poverty lines. I consider the thresh-
olds set by the World Bank for extreme poverty (1.25 US$/day) and average poverty (2 US$/day).43 As
in Dunbar et al. (2013), I set the poverty lines for children to 60 percent of adults’, in order to take into
account the fact that children may have lower needs, while I use the same poverty lines for men and
women. In section A.7 of the Appendix I investigated deviations from this last assumption.
By definition, the ratio of female to male poverty rates provides a measure of female poverty relative
to that of males. I call this measure the poverty sex ratio. While a ratio equal to 1 indicates no gender
asymmetry in poverty, a ratio larger than 1 indicates that female poverty is higher than that of males,
and can therefore be interpreted as excess female poverty.
Table 1.5 reports the poverty estimates. Panel A shows the fraction of households in the sample living
in poverty. Column 1 to 3 report the proportions of households with women, men, or children living
below poverty line, when the model predictions are used to compute person level expenditures. Column
4 shows the implied poverty sex ratio as defined above. Column 5 reports the poverty rates obtained
under the assumption that each household member gets an equal share of household resources. In panel
B, I present the poverty rates estimated at the individual level, i.e., the fraction of all individuals, or
women, men and children, separately, who live in poverty. This distinction is quite crucial, as poor and
non poor households may have systematically different size and composition.44
The poverty estimates indicate that there are more households with women living below poverty line
43The poverty rate at US$1.25 (US$2) is the proportion of the sample population living on less than US$1.25 (US$2) per day,
adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).
44The poverty head counts in the estimation sample are lower than the latest World Bank estimates (2011), which indicate that
24 and 59 percent of individuals live below the 1.25 US$/day and 2 US$/day poverty lines at 2005 international prices,
respectively. This is not surprising since a selected sample is used in estimation.
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Table 1.5: Poverty Head Count Ratios
Model Predictions (Unequal Sharing) Equal Sharing
Women Men Children Poverty All
Sex Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Household Level Poverty Rates
1.25 US$/day 0.1657 0.1177 0.2822 1.4078 0.1280
2 US$/day 0.4313 0.2759 0.5058 1.5632 0.4250
Panel B: Individual Level Poverty Rates
1.25 US$/day 0.2098 0.1463 0.3925 1.4340 0.1540
2 US$/day 0.4965 0.3422 0.6231 1.4509 0.4784
than with poor men and that there are more women living below poverty line than men. In particular, 17
percent of households in my sample have women living in extreme poverty, while less than 12 percent
of households have men living on less than US$ 1.25/day. In terms of individual head count ratios, 21
percent of women live below the extreme poverty cutoff, while 15 percent of men do. Similar gender
patterns hold when the alternative poverty line is considered: about 50 percent of women live with less
than US$ 2/day, while one man out of three lives below this threshold. Children poverty rates are the
highest, with 40 percent of children living in extreme poverty.45 Finally, my poverty estimates provide
evidence of excess female poverty, as the poverty sex ratios are above 1.
While I do not formally present robustness analysis along this dimension, these patterns are robust to
the use of national poverty lines.46 I do not wish to stress the absolute levels of poverty too much as they
depend on the relative needs of each household member and on the modeling assumptions discussed in
section 1.4. However, my findings suggest that intra-household inequalities should be taken into account
when measuring poverty and evaluating the effect of policies to alleviate it.
To investigate the distribution of male and female poverty across ages, I compute gender-specific head
45This is in line with the findings in Malawi by Dunbar et al. (2013). Understanding the mechanisms driving this phenomenon
goes beyond the scope of this paper and is an open area of research.
46See Planning Commission (2014).
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(A) Model Predictions (Unequal Sharing) (B) Equal Sharing
Note: The graphs show the fraction of females or males in each age group living below poverty line. Individuals from all households
in the sample are used for calculations. Per capita expenditures are computed using the model predictions in panel A. In panel B, I
assume that household expenditure is split equally among household members. Per capita expenditures are compared to the 1.25
US$/day poverty line.
Figure 1.4: Poverty Rates By Gender and Age (1.25 US$/day)
count ratios within thirteen 5-year age groups, from 15-19 to 75-79. As above, I use the model estimates
to calculate per capita expenditures. I then compute gender-age specific poverty rates as the fraction of
females or males in each age group living below poverty line. Figure 1.4 shows gender specific poverty
rates across age groups, together with the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals. Poverty rates
are based on the World Bank 1.25 US$/day poverty threshold.
There are at least three features to note. First, the gender-age specific poverty estimates confirm that
poverty calculations are drastically affected by the inclusion of intra-household gender asymmetries:
female poverty rates are higher at all ages when unequal distribution is accounted for (panel A), whereas
almost no difference can be detected when equal distribution of resources is assumed (panel B). In this
case, any difference between female and male poverty rates is due to different household and age group
compositions. Second, standard poverty estimates may suggest that male and female poverty rates are
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relatively stable across ages. In contrast, my estimates unveil an interesting pattern: while male poverty
is roughly constant over age, the relationship between female poverty and age is U-shaped, with peaks
in the 15-19 and 70-74 age groups.47 Finally, the gap between female and male poverty rates widens
dramatically at ages 45-49 and above, indicating that female poverty relative to males’ is particularly
high at post-reproductive ages. These patterns are confirmed when the 2 US$/day poverty threshold is
considered (see figure A.8 in the Appendix).
1.5.3 Explaining Excess Female Mortality
The poverty analysis discussed above indicates that gender asymmetries in resource allocation inside the
household imply gender asymmetries in poverty. The fraction of women in the sample living in extreme
poverty (under 1.25 US$/day) is 0.21 when the model predictions are used and unequal distribution of
resources within the household is taken into account. Under the assumption of equal intra-household
sharing, 14 percent of women live below the extreme poverty threshold, indicating that granting equal
access to resources across genders could reduce the number of women living below 1.25 US$/day by one
third. When focusing on post-reproductive ages, equal sharing of household resources between genders
is associated with a reduction in the number of extremely poor women by more than 40 percent. As
poverty and mortality are tightly linked, these findings corroborate my hypothesis that excess female
mortality at older ages in India can be explained by the decrease in women’s bargaining power and
access to resources over the life-cylce.
Figure 1.4 provides a graphical illustration of this claim. The solid line represents the poverty sex
ratio, obtained as the ratio between female and male poverty rates in each age group. As above, a ratio
47The empirical evidence in the existing literature on the relationship between poverty and age is mixed. Some empirical studies
suggest the existence of a U-shaped relationship of age and poverty, with elderly population facing a higher incidence of poverty
compared to other groups (Barrientos et al. (2003)). Other studies document that poverty among elderly households is lower
than that of non-elderly households, mainly due to survival bias (Deaton and Paxson (1995)). Third, Gasparini et al. (2007)
show that in countries with weak social security systems, there is no significant difference between old age poverty and the
overall poverty rates, while in countries with a well developed pension system, poverty rates are lower for the elderly than for
other age groups.
37
Chapter 1 Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty
larger than 1 indicates that female poverty is higher than that of males and can be interpreted as excess
female poverty. The dotted line plots the age distribution of missing women estimated by Anderson and
Ray (2010). As in figure 1.1, the shaded area represents missing women at post-reproductive ages. For
simplicity and consistency with the model estimates, I here focus on age groups 15-19 to 75-79.
When unequal allocation of resources within the households is taken into account and the model pre-
dictions are used for calculation (solid line), the age profile of excess female poverty matches the age
distribution of missing women remarkably well. This match is close to perfect at post-reproductive ages,
when the correlation coefficient between excess female mortality and excess female poverty is equal
to 0.96. Not surprisingly, there is almost no evidence of excess female poverty when equal sharing of
household resources is assumed (dashed line). The area between the solid and the dashed lines repre-
sents the reduction in female poverty relative to males’ that is achievable by granting equal allocation
of household resources between genders. At post-reproductive ages, a 94 percent reduction in excess
female poverty in the sample can be obtained by removing intra-household asymmetries.48
One should be cautious when trying to translate these results in terms of excess female mortality.
While several alternative approaches could be used, I here take the correlation shown in figure 1.4
seriously and assume the relationship between excess female mortality and excess female poverty to be
linear and independent of age (see figure A.9 in the Appendix).49 For each age category, I predict how
many missing women would be there in absence of excess female poverty as the intercept of a regression
line of excess female deaths on excess female poverty. A one unit reduction in the excess female poverty
is associated with a decrease in the number of missing women by about 101,287. The R-squared of the
simple linear regression model is equal to 0.69 and the estimated intercept is 17,118, while the total
number of excess female deaths at ages 45 to 79 estimated by Anderson and Ray (2010) is 662,000. The
48The difference between the areas below the sold and the dashed line at post-reproductive ages is equal to 4.6317, which is about
94 percent of the total area between 1 and the solid line (4.9283).
49Whereas this is beyond the scope of this paper, further work should investigate in more details the link between relative poverty
and mortality.
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Note: The graph shows the fraction of females poverty rate to male poverty rate in each age group. Individuals from all households
in the sample are used for calculations. The underlying gender-age specific poverty rates are displayed in figure 1.4 and are
calculated using the 1.25 US$/day poverty line.
Figure 1.5: Poverty Sex Ratio and Missing Women by Age (1.25 US$/day)
predicted number of excess female deaths in the absence of excess female poverty is about 120,000.50
Thus, up to 82 percent of missing women at post-reproductive ages can be attributed to the decrease in
women’s bargaining power over the life-cycle, and to the consequent increase in female poverty at older
ages relative to that of males.51
As other forces may obviously be playing a role and the link between poverty and mortality is likely to
vary with age, these magnitudes should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, my analysis indicates
5017,118 × 7, where 7 is the number of post-reproductive age groups.
51Alternatively, it is possible to calculate the number of excess female deaths in a situation with no gender inequalities in resource
allocation in all households (where the poverty sex ratio is equal to the dashed line in figure 1.5). In this alternative scenario,
the predicted number of missing women at post-reproductive ages is about 150,000, which is 77 percent lower than the
Anderson and Ray (2010) estimates.
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that a potentially sizable reduction in excess female mortality at older ages can be achieved by alleviating
the problem of gender asymmetries within the household and the consequent asymmetries in poverty.
1.6 Counterfactual Policy Experiment
As they reinforce individuals’ bargaining power and improve access to household resources, inheritance
rights may affect female poverty and, in turn, female mortality. The Hindu Succession Act amendments
that equalized inheritance rights between genders were enacted in different states at different times and
applied only to women who got married after their implementation. A large fraction of women in the
sample is therefore excluded. Especially after the nation-wide amendment of 2005, understanding the
role of these reforms in shaping female poverty and risk of mortality is of primary policy interest.
I consider the counterfactual scenario of all women (of all religions and ages) being exposed to the
reforms. More precisely, this hypothetical scenario refers to a situation in which the wife of the head
of household is eligible to the HSA amendments in all households. The model estimates indicate that
eligibility of the wife of the head of household to the HSA amendments increases women’s overall
resource shares by 1.2 percentage points in households with children and 2.3 percentage points in
households without children.52 I compute counterfactual female and male resource shares and use
these predictions to calculate counterfactual poverty rates for each age group 15-19 to 75-79. Figure 1.6
shows the actual (solid line) and counterfactual (dashed line) poverty sex ratios across age groups and
the age distribution of missing women estimated by Anderson and Ray (2010). As only one resource
share is retrievable for each household member type, HSAA eligibility affects individuals of the same
type by the same amount. The difference between the actual and the counterfactual poverty sex ratios
52I calculate counterfactual individual resource shares for women equal to (Λˆ f + 0.0225)/F in households without children and
to (Λˆ f + 0.0120)/F in household with children. Counterfactual individual resources shares for men are equal to (1− Λˆ f −
0.0225)/M in households without children and to (Λˆm+0.0016)/M in household with children, where 0.0016 is the estimated
effect of HSAA eligibility on Λm. Figure A.10 in the Appendix shows the age profiles of the actual and counterfactual women’s
resource shares in households with and without children.
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Note: The graph shows the fraction of females poverty rate to male poverty rate in each age group. Individuals from all households
in the sample are used for calculations. The underlying actual and counterfactual poverty rates are calculated using the 1.25
US$/day poverty line.
Figure 1.6: Counterfactual Experiment: HSA Amendment and Poverty Sex Ratio
is therefore fairly constant at all age groups.
I find that granting access to equal inheritance rights for all women in the sample significantly reduces
female poverty. The fraction of women in poverty is 10 percent lower in the counterfactual scenario.
Moreover, analogous to figure 1.5, the area between the solid and the dashed lines represents the reduc-
tion in female poverty relative to males’ that can be achieved by granting equal inheritance rights to all
women in the sample. At post-reproductive ages, a 32 percent reduction in excess female poverty can
be obtained by equalizing inheritance rights across genders.53
While taking the caveats discussed in section 1.5.3 into account, it is possible to predict the number of
53The difference between the areas below the sold and the dashed line at post-reproductive ages is equal to 1.5791, which is about
32 percent of the total area between 1 and the solid line (4.9283).
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missing women in this counterfactual scenario (when the poverty sex ratio is equal to the dashed line in
figure 1.6). The predicted number of excess female deaths under equal inheritance rights for all women
is about 489,000, suggesting that up to a 26 percent reduction in the number of excess female deaths at
post-reproductive ages could be obtained by granting equal inheritance rights to all women, of all ages
and religions.
1.7 Conclusion
“At older ages, excess female deaths may stem from unequal treatment, but the notion needs to
be amplified." (Anderson and Ray (2012), p. 94)
In this paper, I focus on gender asymmetries in intra-household bargaining power and access to house-
hold resources as one form of unequal treatment. I show that a large portion of the missing women at
post-reproductive ages estimated by Anderson and Ray (2010) can be explained by inequalities in intra-
household resource allocation and by the consequent gender asymmetries in poverty.
The emphasis on intra-household allocation is motivated by the existence of a positive causal link
between women’s bargaining power and their health. I demonstrate this fact by analyzing the effect of
amendments in the Indian inheritance legislation on a set of women’s h‘ealth outcomes. These reforms
equalized inheritance rights between genders and therefore represent a source of exogenous variation
in women’s position inside the household.
I then provide a structural model for estimating women’s bargaining power, defined as the fraction
of total household expenditure that is consumed by women, and for analyzing its determinants. The
model predictions indicate that the allocation of resources between women and men is symmetric during
women’s core reproductive ages, while the share of household resources devoted to women declines
significantly at post-reproductive ages. One consequence of this fact is that at older ages poverty rates
are significantly higher among women than among men. Standard per capita poverty measures, which
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by construction ignore intra-household inequality, are unable to unveil this pattern.
As I demonstrate with my reduced-form analysis and counterfactual experiments, policies aimed at
promoting equality within households, such as improving inheritance rights for women, can have a
large impact on female health, poverty and, in turn, risk of mortality. Future research should focus on
identifying alternative mechanisms generating excess female mortality at post-reproductive ages and on
evaluating policies to successfully tackle the problem of excess female poverty, especially among the
elderly. Moreover, subsequent work should investigate the effects of the HSA amendments on marital
sorting and partner matching. As standard practice in the collective literature, I take the match as given,
but interesting insight might arise from relaxing this assumption. Finally, in the spirit of Mazzocco
(2007), Mazzocco et al. (2014), and Voena (2015), a promising avenue of research is the investigation
of the age profile of women’s bargaining power using an inter-temporal model in which household
members cannot commit to the future allocation of resources.
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Women’s Empowerment and Family Health: A
Two-Step Approach
2.1 Introduction
What is the effect of women’s empowerment on their health outcomes? What about their children’s and
their spouses’? Several papers reject empirically the hypothesis that the household acts as a single deci-
sion unit maximizing a common utility function, showing that a relevant determinant of the household
decisions and outcomes is the relative position of the decision makers.1 In particular, there is consensus
that the bargaining power of the decision makers leads to allocations that are closer to the preference
structure of the “stronger" individual. Although this link is by now well-accepted, bargaining power
is de facto an unobserved variable.2 The present paper shows that the causal effect of this unobserved
1Most of this empirical literature focus on testing the income pooling hypothesis, i.e., that only household income matters for
choice outcomes and not the source of the income. empirical evidence against the unitary model can be found e.g. in Lundberg
et al. (1997), Attanasio and Lechene (2002) and Duflo (2003).
2For instance, in the case of the well cited Mexican PROGRESA program, one of the main objectives of the government was
to provide a large amount of non-labor income in the hands of the mother to improve her bargaining position within the
household. Although there is a large literature showing that indeed PROGRESA shifted the balance of power, virtually all the
results rely on indirect evidence of power shift.
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treatment on observable outcomes can be identified by combining features of structural and causal (or
reduced-form) analyses in a two-step approach. We use the former to recover a measure of women’s
bargaining power (step 1), and the latter to establish the causal relationship of interest (step 2). We
apply this approach to study the effect of intra-household empowerment on the health status of family
members in India.
Within the camp of the reduced-form approach, two main strategies have been used to account for
the bargaining power of household members and to study its effects on household’s outcomes: either
to separately estimate the parameters of an ad-hoc power function and then to add such estimates into
a regression equation, or to rely on exogenous policies or programs targeting women. Quisumbing and
Maluccio (2003), for instance, use datasets from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and South Africa to
construct a proxy of bargaining power based on the assets controlled by women evaluated at the time of
marriage, and study its impact on expenditure allocations towards children. Reggio (2011), instead, uses
self-reported questions about who in the household makes decisions about different assets to construct
an ad-hoc measure of women’s empowerment to investigate how the mother’s bargaining power affects
child labor in Mexico. Furthermore, legal reforms aimed at improving women’s property rights, inheri-
tance rights in particular, have been used in the literature to assess the relationship between bargaining
power and women’s or children’s outcomes. In the Indian context, Roy (2008) shows that women’s
exposure to legal reforms that equalized inheritance laws between genders improves self-reported mea-
sures of bargaining power and autonomy. Roy (2013) and Deininger et al. (2013) indicate that these
reforms increase female education, while Calvi (2016) finds that they improve women’s health, mea-
sures of undernourishment and anaemia in particular, by increasing their bargaining position and their
access to household resources.3
3Legal reforms in other countries have been studied as well. La Ferrara and Milazzo (2014) exploit an amendment to Ghana’s
Intestate Succession Law, finding that parents substitute land inheritance with children’s education, while Harari (2014) ana-
lyzes a law reform meant to equalize inheritance rights for Kenyan women and shows that women exposed to the reform are
more educated, less likely to undergo genital mutilation, and have higher age at marriage and at first child.
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In contrast to this line of work, we rely on the collective households framework to structurally recover
a non-ad-hoc measure of bargaining (or decision) power. In this framework, which was pioneered by
Chiappori (1988b, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988), and subsequently elaborated by Browning et al.
(1994), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Blundell et al. (2005) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006), a
household is characterized as a collection of individuals, each of whom has a well defined objective
function, and who interact to generate Pareto efficient allocations.4 Recent advances in the collective
households literature permit the recovery of resource shares (or a sharing rule), defined as each member’s
share of total household consumption. These are particularly appealing, as they provide measures of in-
dividuals’ intra-household bargaining power. There are two mainstream approaches to recover the level
of resource shares. On one hand, Browning et al. (2013) (BCL) provide a model that non-parametrically
identifies the levels of resource shares of both adult household members based on the observation of the
demand functions of single men and single women living alone.5 An obvious limit of this identification
strategy is the impossibility to identify resource shares of children, since they cannot be observed as
singles. On the other hand, an alternative and powerful methodology has been proposed by Dunbar
et al. (2013) (DLP). They extend the BCL model to include children and obtain identification of resource
shares using Engel curves (demand equations holding prices constant) of goods that are consumed ex-
clusively by women, men or children, e.g., clothing.
In general, however, researchers remain agnostic about how intra-household bargaining power affects
the health of family members. In our empirical application, we assume that the parents are the decision
makers and that they obtain utility from investing in someone’s health, albeit not necessarily to the
same degree. As a consequence, we allow for disagreement over this decision. We then proceed in two
4The efficiency assumption is quite convenient since the choice of a particular bargaining protocol to model household behavior
has a strong limitation: if its empirical implications are rejected, then it is not possible to determine whether the particular
choice itself is rejected or the bargaining setting in general (Vermeulen, 2002).
5The same strategy is followed in the applications by Lise and Seitz (2011) and Cherchye et al. (2012b). A similar approach is
represented by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008). They propose some restrictions on BCL that permit the identification of the levels
of adult’s resource shares in a model based on comparing the Engel curves, which does not require price variation, of single
men and women and men and women in childless married couples. Bargain and Donni (2012) is the first contribution that, by
extending BCL, is able to identify the resource shares also of children.
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steps. First, using the DLP approach, we estimate the household demand model using data with detailed
expenditure data from the 2011-2012 National Sample Survey (NSS) of Consumer Expenditure. Due to
the lack of NSS data on health outcomes, we use the structural estimates to perform an out-of-sample
prediction on the 2005-2006 National Family Health Survey (NFHS). The latter includes the same socio-
economic characteristics of individuals and households as the NSS dataset and detailed information
about women’s (aged 15 to 49), men’s (aged 15 to 54) and children’s (aged 0 to 5) health indicators.
This first step allows us to recover the unobserved treatment of interest, i.e., the fraction of parents’
resources that is allocated to the mother. This is a non-ad-hoc measure of women’s intra-household
empowerment, with a clear interpretation that is provided by the collective household model. Second,
we make use a Two Stages Least Square (2SLS) approach to study the causal effect of this structurally-
recovered measure of women’s decision power on household members’ health status.6
Our results are threefold. First, when we focus on women’s health outcomes, we find positive and
significant effects of women’s decision power relative to their male counterparts. An increase in our
structurally-recovered measure of bargaining power improves women’s weight and their body mass in-
dex, and decreases their probability of being underweight or anemic. Moreover, our estimates indicate
that more empowered mothers face higher birth intervals (or birth spacing), which may improve mater-
nal health and reduce the risk of anemia. Second, when we focus on men’s health outcomes, we do not
find any significant effect of women’s decision power. Finally, when we look at children, our estimates
indicate that women’s bargaining position does not significantly affect their anthropometric indicators
such as weight and height, while it affects the likelihood of children being vaccinated. We show that this
result is mainly driven by improvements in the vaccinations against polio.
Important implications can be drawn from this analysis. From a policy perspective, policies aimed
at empowering women within households, such as improving women’s rights to inherit property, can
6We here impose some structure in the second step as well and consider a linear regression model. In ongoing work, we relax
these restrictions and focus on identifying the local average treatment effect.
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have positive spillovers on women’s health and, to a certain extent, can boost investments in children’s
health. From a methodological perspective, our approach shows the advantages of combining structural
and causal features in conducting empirical research. By using a household model to recover a structural
measure of bargaining power, we are able to answer a wider range of important research and policy
questions and to provide a more accurate assessment of the effect of women’s empowerment on family
member’s outcomes.
Proponents of causal modeling are often concerned about the complexity of the structural modeling
and question the validity of its underlying assumptions. Advocates of the structural approach, instead,
stress the much richer insights that can be obtained when one allows economic theory to guide the
empirical work (Wolpin, 2013). Recent contributions in the econometrics literature have started to
formally unify the two camps in order to overcome these divisions.7 Heckman (2010), for example,
proposes to combine the best features of both the structural and the causal modeling approaches in
what he calls a “third way" of policy analysis. Along the same line, Lewbel (2016) argues that “the
conflict between causal and structural modeling is foolish, even harmful", and that in some instances
the best strategy for identification is to combine the strengths of both approaches. With this work, we
make a further step in this direction and show that a combination of structural and causal analyses can
significantly expand the set of questions that researchers can answer.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the structural model and
discusses how intra-household bargaining power may affect health decisions. Section 2.3 presents the
data, the estimation strategy, and our instrumental variable, while section 2.4 discusses the empirical
results. Section 2.5 concludes.
7See e.g., Vytlacil (2002), Heckman et al. (2006), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007), and Pearl (2009).
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2.2 Intra-Household Bargaining Power and Health
Our goal is to study the effect of women’s empowerment on the health status of family members. To
motivate our causal analysis, we set out a theoretical framework, which augments a standard collective
model of the household to include the decision of investment on the health of each family member and
allows us to study such decision jointly with the intra-household resource allocation process. This same
framework allows for the estimation of our unobserved treatment of interest.
2.2.1 The Model
We consider the static framework developed by DLP and extend it to include health investment decisions.
We use subscripts to index goods and superscripts to index individuals. We consider three types of
individuals: t ∈ {m, f , c} indicating father, mother, and children, and focus only on households composed
by one mother, one father, and one to four children aged 0 to 14. The two parents are the relevant
decision makers in the household, whereas children receive a share of the resources but do not participate
in the decision making process. Households differ in many other attributes such as age of members,
residency, and several socioeconomic characteristics that may affect preferences. We suppress these
arguments in the theoretical section but we will take this heterogeneity into account when we estimate
the model empirically.
Each household consumes K types of goods with prices p = (p1, ..., pK). y is the household income.
z = (z1, ..., zK) is the vector of observed quantities of goods purchased by each household, while qt =
(qt1..., q
t
K) is the vector of unobserved quantities of goods consumed by an individual t. We allow for
economies of scale in consumption through a linear consumption technology, which converts purchased
quantities by the household, h, in private good equivalents, x .8 Let ut(qt) denote the utility that an
individual of type t would attain if she consumed the bundle of goods qt . We refer to the latter as
8This specific technology assumes the existence of a K × K matrix A such that h= A(q f + qm + sqc).
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material welfare. Each decision maker has caring preferences toward her children and her spouse, that
is, her individual total utility depends, in a weakly separable manner, on the material welfare of the other
household members, i.e. the utility they derive from consumption (u−t(q−t)). For children, uc(qc) can
be interpreted as the child’s actual utility function over the bundle of goods qc that the child consumes,
or the utility function that parents believe the child has. For simplicity, it is assumed that each child of
the same family is assigned the same utility function.9
In addition, we assume that each parent attaches some value to the health status of household mem-
ber’s j ∈ {m, f , c1, . . . , cs}, where j now identifies either herself, her spouse, or the children, and therefore
to the decision of investing in j’s health. These decisions are summarized by the J -dimensional vector H
(J = s+ 2), whose elements indicate whether the parents decide to invest or not to invest in j’s health.
We model the utility parents get from each member’s health as an expenditure in a public good. Hence
H is interpreted as the outcome of a joint decision of expenditure on a good which has public good fea-
tures. For simplicity, parents are assumed to make single period (myopic) decisions about to what extent
to invest in j’s health. This is a restrictive assumption in general, but it is quite sensible in our framework
as we focus on poor or constrained households. Moreover, we assume that each health investment deci-
sion is independent of another. In other words, given any two family members, the decision of investing
in one’s health affects the decision of investing in the other one only through the budget constraint.
In line with the collective modeling of household behavior, we assume that household decisions result
from a cooperative bargaining process among the decision makers, which leads to a Pareto efficient
outcome. The collective framework implies that households will choose consumption levels and health
investments in order to maximize a weighted sum of parents’ utilities:
UH = RUm(um, u f , uc , H) + (1− R)U f (u f , um, uc , H) (2.1)
9It is straightforward to extend the model to allow each child to have a different utility function. What we need is information
on a separate private assignable good for each child to achieve identification of each child’s resource share.
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where R= R(p, y, D) is the Pareto weight, which may depend on prices p, total expenditures y , and on a
vector of distribution factors D. The latter are defined as variables with no direct impact on preferences
or budget constraint, but that may influence the decision process. From a bargaining point of view, R
can be seen as a measure of the mother’s influence in the decision process: the larger R, the greater is
the weight that m’s preferences receive in the resulting household’s allocation of resources.
Each parent’s preferences in (2.1) are assumed to be separable in both the material well-being of
the other family members and the utility derived from H. For simplicity, we parametrize the individual
parents’ utilities as follows:
Um = um(qm) +δmf u
f (q f ) +δmc u
c(qc) +H ′αm
U f = u f (q f ) +δ fmu
m(qm) +δ fc u
c(qc) +H ′α f
where αm and α f are vector of parameters, whose elements, αmj and α
f
j , describe how much additional
utility each parent m or f attaches to the health investment on j. We can rearrange equation (2.1) as
follows:
UH = UCons + RH ′αm + (1− R)H ′α f (2.2)
where UCons is the total utility obtained from consumption by the household. Choosing H consists of
deciding whether to invest or not in each family member’s health. The choice must be optimal in the
sense that it maximizes (2.2) subject to the following budget constraint:
y ≤ z′p+ KH (2.3)
where KH is the total cost of health investment. Under the assumption that each decision maker’s power
R(p, y, D) is fixed, we can reinterpret the household program as that of a unique entity that maximizes
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a common welfare index. Alternatively, we can assume that the decision power is in the hands of one
individual (i.e., R(p, y, D) = 0) and that this benevolent dictator makes optimal decisions for all members
of the household. These are the common restrictions implied by the unitary model of the household.10
Our collective model framework is more general and allows us to analyze the role played by the decision
makers’ bargaining power in the health investment decisions, especially when there is disagreement.
The following example may help clarifying this point.
2.2.2 Bargaining Power and Health Decisions: An Illustrative Example
H is a J−dimensional vector, whose the elements are h j ∈ {0,1}, and indicate whether there is an
investment in j’s health. Given that the choice of H is optimal, it is in particular preferred to H˜, which
differs from H only in the health investment decision on member j. Without loss of generality, assume





′ Rαm + (1− R)α f  < UCons1 +H ′ Rαm + (1− R)α f 
UCons0 + h˜ j

Rαmj + (1− R)α fj

< UCons1 + h j







j + (1− R)α fj (2.4)
This allows us to set up a latent function that determines the decision of investing in j’s health, con-
ditional on the other health investment decisions. The parents will decide to invest in j’s health if the
latent variable h∗j is greater than the threshold zero and not to invest otherwise:
h∗j = UCons1 − UCons0 + Rαmj + (1− R)α fj (2.5)
10Note that both restrictions generate the “income-pooling hypothesis" according to which, any distributional variable should have
no effect on household decisions.
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Since the bargaining weights do not depend on the health investment decisions, the sharing rule for
the household is, in some sense, fixed with respect to the decision of H. Therefore, each household
member can compute her own overall utility in both status. The following table summarizes the possible
scenarios that our model allows for:
h j m f
0 Um U f
1 U˜m U˜ f
Here U j are the parents’ utilities in case there is no health investment on individual j, whereas U˜ j refers
to the utilities when there is a positive health investment decision. Three situations may emerge:
U˜m > Um and U˜ f > U f → Agreement, Investment in j
U˜m < Um and U˜ f < U f → Agreement, No Investment in j
U˜m < Um and U˜ f > U f or U˜m > Um and U˜ f < U f → Disagreement
In the first two cases, there is agreement among the household decision makers concerning the invest-
ment in j’s health. In particular, in the first instance both parents gain by investing in j’s health, whereas
in the second situation they both lose. In these instances, the decision of the household is trivial: either
they invest in the first case, or do not invest in the second. In the third case, however, there is a disagree-
ment with respect to the health investment decision. In this instance, the relative power of the parents
in the household decision process may play a crucial role.
An important remark is in order. In our setup, we assume that the Pareto weights of the parents are
independent of the health investment decisions. This allows us to obtain a simple expression for the
impact of decision power on the health status choice made by the household. However, this also restricts
our ability to fully exploit the mechanisms of compensation and transfers within the collective household
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literature.11 While this is a quite interesting generalization of our approach, we leave the relaxation of
this assumption to future work.
2.2.3 Recovering the Unobserved Treatment
We rely on Dunbar et al. (2013) (DLP) and Browning et al. (2013) (BCL) to recover a measure of
mother’s bargaining power relative to the father, i.e., the unobserved treatment. With the former, we
obtain resource shares for fathers, mothers, and children. With the latter, we show that, under some
functional form assumption, the decision power weight R can be measured as the fraction of parents’





f (q f ) +δmc u
c(qc)

+ (1− R)u f (q f ) +δ fmum(qm) +δ fc uc(qc)
= Ru˜m + (1− R)u˜ f + (Rδmc + (1− R)δ fc )uc (2.6)
Equation (2.6) shows that, conditional on the health investment decisions, the household problem can
equivalently be represented as a maximization of a weighted sum of the three utility functions from
consumption. Moreover, given the separability assumptions made in section 2.2.1, conditional on the
11In particular, it has been shown by Chiappori (1992) that the assumption of Pareto optimal household decisions allows for a
representation in terms of autonomous (individual) decisions, where first household income is divided among the household
members and then private consumption decisions are taken, given the respective shares obtained from the first stage. This
representation has been referred to as the sharing rule representation and it is by now a classic result in the literature on
collective household models. Given the heterogeneity of tastes between parents on health status, it seems therefore very
sensible to allow for compensatory transfers at the level of the household, through the sharing rule. This kind of reasoning
would require us, however, to drop the assumption that Pareto weights are independent of the health status decision.
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health investment decision, the household program is as follows:
max
q f ,qm,qc ,z
µ f u f +µmum + (1−µ f −µm)uc
such that
z = A(q f + qm + sqc)
y = z′p+ KH
(2.7)
The solutions to this program provide the bundles of private good equivalents, qt . Pricing those at
the shadow prices A′p gives the resource shares, ηm, η f and ηc = 1− η f − ηm, that are the fractions
of household total resources that are devoted to individuals of type t. BCL show that there exists a
monotonic correspondence between the weights µt and resource shares. Moreover, they argue that the
latter is a more tractable measure of bargaining power, as it is invariant to unobservable cardinalizations
of the utility functions.
The household program (2.7) can be decomposed in two steps: 1) the optimal allocation of resources
across members and 2) the individual maximization of their own utility function. This results follows
directly from the second welfare theorem, as any Pareto efficient allocation can be implemented as
an equilibrium of this economy, possibly after lump sum transfers between members. Conditional on





t y . Substituting the indirect utility functions V t(A′p,ηt y) in
the program above simplifies the optimization problem to the choice of optimal resource shares subject
to the constraint that total resources shares must sum to one. The household program can be therefore
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µ f V f +µmV m + (1−µ f −µm)V c
such that
η f +ηm + sηc = 1
(2.8)
An exact relationship between the shares η and the weights µ can be obtained from the three-member
analogue of Proposition 2 in BCL, which states that:
κµm =
∂ V c(A′p,ηc y)
∂ ηc
∂ V m(A′p,ηm y)
∂ ηm
and κµ f =
∂ V c(A′p,ηc y)
∂ ηc
∂ V f (A′p,η f y)
∂ η f
(2.9)
where V t is the indirect utility function of household member t.12 Assume each household member t
has a subutility given by Muellbauer’s Price Independent Generalized Logarithmic (Piglog) model. In
this framework, the indirect utility functions can be written as follows:












where A′p and ηt y are the relevant (Lindahl) prices and income for the household member’s own
optimization program, respectively. ψt is differentiable and strictly monotonically increasing and in this
case does not depend on prices for the private assignable goods of other household members. Under a








which allows us to use the fraction of parents’ resources devoted to the mother as an index of mother’s




j=1 p j∂ F
j(x)/∂ x i , where λ is the Lagrange multiplier coming from
Program (2.8).
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decision power of in the household.13
2.2.4 Health Production
A fully specified structural model would require a theory of health production within the household,
stemming from the underlying health investment decisions. Our approach, instead, does not require
this further step, and allows us to focus directly on the causal relationship of interest in a reduced-
form setting, while remaining agnostic on the exact health production mechanism. In other words, we
use economic theory to recover our unobserved treatment, but we avoid the complexity of structural
modeling and estimation when investigating the relationship of interest, taking full advantage of clear
and effective tools of causal inference. For simplicity, in order to study the effect of R on Y , we now use
a linear regression model. In ongoing work, we relax this assumption.
2.3 Estimation
We use a two-step estimation procedure to assess the role woman’ bargaining power plays in affecting
the health status of household members. First, we structurally estimate a measure of intra-household
bargaining power. Second, we use this measure to assess the causal effect of women’s empowerment on
family health in a reduced-form setting.
13ψ(.) is set to exp(.), which simplifies the expression for κµm described above:
∂ V t
∂ ηt













This results in the following expressions for the parents’ decision power weights:
κµt =
ηt exp F c
ηc exp F t
(2.13)
where F t (A′p) = A′ptφ(A′p) with φ(A′p) independent of household member t. This form is implied by the identifying
assumption of similar preferences across people (SAP). See Dunbar et al. (2013). Thus, an assumption of proportionality









This assumption may not be as strong as it looks since any price variation in the exclusive goods used in this application,
clothing and shoes, is very likely to stem solely from differences in remoteness of the different locations. Such variation should
affect the prices for all clothes in very similar measure.
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2.3.1 Data
We implement our empirical analysis by means of two Indian datasets: the 2011-2012 National Sample
Survey (NSS) of Consumer Expenditure (68th round) and the 2005-2006 National Family Health Survey
(NFHS-3).
NSS data. The NSS Consumer Expenditure Survey contains detailed data on household expen-
diture and details about household socio-economic characteristics, and other particulars of household
members. We select a sample of households with one woman and one man above age 15, and up to
4 children under 15. Moreover, we exclude households with no women or no men above 15 years of
age, households in the top 1 percent of expenditure, households with a female head and households
with head or head of household wife under 15. Finally, we exclude households reporting to have per-
formed any ceremony during the month prior to the survey, as unusual purchases of clothing items and
non-standard expenditure patterns may occur for festivities and ceremonies.
Among other items, households are asked to report how much they spent on clothing, bedding, and
footwear. Given the detailed breakdown of clothing expenditure, it is possible to identify the expendi-
ture on items of clothing that can be assigned to women, men, and children. Observability of private
assignable goods (goods that are consumed exclusively by one known member or by household members
of the same type) is necessary for the identification and the estimation of our measure of parent’s relative
bargaining power. We follow Calvi (2016) and define expenditure on women assignable clothing as the
sum of expenditures on saree, shawls, chaddar, and kurta-pajamas suits for females. For men assignable
clothing, we combine expenditure on dhoti, lungi, kurta-pajamas suits for males, pajamas, and salwar.
For children, we use expenditure on school uniforms and infant clothing.14 Unfortunately, the NSS Sur-
14Notice that Tommasi and Wolf (2016) have recently shown that when the data exhibit relatively flat Engel curves in the con-
sumption of the private assignable goods, the DLP model is weakly identified and induces high variability and an implausible
pattern in least squares estimates of resource shares. However, the advantage of following Calvi (2016) is that households in
her dataset have a large variation in the consumption of private assignable goods, which facilitates identification. Hence the
problem of weak identifiability in this context is very mild and negligible.
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vey does not include any information on individuals’ health status. Table 2.1 contains some descriptive
statistics. For clothing items, the survey entry refers to the expenditure occurred in the past 365 days.
For simplicity, we convert annual into monthly figures. Budget shares are computed as percentage of
total household expenditure, including durables.
NFHS-3 data. The 2005-2005 National Family Health Survey includes detailed information about
women’s (aged 15 to 49) and men’s (aged 15 to 54) health indicators, such as anthropometrics and
measures of anaemia, together with socio-economic characteristics of individuals and households that
render the out-of-sample prediction of resource shares feasible. For children born in the 5 years prior to
the date of interview, we observe anthropometric indicators and vaccination records. To investigate the
causal effect of women’s intra-household empowerment on the health outcomes of family members, we
consider the NHFS women, men and children datasets separately. Table 2.2 presents some descriptive
statistics.
For women, men and children, we observe anthropometric indicators, such as body mass index (BMI),
weight, height, and levels of anaemia.15 BMI is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in
meters squared. A cut-off point of 18.5 is used to define thinness or acute undernutrition, and a BMI
of 23 or above indicates overweight or obesity for Asian Indians (Shiwaku et al., 2004). Anaemia,
instead, is a condition in which the number of red blood cells or their oxygen-carrying capacity is in-
sufficient. Although its primary cause is iron deficiency, it coexists frequently with a number of other
causes, such as malaria, parasitic infection, and nutritional deficiencies; 90 percent of anaemia sufferers
live in developing countries. Prevalence of anaemia in South Asian countries is among the highest in the
world.16 For women, we also compute their average birth spacing, i.e., the average number of months
between births. The adverse health consequences of a short spacing between births are well known: as
15See Schultz (2009) for more details.
16See Kaur (2014).
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Table 2.1: NSS Consumer Expenditure Data and NFHS Data
NSS Sample NFHS Sample
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Obs. Mean Median St. Dev.
Total Expenditure (Rupees) 15,173 7,333 6,002 5,928
Woman’s Assignable Clothing Budget Share 15,164 1.22 1.06 0.99
Man’s Assignable Clothing Budget Share 15,164 1.42 1.18 1.26
Children’s Assignable Clothing Budget Share 15,164 0.75 0.59 0.83
I(1 child) 15,173 0.27 0.00 0.44 23,699 0.26 0.00 0.44
I(2 children) 15,173 0.44 0.00 0.50 23,699 0.39 0.00 0.49
I(3 children) 15,173 0.21 0.00 0.41 23,699 0.24 0.00 0.42
I(4 children) 15,173 0.08 0.00 0.27 23,699 0.11 0.00 0.31
Fraction of Female Children 15,173 0.44 0.50 0.37 23,699 0.47 0.50 0.37
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh) 15,173 0.79 1.00 0.41 23,695 0.77 1.00 0.42
Woman’s Age 15,173 32.80 32.00 6.54 23,697 30.22 30.00 7.32
Gender Age Gap 15,173 4.51 5.00 5.93 23,662 5.80 5.00 5.01
Children’s Avg. Age 15,173 7.70 8.00 3.46 23,699 6.46 6.33 3.58
Wealth Index 15,173 0.38 0.37 0.17 23,699 0.39 0.36 0.23
I(Woman’s Higher Education) 15,173 0.19 0.00 0.39 23,699 0.09 0.00 0.28
I(Man’s Higher Education) 15,173 0.28 0.00 0.45 23,699 0.13 0.00 0.34
I(Rural) 15,173 0.59 1.00 0.49 23,699 0.54 1.00 0.50
I(North India) 15,173 0.27 0.00 0.44 23,699 0.30 0.00 0.46
I(East India) 15,173 0.18 0.00 0.39 23,699 0.16 0.00 0.37
I(North-East India) 15,173 0.16 0.00 0.37 23,699 0.20 0.00 0.40
I(South India) 15,173 0.28 0.00 0.45 23,699 0.21 0.00 0.41
I(West India) 15,173 0.11 0.00 0.31 23,699 0.13 0.00 0.34
I(HSA Eligible) 15,173 0.29 0.00 0.46 21,110 0.06 0.00 0.24
Budget shares are multiplied by 100. Woman’s assignable clothing includes expenditures on saree, shawls, chaddar, and kurta-pajamas suits
for females; man’s assignable clothing includes expenditures on dhoti, lungi, kurta-pajamas suits for males, pajamas, salwar, and cloth for coats,
trousers, and suit and for shirt, pajama, kurta, and salwar; children’s assignable clothing includes expenditures on expenditure on school uniforms
and infant clothing. The household wealth index is obtained using principle component analysis. I(Higher Education Women) and I(Higher
Education Men) are indicator variable for higher education (diploma or college) completed by at least one woman or man in the household.
North India includes Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Chandigarh, Uttaranchal, Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and
Madhya Pradesh. East India includes West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, A & N Islands, and Chattisgarh. North-East India includes Sikkim,
Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. South India includes Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh,
Kerala, Lakshadweep, and Pondicherry. West India includes Gujarat, Goa, Maharashtra, Daman & Diu, and D & N Haveli.
the mother is not allowed sufficient time to restore the adequate supply of nutrients, short spacing is
found to affect maternal health and increase the risk of anemia (Conde-Agudelo and Belizán (2000) and
Milazzo (2014)). Finally, for children we also observe whether a child received a BCG vaccine (against
tuberculosis), one to three DPT vaccines (against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus), and one to four
polio vaccines (at birth and one to three after). For simplicity, we consider whether or not a child has






















Table 2.2: Causal Inference, NFHS Data
Women (age 15 to 49) Men (age 15 to 54) Children (age 0 to 5)
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Weight (kg) 16,608 48.24 10.08 8,587 56.86 10.82 11,063 10.67 3.29
BMI (kg/m2) 16,593 20.89 3.94 8,584 21.14 3.50 11,037 15.13 5.07
I(BMI ≤18.5) 16,593 0.30 0.46 8,584 0.24 0.43
I(Anemic) 15,614 0.16 0.37 7,989 0.16 0.36
Avg. Birth Gap (months) 14,082 35.12 17.93
Height (cm) 11,037 83.95 13.93
I(BCG) 12,022 0.78 0.42
I(DPT) 11,959 0.75 0.43
I(Polio) 12,063 0.91 0.29
I(Any Vaccination) 12,078 0.92 0.28
Woman’s Decision Making Index 17,227 28.53 34.99
Age 17,241 29.85 6.01 9,067 35.43 6.73 39,134 7.43 4.92
I(Worked in Past 12 Months) 17,239 0.42 0.49 9,066 0.44 0.50 43,410 0.45 0.50
Education (years) 17,240 5.05 5.12 9,067 5.21 5.13 43,415 4.24 4.85
I(Female) 43,416 0.48 0.50
I(Birth Ord. = 1) 43,416 0.39 0.49
I(Birth Ord. = 2) 43,416 0.33 0.47
I(Birth Ord. = 3) 43,416 0.19 0.39
I(Birth Ord. = 4) 43,416 0.09 0.29
I(Rural) 17,241 0.55 0.50 9,067 0.53 0.50 43,416 0.59 0.49
I(Sch. Caste, Sch. Tribe, OBC) 17,241 0.68 0.47 9,067 0.71 0.45 43,416 0.71 0.45
Wealth Index 17,241 0.38 0.23 9,067 0.38 0.22 43,416 0.35 0.22
Number of children (under 15) 17,241 2.26 0.96 9,067 2.27 0.95 43,416 2.57 0.95
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh) 17,241 0.80 0.40 9,067 0.78 0.42 43,416 0.78 0.41
I(BPL card) 17,140 0.19 0.39 9,016 0.19 0.39 43,173 0.21 0.41
Fraction of Female Children 17,241 0.47 0.36 9,067 0.47 0.36 43,416 0.47 0.33
I(HSA Eligible) 14,433 0.09 0.29 7,307 0.15 0.36 37,457 0.07 0.26
Age is defined in years for men and women, and in months for children. For children, I(Worked in Past 12 Months) and education refer to the mother.
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2.3.2 Indian Inheritance Rights Reforms
A woman’s right to inherit land and other property is often claimed to play a significant role in deter-
mining women’s position within the household (World Bank, 2014). Inheritance rights in India differ
by religion and, for most of the population, are governed by the Hindu Succession Act (HSA). The HSA
was first introduced in 1956 and applied to all states other than Jammu and Kashmir and only to Hin-
dus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains. It therefore did not apply to individuals of other religions, such as
Muslims, Christians, Parsis, Jews, and other minority communities.17 It aimed at unifying the traditional
Mitakhshara and Dayabhaga systems, which were completely biased in favor of sons (Agarwal, 1995),
and established a law of succession whereby sons and daughters would enjoy (almost) equal inheritance
rights. Gender inequalities, however, remained even after the introduction of the HSA. On one hand, in
case of a Hindu male dying intestate, i.e., without leaving a will, all his separate or self-acquired property,
devolved equally upon sons, daughters, widow, and mother. On the other hand, the deceased’s daugh-
ters had no direct inheritance rights to joint family property, whereas sons were given direct right by
birth to belong to the coparcenary.18 In the decades following the introduction of Hindu Succession Act,
state governments passed amendments that equalized inheritance rights for daughters and sons. Kerala
in 1976, Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil Nadu in 1989, and Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994 passed
reforms making daughters coparceners. These amendments only applied to Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or
Jain women, who were not yet married at the time of the amendment. A national-level ratification of
the amendments occurred in 2005.
Both the NSS and the NFHS survey contain information about women’s year of birth, state of resi-
17 While most laws for Christians formally grant equal rights from 1986, gender equality is not the practice, as the Synod of
Christian Churches has being arranging legal counsel to help draft wills to disinherit female heirs. The inheritance rights of
Muslim women in India are governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937, under which daughters
inherit only a portion of what the sons do (Agarwal, 1995).
18All persons who acquired interest in the joint family property by birth are said to belong to the coparcenary. The Hindu Women’s
Right to Property Act of 1937 enabled the widow to succeed along with the son and to take a share equal to that of the son.
The widow was entitled only to a limited estate in the property of the deceased with a right to claim partition. A daughter,
however, had virtually no inheritance rights.
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dence, and religion. We construct a variable capturing women’s eligibility to the Hindu Succession Act
(HSA) amendments as the interaction between an indicator variable for being Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or
Jain, and an indicator variable equal to one if a woman was 14 or younger at the time of the amendment
in her state and to zero if she was 23 or older.19 Our choice to focus on women’s eligibility (rather than
their actual exposure) to the inheritance rights amendments has a double motivation. First, while the
NFHS data include information about each woman’s year at marriage and is therefore suitable for the
identification of women who are Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain women and who were not yet married
at the time of the amendment, the NSS does not. Second, as exposure to the HSA amendments is deter-
mined by each woman’s year of marriage, we focus on an intent-to-treat effect and address the concerns
about a potential endogeneity of treatment. As shown in Table 2.1, in both samples about 80 percent of
the sample is Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh. However, the percentage of households where the woman
is eligible to the Hindu Succession Act amendments is much higher in the NSS. This is mainly due to
the timing of the surveys, 2011-2012 for the NSS and 2005-2006 for the NHFS, as the former includes a
larger number of women who were unmarried at the time of the national amendment in 2005.
2.3.3 Empirical Strategy
Step 1: Structural Estimation. To recover the unobserved treatment R, we estimate the resource
shares ηt for all household members. To this aim, we set up an Engel curve system as in DLP. This
system is based on the Piglog preferences, whose indirect utility function is defined in Equation (2.10).
Under these functional form assumption, we obtain a set of three budget share equations for assignable
19We use 14 and 23 as they are the 10th and 90th percentiles of women’s age at marriage in the NHFS-3 sample. This variable is
therefore fully determined by each woman’s religion, year of birth and state.
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clothing that are linear in the total household expenditure:

W f = η f [δ f + β f (lny + lnη f )]
W m = ηm[δm + βm(lny + lnηm)]
W c = sηc[δc + β c(lny + lnηc − lns)]
(2.14)
where sηc = 1−η f −ηm. y is the total household expenditure (in Rupees) reported for the month prior
to the survey, and w t are the budget shares spent on assignable clothing and food, respectively.
Identification of resource shares is obtained by imposing similarities of preferences on private assignable
goods across household members and across households. These restrictions allow to identify individual
resource shares by comparing household demands for private assignable goods across people within
households and across households. In particular, provided that β f = βm = β c = β , the slopes of the
Engel curves in equation (2.14) can be identified by a linear regression of the household budget shares
Wt on a constant term and ln y . βη
t is the slope of type t ’s assignable clothing Engel curve. The slopes
are proportional to the unknown resource shares, with the factor of proportionality set by the constraint
that the resource shares must sum to one.
We account for observable heterogeneity across households by specifying δt (t = f , m, c) and β as
linear functions of observable household characteristics (Z). Moreover, ηt depend linearly on X and one
distribution factor, D, i.e.,
ηt = θ t0 + θ
t
1 Z1 + ...+ θ
t
n Zn + θ
t
D D (2.15)
This characterization renders the system of Engel curves non-linear. The vector Z = (Z1, ..., Zn) includes,
among other variables, details about the composition of the household, socio-economic characteristics,
such as demographic group, religion, measures of parental education, and a household wealth index,
and the mother’s, the father’s, and the average age of children. It also contains region fixed effects
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(South, East, West, North-East, North, with West being the excluded category) and dummy variables
identifying the number of children under 15, for living in rural areas, and for belonging to a disad-
vantaged demographic group (Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or other backward classes). Although
distribution factors are not required for identification of the resource shares, it is going to be crucial for
the identification of a causal effect of interest in the reduced form model. Thus, we include the mother’s
eligibility to the HSA amendments as a factor affecting resource allocation but not preferences.
We implement the model empirically by adding an error term to each equation in system (2.14)
and by imposing similarity of preferences over private assignable goods. Since the error terms may be
correlated across equations, we estimate the system using non-linear Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR) method. Non-linear SUR is iterated until the estimated parameters and the covariance matrix
settle. Iterated SUR is equivalent to maximum likelihood with multivariate normal errors. We estimate
the model using the NSS sample discussed in section 2.3.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
first sampling unit (2001 Census villages in rural areas and 2007-2012 Urban Frame Survey blocks in
urban areas).
Once we obtain estimates bθ t = (bθ t0 , bθ t1 , ..., bθ tn , bθ tD) for the underlying θ , we predict the resource shares
parameters and we construct our measure of the mother’s decision power in the household, i.e., the
fraction of parents’ resources that are devoted to the mother, as:
bR(D, Z , bθ) = bηm(D, Z , bθm)bηm(D, Z , bθm) + bη f (D, Z , bθ f ) (2.16)
Since we observe Z = (Z1, ..., Zn) and D in the NSS and in the NFHS-3 sample, we can compute bR(D, Z , bθ)
in both samples. As the NSS sample does not include health information about family members, we
investigate the effect of mothers’ decision power on family member’s health outcomes using the NFHS-3
data only.
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Step 2: Causal Inference. We study the relationship between R on H by imposing more structure
and regressing Y on bR and X . Our preferred specification is as follows:
Yircs = λ lnbRircs + X ′ircsγ+αr +αc +αs +αrs +αrc +δsc+ εircs (2.17)
where Y is a measure of the health status of individual j, either a health outcome or a binary decision
of health investment, and X is a vector of covariates that include variables that characterize the indi-
vidual (e.g., age and gender), the household (e.g., wealth, demographics, number of children), and the
environment of the household (e.g., fixed effects and time trends).20
To allow a causal interpretation to our estimate, we instrument lnbR with women’s eligibility to the
Hindu Succession Act (HSA) amendments. The first stage of our Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS)
approach is defined as:
lnbRircs = λ˜Dircs + X ′ircsγ+αr +αc +αs +αrs +αrc +δsc+ εircs (2.18)
where D is defined the interaction between an indicator variable for being Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain,
and an indicator variable equal to one if a woman was 14 or younger at the time of the amendment in
her state and to zero if she was 23 or older.21 The second stage consists of estimating equation (2.17),
where now the regressor of interest lnbR is replaced by the fitted values from the first-stage regression. λ
is the parameter of interest and measures the average effect of a one percent increase in the unobserved
treatment bR, for those households in which the relative bargaining position of the decision makers is
influenced by women’s exposure to the HSA amendments.
Identification of a causal effect comes from the assumption that D is uncorrelated with the error term
20We consider the logarithm of the bR, instead of the variable in levels, as we believe that percentage changes matter more than a
unit change, i.e., we believe that an increase in bR from 0.20 to 0.30 does not have the same effect of an increase from 0.60 to
0.70.
21See section 2.3.1 for details.
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in our outcome equation (2.17), while adequately correlated with lnbR. The exclusion restriction needed
for identification is that the mother being eligible to the Hindu Succession Act Amendments has an effect
on the health outcomes of interest only through the increase in mother’s decision power. To strengthen
the argument that this is the case, we include state, cohort, religion, religion-cohort, and state-religion
fixed effects, and state specific linear trends in all specifications.
2.4 Results
In this section we present the results of both the structural (step 1) and causal (step 2) estimates. Unless
otherwise indicated, in all 2SLS regressions we present standard errors calculated from a bootstrap with
2,000 replications. Each replicate draws a sample of primary sampling units (village) to allow for intra-
cluster correlation in the standard errors.22 We estimate the causal model in the women, men, and
children separately, which allows us to investigate the impact of mother’s decision power on her, her
spouse’s, and her children’s health outcomes.
2.4.1 Step 1: Structural Estimation
Table 2.3 in the Appendix reports the estimated marginal effects bθ for the covariates (D, Z1, ..., Zn).
Households composition and socio-economic characteristics play an important role. The mother’s share
of resource increases the lower is the number of children, while there does not seem to be any significant
correlation with the share of resources devoted to the father. In line with Dunbar et al. (2013) and Calvi
(2016), the fraction of female children is positively related to ηm: if all children are girls, the mother’s
resource share is 3.6 percentage points larger. This result can be attributed to the fact that adult women
may be willing (or required) to forgo a higher fraction of household resources in presence of male
22Note that if in step 1 the unobserved treatment was specified as linear in the set of covariates Z , and Z coincided with X , our IV
strategy in step 2 would simplify to a least square regression of Y on bR and X , provided that standard errors are appropriately
adjusted.
67
Chapter 2 Women’s Empowerment and Family Health: A Two-Step Approach
children, due to son preference.
The estimates also indicate that the wealthier the household the higher is the fraction of household’s
total expenditure devoted to the father, everything else equal. In addition, being part of Scheduled
Caste, Scheduled Tribes, and other disadvantaged social classes is associated with higher bargaining
power of the mother relative to the father, while the opposite holds true for living in rural areas. The
fraction of resources devoted to the mother are higher in the North-East states and lower for the father,
which is consistent with the presence of a number of matrilineal societies and cultures (Khasi and Garo
societies, for example). In contrast, North Indian women seem to have a much lower bargaining power
relative to their male counterparts. Finally, a higher likelihood to be exposed to the Hindu Succession
Act amendments - women’s eligibility to the reforms - is associated with a stronger women’s bargaining
position within the household. These results confirm existing reduced-form findings in on the effects
of HSA amendments on self-reported measures of women’s autonomy and bargaining power (e.g., Roy
(2008) and Heath and Tan (2014)).
Using the estimates bθ in Table 2.3, we predict the share of resources devoted to the mother, the father
and the children, as in equation (2.15). We obtain two sets of predictions: one in-sample, using the
NSS data that we use for the estimation of the Engel curve system, and one out-of-sample, using the
NFHS-3 data, which contains all the relevant covariates (D, Z1, ..., Zn), together with individual’s health
outcomes that we will use in step 2. Table 2.4 contains descriptive statistics for the predicted resource
shares obtained in the two samples and for the implied unobserved treatment, bR. These summary
statistics take into account the empirical distributions of the covariates (D, Z1, ..., Zn), as they average
over all the values of demographic factors observed in the population. That the minima and maxima of
estimated resource shares do not fall outside the zero to one range for any person in any household in
the two sample is reassuring. Moreover, the standard deviations of resource shares are larger for men
than for women, suggesting that the covariates induce more variation for fathers than for mothers. In
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Table 2.3: Estimated DLP parameters, bθm and bθ f
Mother’s Resource Share (ηm) Father’s Resource Share (η f )
(1) (2)
I(1 child) 0.0396∗ 0.0232
(0.0239) (0.0364)
I(2 children) 0.0124 0.00833
(0.0207) (0.0335)
I(3 children) 0.0183 0.00534
(0.0211) (0.0343)
Fraction of Female Children 0.0358∗∗ -0.0164
(0.0166) (0.0195)
I(HSA Eligible) 0.0295∗∗∗ -0.0156
(0.0102) (0.0125)
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh) -0.0194 0.0469∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0216)
I(Sch. Caste, Sch. Tribe, OBC) 0.0545∗∗∗ -0.0516∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0200)
Wealth Index -0.0539 0.155∗∗∗
(0.0435) (0.0591)
I(Woman’s Higher Education) 0.0216 -0.00904
(0.0172) (0.0227)




Gender Age Gap 0.0312 -0.0687
(0.134) (0.204)
Woman’s Age -0.420 -0.140
(1.874) (2.156)
Gender Age Gap2 -0.263 -0.138
(0.405) (0.580)
Woman’s Age2 0.909 -0.593
(4.626) (5.256)
Gender Age Gap3 0.891 -0.226
(1.459) (2.180)
Woman’s Age3 -0.501 0.953
(3.673) (4.085)













Estimates are on the NSS 68th Round Consumer Expenditure data. Women’s age and age differences
are divided by 100 to ease computation. West India is the excluded region. Robust standard errors
(in parentheses) clustered at the first sampling unit level. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 2.4: Estimated Resource Shares and Woman’s Power (bR)
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: NSS Sample (Obs:15,164)
Woman’s Resource Share (bηm) 0.2993 0.0743 0.0671 0.5368
Man’s Resource Share (bη f ) 0.4484 0.1055 0.1122 0.7461
Children’s Resource Share (bηc) 0.2522 0.0762 0.0000 0.5105
Each Child’s Resource Share (bηc/s) 0.1375 0.0641 0.0000 0.4484
Woman’s Power (bR) 0.4052 0.1136 0.930 0.8271
Panel B: NFHS Sample (Obs: 20,131)
Woman’s Resource Share (bηm) 0.2860 0.0755 0.0829 0.4950
Man’s Resource Share (bη f ) 0.4531 0.1263 0.1060 0.7313
Children’s Resource Share (bηc) 0.2609 0.0847 0.0568 0.5131
Each Child’s Resource Share (bηc/s) 0.1372 0.0712 0.0374 0.4684
Woman’s Power (bR) 0.3960 0.1301 0.1102 0.8005
Summary statistics of the estimated resource shares for both samples used.
both samples, the resource share for mothers is lower than that for fathers: on average, mothers receive
about 30 percent of household resources, while close to half of the family expenditure is allocated to the
fathers. On average only one fourth of resources is allocated to children, and the per child amount of
resources declines as the number of children increases.23 The mean estimated unobserved treatment is
equal to about 40 percent in both prediction samples, which indicates that on average the mother gets
40 percent of the total resources allocated to parents (the decision makers).
How does our structurally-motivated measure of bargaining power compare with other more standard
proxies? As discussed in details in section 2.2.1, the larger is bR, the greater is the weight of the mother’s
preferences in the household program, i.e., the higher is her say in the household decision process. We
confirm this interpretation by analyzing how bR relates to self-reported measures of women’s participation
in household’s decisions. From the NFHS data, we assess a woman’s decision-making ability using
her answers to the question: “Who makes decisions about [X] in your household?". Using principal
23These numbers are in line with the results obtained in Dunbar et al. (2013) using data from the Malawi Integrated Household
Survey (IHS2). They look at married couples with up to four children.
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Figure 2.1: bR and “NO say" Index
component analysis, we create an index combining answers related to the decisions about the woman’s
own health care, large household purchases, visits to family or relatives, and purchases for daily needs.
Figure 2.1 displays the clear negative relationship between our “NO say" Index - rescaled to range from
0 to 100 - and the unobserved treatment, corroborating that the larger is bR, the higher is her say in the
household decision process. These findings are confirmed in Table B.1 in the Appendix, which shows the
correlation coefficients between the respondent’s answers, “NO say" Index and bR.
2.4.2 Step 2: Causal Inference
We adopt an instrumental variable approach to ensure the causal interpretation of the effect of the
unobserved treatment bR on the health outcomes of household members. In this section, we report the
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Table 2.5: First Stage, OLS Estimates
Woman’s Power (lnbR)
Women Men Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(HSA Eligible) 0.167∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.0187∗∗∗
(0.00702) (0.00646) (0.00860) (0.00886) (0.00728) (0.00662)
Observations 14,340 14,340 7,258 7,258 35,487 35,487
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cohort Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
State-Religion Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cohort-Religion Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Linear Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Estimates are obtained using the NFHS-3 data. All specifications include the number of children
below 15, the fraction of female children, a household wealth index, indicator variables for owning a BPL card, for living in rural areas,
and for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes. Specifications in Columns 2-4-6 include religion,
state, cohort (woman), state-religion, and cohort-religion fixed effects, and state time trends. Specifications in columns 1-2 and 5-6 also
include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the woman worked in the past 12 months and the woman’s years of education; in columns
3-4, they include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the man worked in the past 12 months and the man’s years of education. Bootstrap
standard errors in parentheses (2,500 repetitions). Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level.
results obtained with a 2SLS approach, while the least squares estimates are in tables in the Appendix.
Table 2.5 contains the first stage estimation results for women, men, and children models separately.
Household level and individual level covariates are included in columns (2)-(4)-(6). Clearly, the sample
sizes and the sets of covariates are slightly different in the three models: all specifications include the
number of children below 15, the fraction of female children, a household wealth index, indicator vari-
ables for owning a BPL card, for living in rural areas, and for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes or Other Backward Classes; columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) also include an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the woman worked in the past 12 months and the woman’s years of education, while columns
(3)-(4) include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the man worked in the past 12 months and the man’s
years of education. Moreover, the specifications in columns (5)-(6) also include the child’s age, sex,
and a dummy variable for his/her birth order (up to four). To ensure the exclusion restriction to hold,
specifications in columns (3)-(5)-(7) include also state, cohort (mother’s), state-religion, cohort-religion,
and state-specific linear trends. Even conditioning on these several sources of unobserved heterogeneity,
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mothers’ eligibility to the Hindu Succession Act amendments is positively and significantly correlated
with their bargaining position relative to the fathers, providing some evidence of the fact that weak in-
strumentation is not an issue in our setting.24 In all samples, the unobserved treatment bR is significantly
higher for women who are exposed to these amendments.
The 2SLS results indicate that the relative decision power of parents matters, however not for every-
one. When we focus on women’s health outcomes (Table 2.6), we find positive and significant effects
of women’s decision power relative to their male counterparts. A one percent increase in bR determines
significant increases in women’s weight and in their body mass index (BMI) - by about 1.2 kilograms
and 0.5 units respectively - and a decrease in their probability of being anemic by 0.04. Moreover, our
estimates indicate that more empowered mothers face higher birth intervals (or birth spacing). The
adverse health consequences of a short spacing between births are well documented: as the mother is
not allowed sufficient time to restore the adequate supply of nutrients, short spacing is found to affect
maternal health and mortality both directly and indirectly through increased risk of anemia (e.g., Conde-
Agudelo and Belizán (2000) and Milazzo (2014)). In contrast, we do not find any significant effect on
men’s health outcomes (Table 2.7), suggesting intra-household health investment is not necessarily a
zero-sum game and, thus, that women’s empowerment inside the family does not result in a decline
in men’s outcomes. Moreover, that women’s bargaining position has a much more important effect on
their health relative to their spouses might indicate that the household decision makers disagree more
strongly (and more often) on investment on women’s rather than men’s health.
Table 2.8 contains the 2SLS estimation results for the impact of mothers’ decision power on children’s
health. Our estimates indicate that women’s bargaining position does not significantly affect children’s
anthropometric indicators, such as weight and height. When we consider the impact on mother’s deci-
sion power relative to the father’s on the likelihood of children being vaccinated, however, the conclusion
24This is also confirmed by the Wald tests for joint significance of the instruments, both included and excluded.
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Table 2.6: Women’s Health, 2SLS Estimates
Weight (kg) Body Mass
Index
Pr(BMI≤18.5) Pr(Anemic) Avg. Birth
Space
(months)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman’s Power (lnbR) 121.1∗ 51.87∗ -3.744 -4.874∗∗ 321.5∗∗
(68.48) (27.03) (2.613) (2.453) (151.6)
Observations 13,838 13,824 13,824 12,952 12,028
Mean Dependent Variable 48.24 20.89 0.30 0.16 35.11
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Estimates are obtained using the NFHS-3 data. All specifications include state,
cohort (woman), state-religion, and cohort-religion fixed effects, and state time trends. The sample includes married
women of age 15 to 49 included in nuclear households with up to 4 children. All specifications include a religion
dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, number of children below 15, the fraction of female
children, woman’s years of education, a household wealth index, indicator variables for owning a BPL card, for living
in rural areas, and for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes, for having worked
in the past 12 months. Anemia includes mild and moderate anemia. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (2,500
repetitions). Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level.
Table 2.7: Men’s Health, 2SLS Estimates
Weight (kg) Body Mass Pr(BMI≤18.5) Pr(Anemic)
Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Woman’s Power (lnbR) 70.78 33.55 -0.436 -1.268
(112.9) (37.00) (4.188) (3.412)
Observations 6,886 6,884 6,884 6,230
Mean Dependent Variable 56.85 21.13 0.24 0.10
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Estimates are obtained using the NFHS-3 data. All specifications
include state, cohort (woman), state-religion, and cohort-religion fixed effects, and state time trends.
The sample includes married men of age 15 to 54 included in nuclear households with up to 4 children.
All specifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain,
number of children below 15, the fraction of female children, man’s age and years of education, a
household wealth index, indicator variables for owning a BPL card, for living in rural areas, and for
being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes, for having worked in the
past 12 months. Anemia includes mild and moderate anemia. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses
(2,500 repetitions). Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level.
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Table 2.8: Children’s Health, 2SLS Estimates
Weight (kg) Height (cm) Pr(Any
Vaccine)
Pr(BCG) Pr(DPT) Pr(Polio)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman’s Power (lnbR) -14.35 -109.2 5.428∗ 6.032 7.671 6.551∗∗
(40.01) (149.6) (3.290) (4.124) (5.273) (2.876)
Observations 8,761 8,739 9,549 9,511 9,459 9,538
Mean Dependent Variable 10.67 83.94 0.91 0.78 0.75 0.91
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Estimates are obtained using the NFHS-3 data. All specifications include state, cohort (woman),
state-religion, and cohort-religion fixed effects, and state time trends. The sample includes children 0 to 5 in nuclear households
with up to 4 children. All specifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, number
of children below 15, the fraction of female children, mother’s years of education, a household wealth index, indicator variables for
owning a BPL card, for living in rural areas, and for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes, for
having a mother who worked in the past 12 months. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (2,000 repetitions). Standard errors
clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level.
is different. We find that a one percent increase in the unobserved treatment bR leads to a 0.05 increase in
the probability of children being vaccinated. This result seem to be driven by the likelihood of children
being vaccinated against polio. Due to the larger standard errors, we do not find a significant effect
on the probability of having received the BCG (against tuberculosis) or the DPT (against diphtheria,
pertussis, and tetanus) vaccines.
2.5 Conclusion
We apply a novel two-step approach to study the effect of intra-household women’s empowerment on
the health status of family members in India. In a first step, we rely on the structural model to recover a
measure of the bargaining power of each member, which is unobservable in practice. In the second step,
we use this structurally-motivated proxy of power and study its causal effect on household member’s
health status in a reduced-form framework.
To motivate our empirical analysis, we augment the standard Dunbar et al. (2013) (DLP) collec-
tive model to include health investment decisions on each household’s member. We show that in this
framework the relative bargaining position of the decision makers matters, especially in situations of
75
Chapter 2 Women’s Empowerment and Family Health: A Two-Step Approach
disagreement. Results of the empirical application indicate that the relative decision power of parents
matters, however not for everyone. We find that the effect of women’s empowerment on their own
health outcomes is positive and significant. An increase in their bargaining power (relative to their
spouse) improves both their weight and body mass index, decreases their probability of being anemic,
and increases birth spacing. When we turn to estimate the effect of women’s relative decision power on
the health outcomes of their spouse and children, we find, respectively, no significant effect and no sig-
nificant effect on anthropometric indicators such as weight and height of the children, but a significant
increase in the likelihood of children being vaccinated.
Aside from the quantitative findings of the application, our analysis highlights the advantages of com-
bining structural and causal features in conducting empirical analysis. By using a household model to
recover a structural measure of bargaining power, we are able to answer a wider range of important
research and policy questions and to provide a more accurate assessment of the effect of women’s em-
powerment on family members’ outcomes.
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Chapter 3
Long-Term Effects of Access to Health Care:
Medical Missions in Colonial India
3.1 Introduction
According to the most recent World Health Organization (WHO) estimates, India is ranked 150th in the
world in terms of life expectancy and one out of three Indian adults is underweight. These country-level
figures hide a considerable regional variation in health conditions: while South Indian states are doing
relatively well in terms of health performance, the same cannot be said for some of the most populous
states, such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, whose health indicators are worse than those of many Sub-
Saharan African countries.1 Moreover, recent evidence suggests that differences in health performance
persist even at the sub-state level and across areas within the same district.2
This paper studies one of the possible sources of this geographical heterogeneity in health conditions
by examining the long-term effect of access to historical health facilities on current individual health
1See Pal and Ghosh (2007).
2See Srinivisan (2010). India comprises 28 states and 7 union territories. These are divided into 593 districts (Census 2001).
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outcomes. We exploit information about the diffusion, location and activities of Protestant medical
missionaries in colonial India.3 In the late nineteenth century, missionaries became aware of the role
that medicine could have in facilitating evangelization among non-Christian populations and the number
of doctors and medical personnel sent to India by Protestant societies increased dramatically.4
We investigate whether the proximity to a Protestant medical mission in colonial India predicts in-
dividual health outcomes today. To this aim, we construct a novel and unique dataset that combines
contemporary individual-level data with historical information on Protestant medical missions.5 Consis-
tent with the previous literature, we measure health status with individuals’ anthropometric indicators.6
We use geocoding tools to calculate the distance between the location of individuals today and that of
Protestant health facilities in nineteenth century India. We find that the proximity to a Protestant med-
ical mission is positively and significantly associated with current individuals’ body mass index (BMI)
and other health indicators.
To give a causal interpretation to our estimates, we account for two types of selection bias. First,
historical and geographic characteristics may have driven the missionaries’ location decisions. Second,
Protestant missions may have endogenously selected themselves into building a health facility and into
providing health care. We show that these potential biases are not the the driving force behind our
results. To correct for possible systematic differences between regions with and without Protestant mis-
sions, we restrict our sample of analysis to individuals living within a certain distance from a Protestant
mission. By limiting the analysis to more concentrated areas we minimize the risk of our findings being
driven by unobserved geographical differences. In addition, we control for the minimum distance from
3Our decision of focusing on Protestant medical missions as opposed to Catholic missions is mainly data driven. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no document that systematically records medical activities of Catholic missions. Moreover, India was
the preferred destination of the Protestant missionary venture due to its British element. Protestant were especially committed
to operate among non-elites and socially disadvantaged groups, while Catholic missionaries, at least until the Second Vatican
Council in 1965, strategically decided to focus their efforts on the elite groups of society (Mathew (1999)).
4See Mathew (1999) and Fitzgerald (2001).
5Throughout the paper we use the terms medical missions, medical facilities, medical settlements, health facilities, and hospitals,
interchangeably.
6See Schultz (2002, 2003).
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generic Protestant and Catholic missions. These variables should capture factors that also determined
the location decisions of Protestant medical missionaries. If our results were purely driven by unob-
served heterogeneity across locations, we would find a significant correlation between these variables
and individuals’ current health outcomes. We address the second type of selection bias by developing
an instrumental variable approach in the spirit of Cagé and Rueda (2014). We exploit the fact that
Protestant missionary societies differ in their inclination to undertake medical activities. We use these
differences to compute each society’s share of medical missions in all regions of the world outside of
India and then use those shares to construct our instrument. We show that our results are robust to
the instrumental variable approach. We find that halving the distance from the location of a Protestant
medical facility increases current individuals’ BMI by 0.4.
We analyze three potential transmission channels: persistence of infrastructure, improvements in
health potential (health status of previous generations and nutrition), and improvements in health habits
(hygiene and health awareness). First, consistent with the previous literature, we show that proximity
to current health facilities does not play a role.7 Second, we find that the long-term effect of historical
medical missions is partially, but not entirely, driven by improvements in health potential. Finally, we
provide evidence of the fact that proximity to a health care facility in the past may have affected individ-
ual habits regarding hygiene, preventive care and health awareness, which have been bequeathed over
time and have influenced health outcomes of later generations.
This paper represents the first attempt to investigate how the exposure to historical medical missions
may have determined advancements in current individual health outcomes. With this contribution, we
add to the growing empirical literature that looks at historical institutions as important determinants of
current outcomes and investigates path persistence in developing countries.8 More specifically, we con-
tribute to previous literature that recognizes the importance of the activities of religious organizations as
7See e.g. Chaudhury and Hammer (2004) and Banerjee et al. (2004).
8See e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2001), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), Nunn (2009), and Alesina et al. (2013).
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possible fundamental sources of economic and social outcomes.9 Previous works have identified Protes-
tantism as an important determinant of advancements in human capital by focusing on its contribution
to literacy and education.10
Recent works study how religious institutions and affiliation may help explaining differences in health
outcomes. Almond and Mazumder (2011) analyze births to Arab parents in Michigan and find that
prenatal exposure to Ramadan results in lower birth weight. While Bhalotra et al. (2010) show that
Muslim children in India have a significantly higher probability of survival in infancy than Hindu chil-
dren, Brainerd and Menon (2013) demonstrate that this advantage does not persist beyond infancy.
Finally, Menon and McQueeney (2015) find that Christian infants in India have higher health outcomes
compared to infants of other religious identities. We differ from this strand of literature in that we focus
on the long-term effect of religious institutions.
Important policy implications may be drawn from our analysis. On one hand, understanding historical
determinants of regional variation in health conditions may provide useful guidance in addressing issues
related to health inequality in modern India. On the other hand, in light of the existence of long-
run positive spillovers, the expansion of healthcare access becomes an even more critical priority, as it
provides benefits for both current and future generations. Health can influence not only individuals’
early survival and life expectancy, but also cognitive performance, schooling decisions, and productivity
as adults. Understanding accumulation of health capital in developing countries means understanding
one of the foremost determinants of economic development.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief historical description of the
Protestant medical enterprise in colonial India. Section 3.3 describes our novel dataset, and discusses
the use of anthropometric indicators as a measure of health. Section 3.4 presents our empirical strategy.
9See e.g. Barro and McCleary (2003, 2005).
10See e.g. Weber (1930), Becker and Woessmann (2009), Gallego and Woodberry (2009), Bai and Kung (2014), Cagé and Rueda
(2014), and Mantovanelli (2014).
11See Schultz (2009).
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Section 3.5 discusses the estimation results, while section 3.6 checks the robustness of our findings.
Section 3.7 investigates potential transmission channels. Finally, section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Medical Missions in Colonial India
The period between 1800-1914 represents an era of great missionary expansion led by the Protestants
of Britain and the United States. The intensity of the missionary evangelization was such that that
period is known as the great century of missions. India was the preferred destination of the Protestant
missionary venture due to its British element. In the mid-nineteenth century more than a quarter of all
the Protestant missionaries were stationed in India. On the eve of the first World War 5,200 Protestant
missionaries (of whom 2,500 British and 1,800 American) were posted in the Indian sub-continent. At
that time, only China rivaled India in terms of Protestant presence.12
At first, missionary societies showed very little interest in medicine. Protestant organizations did not
consider the establishment of hospitals and the provision of medical care as crucial for the scope of their
missions. The missionary movement was convinced that the biblical command of evangelizing every
nation was limited only to preaching and teaching the Gospel.13
Evangelizing strategies started to change from the 1860s onwards in correspondence with the growing
awareness of the deficiencies of the orthodox missionary methods. Anxiety over the lack of tangible
results provided a powerful trigger for a change in official mission policies and practices. The belief was
that the missionary sphere could rightfully include a range of activities beyond those of preaching and
teaching:
“I feel convinced that medical missions are amongst the means best calculated [...] to give a fresh
impetus to the cause of the Gospel, to help lift the chariot out of the rut in which sometimes it
12For more details refer to Richter (1908).
13The constitution of the Baptist Missionary Society, for example, stated that the propagation of Christianity consisted of “the
preaching of the Gospel, the translation of the Holy Scriptures and the establishment of Schools.”
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seems for a moment set fast and its progress retarded.”
(Rev. Thomas V. French, Bishop of Lahore, quoted by Bishop McDougal in a speech at the Oxford
Missionary Conference of 1877)
Medical missions were finally recognized as valuable auxiliaries to the work of propagating Christianity,
“The work of the doctor is to open the door that the evangelist may enter in.”
(Medical Missionary Journal [1874], 9, 58-59)
In contrast to official colonial medicine, Protestant mission medicine sought to place itself within non-
European social and institutional milieus and reached out to embrace all classes of the native society,
regardless of caste or gender.14
In light of the recognition of the importance of medicine as an effective weapon in the evangelization
process, the last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed an unprecedented growth of the medical
mission enterprise. The number of doctors and medical agents sent to India by the Protestant soci-
eties rose from 28 in 1870 to 335 in 1912. This was accompanied by a rapid increase in the number
of mission hospitals and dispensaries. By 1912, approximately three million patients were treated in
Protestant medical facilities annually. The quality of medical missionary medicine increased as well in
the closing years of the nineteenth century. At the Bombay Missionary Conference of 1892-93 a resolu-
tion was passed stating that medical missionaries in India should invariably possess a medical degree or
diploma sufficient to qualify as a licensed medical practitioner in the West. Fitzgerald (2001) indicates
that, despite initial fears, it was surgery that determined acceptance of Western medicine among the
Indian people and their greater willingness to use the resources of medical missions. Missionary reports
document that over time patients became increasingly willing to enter a mission hospital for periods of
in-patient care and were generally applying for medical assistance at an earlier stage in their illness.15 In
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700 in 1912), creating another vital contribution to the local communities.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data Sources
One of the main contributions of this paper is the creation of a unique and fully geocoded dataset that
combines historical, geographic, and contemporary information.
Contemporary Data. Current individual data are from the 2003 India World Health Survey (WHS).
The World Health Surveys (WHS) were launched by the World Health Organization to monitor and eval-
uate critical health outcomes and health systems through cross-country comparable household surveys.
The WHS were implemented between 2002 and 2004 in 70 countries selected to represent all regions
of the world. The 2003 India WHS covers individuals and households residing in seven states: Assam,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. While the survey
is centered around health-specific issues, it also provides demographic information of the respondents
and data about household composition and educational level. Crucially for the purpose of our research,
the survey discloses the geographic coordinates of where the respondents live and some anthropometric
indicators.16 Figure 3.1 shows the locations of survey respondents.
To investigate possible transmission channels of the long-term effect of access to Protestant medical
missions, we use data from the Village Directory of the 2001 Census of India and the 2007-2008 District
Level Household & Facility Survey (DLHS-3). We obtain information about the location of current health
facilities from the former, and data about health and preventive care practices from the latter. The
2001 Village Directory contains detailed information about population and infrastructure/amenities -
16The decision of not using the Demographic Health Survey, known as National Family Health Survey for India, is data driven, as
geographic coordinates are not available for this country.
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including hospitals and several types of health facilities - of all villages and towns in India. The DLHS-3,
one of the largest demographic and health surveys ever implemented in India, allows us to assess the
utilization of services provided by health care facilities and people’s health practices.17 The survey does
not provide any village level identifier, but it contains information about the village population as per
Census 2001. We follow Banerjee and Sachdeva (2014) and use the village population to match the
DLHS-3 data set with the Census 2001 data. The matching provides information on census village codes
and villages names for all of the DLHS-3 sample.18 We successfully match and geocode 21,151 villages.19
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one exploiting DLHS-3 information to construct a
fully geocoded version of the survey.20
Historical Data. Information about the location of Protestant missions in colonial India comes
from the Statistical Atlas of Christian Missions, published in 1910 in correspondence with the World
Missionary Conference held in Edinburgh (Scotland). We geocode the maps of India contained in the
Atlas to identify the exact location of Protestant missions as of 1908. Figure C.1 in the Appendix shows an
example of these maps. To identify missionary medical infrastructures we rely on the Centennial Survey
of Foreign Missions (Dennis (1902)) which provides a worldwide list of all the Protestant missions with
medical facilities and a record of their basic characteristics. For example, we know the designation of
the facility (hospital or dispensary), the foundation date, the name of the supporting Protestant society,
and the number of patients and surgical cases. A reproduction of one page of the survey is provided in
Figure C.2 in the Appendix. We digitize and geocode this information for the Indian subcontinent. We
use the same data source to identify Protestant missions with educational institutions. Our final sample
17It consists of one village level, one household level, and two individual level questionnaires (ever married women of age 15-49
and unmarried women of age 15-24). While it covers all India and the sample size is much larger than in the WHS, the DLHS-3
does not contain anthropometric indicators.
18The matching is done generating village identifiers using state, district, and village population. We drop duplicates from the
census data and all DLHS villages that have the same population at the tehsil/taluk (sub-district administrative units) level.
19The geocoding is based on Google coordinates for a string containing the names of state, district, and village.
20Banerjee and Sachdeva (2014) match the DLHS-3 data set with the Census 2001 data to analyze the impact of a nationwide
road construction program on the usage, provision, and awareness of preventive health care. Their dataset does not include
geographic coordinates. We are grateful to Ashish Sachdeva for suggesting this approach.
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Figure 3.1: Protestant Medical Missions and WHS Respondents
includes 1,069 Protestant missions. Of these, 183 are equipped with either a hospital or dispensary.
Figure 3.1 shows the locations of the Protestant medical missions.
Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Government of India started a great trans-
portation infrastructure project aimed at developing a railroad network in the Indian sub-continent.
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Railroads likely played a significant role in determining the missionaries’ location decisions. Areas with
a well-developed railways network were more likely to be targeted by missionaries as they were more
easily accessible. To take this into account we digitize and geocode historical maps from the Constable’s
Hand Atlas of India. Figure C.3 in the Appendix reports a section of one of those maps showing the status
of the Indian railways network as of 1891.
In our empirical analysis we also include information about the location of historical Catholic missions.
We rely on maps contained in the Atlas Hierarchicus, an official document of the Vatican published in
1913 reporting the worldwide geographic distribution of Catholic missions as of 1911. Figure C.4 in the
Appendix shows one of these maps.
Finally, we obtain additional historical information from the History Database of the Global Environ-
ment - HYDE 3.1.21 This database provides rasters of gridded total (estimated) historical population
(inhabitants/gridcell) and gridded cropland (km2/gridcell) from 10,000 B.C. to 2005 A.D. at a 5 × 5
minutes resolution (about 85 km2 around the equator). We extract the 1900 estimates for an area within
a 5-kilometer radius from each WHS location.
Geographical Data. We control for geographic characteristics at the WHS location level. We use
the Global Gridded Population Database from CIESIN to compute the population in year 2000 in an area
within a 5-kilometer radius from each WHS location.22 We also calculate the average elevation within
the 5-kilometer buffer using the SRTM 90m Digital Elevation Data compiled by the CGIAR Consortium for
Spatial Information.23 Both population and elevation data are available at a 30 × 30 seconds resolution
(about 0.8 km2 around the equator). To account for the importance of access to water sources, we also
include a variable measuring the number of water streams within the 5-kilometer buffer around the
WHS locations. Data are from the Digital Chart of the World.24
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3.3.2 Measuring Health
Measurement of health has recently evolved to rely on anthropometric indicators of physical develop-
ment. Previous literature has used height, weight-for-height or body mass index to measure individual
health.25 In this paper we use body mass index (BMI) as our main measure of current individual health
status.26 We also consider height and a self-reported description of current health status as alternative
measures of health.
That the relationship between health status and BMI is nonlinear is a well known fact, both at the
individual and at the aggregate level. Wailer (1984) clearly illustrates this non-linearity by showing a
U-shaped relationship between relative risk of mortality and BMI using Norwegian data from the 1970s.
Especially in low income countries, however, an increase in the caloric intake shifts the lower tail of
the BMI distribution to the right. Fogel (1994, 2004) interprets this shift as an accumulation of the
population’s health human capital, which tends to be associated with both declines in mortality and
increases in labor productivity.
Figure 3.2 shows the results of a non-parametric estimation of the relationship between health status
and BMI. Panel A suggests the presence of a non-monotonic concave relationship between respondents’
self-reported health status and BMI, while panel B indicates a convex relationship between the probabil-
ity of seeking health care in the previous month and BMI.
In our main empirical analysis we focus on individuals aged 20 to 60 with BMI between 15, the cutoff
for starvation, and 30, the obesity threshold. We therefore concentrate only on the monotonic part of
25See e.g. Wailer (1984), Fogel (1994), Schultz (2002), Schultz (2003), Weil (2005), Steckel (2008), Deaton (2008), and Schultz
(2009).




× 703. The WHO provides an international classification of adult underweight,
overweight and obesity according to BMI and fixes 18.5 as the cut-off value between underweight and normal-range, 25 as
the cut-off value between normal-range and overweight and 30 as the cut-off value between overweight and obese. A WHO
expert consultation in 2004 (Shiwaku et al. (2004)) addresses the recent debate about interpretation of recommended body-
mass index (BMI) cut-off points for determining overweight and obesity in Asian populations, and develops population-specific
cut-off points for BMI. The current BMI cut-off values for Asian Indians are 18.5, 23, 25 and 30 for the thresholds between
underweight and normal-range, between normal-range and overweight, between overweight and pre-obese and between pre-
obese and obese, respectively.
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(A) Self-reported health status (B) Health care needed in the past month
Figure 3.2: Non-parametric regression of health status on BMI
the BMI-health relationship. We exclude children, teenagers and elderly in order to avoid changes in
individuals’ BMI due to biological growth and aging. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of BMI in the
main estimation sample.27 Consistent with the previous literature, BMI is log normally distributed.28
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 contains some descriptive statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis. Columns
1 to 3 present figures for the entire population in the survey, while columns 4 to 6 show figures for the
baseline estimation sample (individuals of age 20 to 60, with BMI between 15 and 30). As there are no
significant differences between the survey sample and our baseline estimation sample, we discuss here
some descriptive statistics based on the latter.
The average BMI is 20.42, which falls in the normal range according to the WHO cutoffs, and the
average height is 159 cm. Sixty-one percent of individuals rate their own health good or very good,
27Bandwidth: 0.75; Epanechnikov kernel function.
28See Burmaster and Crouch (1997) and Hjelmborg et al. (2008).
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of BMI in the estimation sample
while only 13 percent rate their health bad or very bad.29 About half of the sample consists of females
and individuals who completed primary school; the average age is 37 years and households have on
average six members. The wealth quartiles are based on a wealth index computed as the first principal
component that combines information about a set of household assets.30
The mean distance from a Protestant medical mission is 81 kilometers, and the mean distance from a
generic Protestant mission - with or without a medical facility - is equal to 37 kilometers. On average,
respondents live 65 kilometers away from a Catholic mission, while the distance from the location
of Protestant missions with an educational institution is larger. Data on population in year 2000 are
available at at the 30” × 30" grid cell. For year 1900, they are available at the 5’ × 5’ resolution, which
29Self-reported health status is an ordinal variable (from 0, “very bad", to 4, “very good") determined by the response to the survey
question “How would you rate your health today?".
30Number of rooms in dwelling, refrigerator, scooter, radio, and bike.
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explains why the average population in 1900 is larger than that in year 2000.
The location of a Protestant mission is likely not random. A number of geographic and historical
factors may have driven the settlement decisions of missionaries in colonial India, such as access to
clean water, population density, altitude, accessibility by railways, land crop suitability, and the prox-
imity to a Catholic mission. Previous literature shows that Protestant missionaries choose to locate in
geographically favorable and more accessible regions.31
In Table 3.2, we investigate how geographic and historical controls vary as we restrict the sample
to areas closer to a Protestant mission or to a Protestant medical mission. Columns 1-2 (3-4) (5-6)
report means and standard deviations of historical and geographic controls when the sample is restricted
to observations below the 25th (50th) (75th) percentile of minimum distance from a mission (Panel
A) or from a medical mission (Panel B).32 Historical population in 5-kilometer radius increases as we
restrict the sample to nearby areas, suggesting that missionaries settled in more densely populated
areas. Moreover, areas close to missionary settlements have better access to colonial railways and water
sources. The distance from a Catholic mission increases as farther away areas are included in the sample.
On one hand, this suggests that the factors driving location decisions of Protestant missionaries are
similar to those driving location decisions of Catholic missionaries. On the other hand, it indicates that
the presence of a Catholic mission did not act as a deterrent to the settlement of Protestant missionaries.
31See e.g. Johnson (1967), Nunn (2010), and Cagé and Rueda (2014).
32The mission distance percentiles are 14 kilometers (25th), 29 kilometers (50th) and 49 kilometers (75th); the medical mission




















Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
All sample Estimation Sample
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Body Mass Index (BMI) 9,305 20.59 6.16 7046 20.42 3.02
Height (cm) 9,305 158.73 11.35 7046 159.08 10.10
1(Self-reported health = Very bad) 9,566 0.02 0.14 7046 0.01 0.12
1(Self-reported health = Bad) 9,566 0.13 0.34 7046 0.12 0.32
1(Self-reported health = Moderate) 9,566 0.26 0.44 7046 0.26 0.44
1(Self-reported health = Good) 9,566 0.36 0.48 7046 0.38 0.49
1(Self-reported health = Very good) 9,566 0.22 0.41 7046 0.23 0.42
1(Female) 9,627 0.51 0.50 7046 0.52 0.50
1(Married) 9,624 0.77 0.42 7046 0.82 0.38
1(Major ethnic group) 9,625 0.81 0.39 7046 0.81 0.39
1(Primary school completed) 9,627 0.52 0.50 7046 0.53 0.50
1(Wealth 1st quartile) 9,469 0.29 0.45 7046 0.29 0.45
1(Wealth 2nd quartile) 9,469 0.22 0.41 7046 0.22 0.41
1(Wealth 3rd quartile) 9,469 0.26 0.44 7046 0.25 0.44
1(Wealth 4th quartile) 9,469 0.24 0.43 7046 0.24 0.42
Age 9,626 38.85 15.22 7046 36.68 11.19
Household size 9,619 5.99 2.42 7046 5.99 2.36
Population in 2000 (000s) 9,181 5815.12 12851.37 7046 5745.19 12657.62
Altitude (meters) 9,181 264.72 250.02 7046 262.04 247.97
No. rivers/water sources 9,181 1.16 1.57 7046 1.17 1.59
No. colonial railways 9,181 0.19 0.43 7046 0.18 0.43
Population in 1900 (000s) 9203 33523.47 83538.05 7046 33288.43 82041.03
Cropland in 1900 (km2) 9,203 38.48 33.15 7046 38.14 33.30
Latitude 9181 22.85 4.81 7,046 22.99 4.77
Longitude 9181 80.01 6.43 7,046 80.05 6.48
Distance from Protestant medical mission (km) 9,181 81.37 59.58 7046 81.49 59.61
Distance from Protestant mission (km) 9,203 36.51 34.06 7046 36.75 34.12
Distance from Catholic mission (km) 9,203 64.13 52.86 7046 64.65 53.18
Distance from Protestant mission with university (km) 9,203 225.09 177.98 7046 227.08 180.96
Distance from Protestant mission with boarding school (km) 9,203 113.65 103.04 7046 114.98 104.98
Distance from Protestant mission with high school (km) 9,203 156.36 173.67 7046 159.48 176.93
Distance from allopathic hospital from Census 2001 (km) 9,203 20.64 25.42 7046 20.55 25.12
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. The wealth quartiles are based on a wealth index computed
as the first principal component that combines information about a set of household assets: number of rooms in dwelling, and asset ownership,
such as refrigerator, scooter, radio, and bike. Population, altitude, presence of rivers/water sources, access to colonial railways and cropland data
are extracted in 5 km-radius buffers around the WHS locations. Population in year 2000 and elevation data are available at the 30” × 30" grid cell;




















Table 3.2: Geographical and Historical Controls
Sample Restricted (Below Percentile of Distance)
25% 50% 75%
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Distance from Protestant mission
Population in 2000 (000s) 12.22 18.99 9.91 17.21 7.37 14.50
Altitude (meters) 269.46 317.21 252.50 275.35 258.54 266.86
No. rivers/water sources within 5 km 1.31 1.81 1.31 1.73 1.21 1.61
Latitude 21.10 4.73 21.94 4.91 22.29 4.91
Longitude 80.17 6.31 80.41 6.31 80.35 6.21
Population in 1900 (000s) 77.07 133.91 55.13 110.97 41.75 94.58
Cropland in 1900 (km2) 39.84 34.23 41.20 33.22 41.73 33.50
No. colonial railways within 5 km 0.38 0.60 0.29 0.52 0.22 0.46
Distance from Catholic mission (km) 37.43 39.36 44.29 43.42 50.36 42.25
Distance from Protestant mission with university (km) 179.74 150.30 190.08 160.31 194.29 163.11
Distance from Protestant mission with boarding school (km) 79.73 83.96 90.57 88.82 94.29 89.08
Distance from Protestant mission with high school (km) 9203 156.36 173.67 7046 159.48 176.93
Panel B: Distance from Protestant medical mission
Population in 2000 (000s) 16.83 21.40 10.31 16.98 7.42 14.54
Altitude (meters) 199.48 281.18 219.16 259.60 252.04 257.92
No. rivers/water sources within 5 km 1.39 1.88 1.35 1.70 1.24 1.66
Latitude 22.44 4.15 22.83 4.25 23.04 4.47
Longitude 79.99 6.07 80.39 5.87 80.24 6.13
Population in 1900 (000s) 98.60 145.72 56.70 112.08 41.49 94.81
Cropland in 1900 (km2) 39.72 35.21 45.33 33.69 41.77 33.63
No. colonial railways within 5 km 0.45 0.62 0.27 0.52 0.22 0.47
Distance from Catholic mission (km) 30.30 30.70 45.14 37.37 55.09 40.34
Distance from Protestant mission with university (km) 110.55 117.00 139.15 121.84 187.69 151.23
Distance from Protestant mission with boarding school (km) 44.28 41.66 58.94 48.17 83.78 69.46
Distance from Protestant mission with high school (km) 62.44 78.74 87.60 89.20 123.43 136.51
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. The mission distance percentiles (based on all
sample statistics) are 14 kilometers (25th), 29 kilometers (50th) and 49 kilometers (75th); the medical mission distance percentiles (based
on all sample statistics) are 28 kilometers (25th), 75 kilometers (50th) and 121 kilometers (75th). Population, altitude, number of colonial
railways and cropland data are extracted in 5 km buffers around the WHS locations. Original population in year 2000 and elevation data are
available at the 30” × 30" grid cell; original population in year 1900 and cropland data are available at the 5’ × 5’ resolution. Latitude and
longitude are in decimal degrees.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
Our baseline specification is as follows:






vdγ3 + εivd (3.1)
where BMIivd is the body mass index of individual i, living in village v in district d.
33 Hospital distanceivd
is the logarithm of the minimum aerial distance between the Protestant medical mission and survey
respondent i.34 β/100 measures the change in BMI following a 1 percent change in the distance from a
location of a Protestant medical mission.
We control for a large set of covariates influencing both current individuals’ BMI and the location of
a Protestant hospital at the end of the nineteenth century. X ivd contains individual and household level
characteristics such as gender, marital status, level of education, ethnic group, age, household size, and
a measure of wealth. The vector W gvd includes village specific geographic controls, such as population
density (2000 population living within a 5-kilometer radius), number of rivers or lakes and average
altitude in a 5-kilometer radius, latitude and longitude. W hvd contains additional historical characteristics,
such as estimated population and area covered by cropland in 1900, and access to colonial railways in
1892. We include district level fixed effects, αd , to account for unobserved heterogeneity across districts.
In order to identify the causal effect of the proximity to a historical Protestant medical facility on
current individuals’ health outcomes, we address two types of selection bias. First, as discussed in section
3.3.3, historical and geographic characteristics may have driven the missionaries’ decision of settling
down in specific locations. Moreover, Protestant missions may have endogenously selected themselves
into building a health facility and into providing health care.
33The survey provides anthropometric information for one single individual per household, so the individual and household
dimensions coincide in our dataset.
34We consider the logarithm of the distance, instead of the variable in levels, as we believe that percentage changes in distance
from a Protestant medical mission matters more than level changes, i.e. we believe that an increase in distance from 10 km to
50 km does not have the same effect of an increase in distance from 110 km to 150 km.
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We deal with the first potential selection issue in two ways. First, in order to correct for possible
systematic differences between regions with and without Protestant missions, we restrict our sample of
analysis to individuals living close to a Protestant mission. By limiting the analysis to more concentrated
areas we attempt to minimize the risk of our findings being driven by (within district) unobserved differ-
ences. Second, we expand W hvd to include the minimum distance from a generic Protestant and Catholic
missions. These variables, while potentially endogenous, should capture factors that also determine the
location decisions of Protestant medical missionaries. If our results were purely driven by unobserved
heterogeneity across locations, we would find a significant correlation between these variables and indi-
viduals’ current health outcomes. Moreover, this approach allows us to check that our results are indeed
driven by proximity to a Protestant medical mission and not by proximity to a generic mission.
We address the second potential source of selection bias by using an instrumental variable approach.
The fact that Protestant missionaries built medical missions in historically and geographically favorable
areas may bias the OLS estimates of β upwards. In contrast, potential downward bias of OLS estimates
may arise due to measurement error, and to the fact that medical missions were built in areas where
medical care was more needed.
Several associations of missionaries and evangelists started to emerge in the late eighteenth century
with the purpose of “administering funds, [...] sending out missionaries, initiating and conducting mis-
sionary operation, funding churches and institutions, and otherwise fulfilling the varied aims of mission
effort".35 To construct our instrument we follow Cagé and Rueda (2014) and exploit the heterogeneity
in the missionary societies’ propensity to undertake medical activities. For each of the 183 Protestant
medical missions in our dataset, we observe the supporting missionary society. For each missionary
35Dennis (1902).
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society, we compute its share of medical missions outside India as:
Society hospital share=
No. medical missions outside India
No. missions outside India
(3.2)
By construction, all medical missions supported by the same missionary society are assigned the same
share.36 Society hospital share can be interpreted as a measure of the propensity of the supporting mis-
sionary society to be involved in medical activities, and, therefore, as a measure of the likelihood to have
a health facility in their missions. We then construct our instrument as the sum of these shares for all




Society hospital sharem(k)ivd (3.3)
Figure C.5 in the Appendix provides a graphical illustration of how we construct the instrument.38 The
first stage of our IV approach is defined as:








vdγ3 + εivd (3.4)
where Hospital distanceivd is the logarithm of the minimum distance between the Protestant medical
mission and the location of survey respondent i and Hospital shareKivd is our instrument as defined in
36Table C.1 in the Appendix contains information about the missionary societies we include in our main analysis. The table in-
cludes only societies affiliated with medical missions historically located less than 50 kilometers away from a WHS respondent.
Data are from the Centennial Survey of Foreign Missions.
37Our findings do not change if we construct our instrumental variable as the sum of shares, defined as in equation (3.3), for all
missions, both medical and non-medical. See section 3.6 for more details.
38The larger is the radius K , the weakly larger is the value of the instrument, by construction. We consider the sum of
Society hospital share instead of the average, as we want to capture the fact that being close to missions affiliated with health
oriented societies indeed is associated with a lower distance from a Protestant medical mission. Consider two individuals A and
B, both located less than K kilometers away from a mission affiliated with the American Baptist Missionary Union, for which
about 23 percent of missions outside of India are medical. If A and B only had one mission located less than K kilometers away,
Hospital shareKivd would equal 23 for both of them. Now suppose individual A, instead, was located less than K kilometers
away from two missions, one supported by the American Baptist Missionary Union and the other by the Wesleyan Missionary
Society, for which less than 3 percent of missions outside of India are medical. Considering the average of Society hospital share
would assign a value of 12.2 to individual A, and therefore make him less likely than individual B to live closer to a medical
mission. This would be incorrect.
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(3.3).
Identification comes from the assumption that Hospital shareKivd is uncorrelated with the error term in
our outcome equation (3.1), while adequately correlated with Hospital distanceivd . The larger Society hospital share,
the more likely it is for a mission associated with this society to be equipped with a hospital. The larger
Hospital shareKivd , the more likely it is for an individual to be closer to a medical mission. The exclu-
sion restriction requires Hospital shareKivd to affect current individuals health outcomes only through the
proximity to a Protestant medical mission. More specifically, Society hospital share must be uncorrelated
with any other long-term determinants of individuals’ health. In section 3.6, we address concerns about
potential violations of this assumption.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Baseline Model
Table 3.3 presents the baseline OLS estimates. Column 1 shows that BMI and the distance from a
Protestant medical mission are significantly and negatively related. The estimated coefficient is equal to
-0.271, indicating that a 1 percent increase in the distance is associated with a decrease in individual’s
BMI by 0.00271. In other words, doubling the distance is associated with a decrease in BMI by 0.19.39
Estimates in columns 2 to 5 indicate that the negative correlation between proximity to a medical
mission and health outcome today is robust to the inclusion of district fixed effects, individual charac-
teristics and geographic and historical village level controls. While village level controls do not seem
to play a role in determining individuals’ health status - with altitude and access to colonial railways
being the only exceptions - some of the individual level variables are significantly associated with BMI.
As expected, better educated individuals have higher levels of BMI, and the same holds for wealthier
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Table 3.3: OLS Estimates
BMI
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.271∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
(0.0527) (0.0975) (0.0912) (0.0921) (0.0923)
1(Female) -0.103 -0.108 -0.108
(0.0779) (0.0779) (0.0843)
1(Married) 0.104 0.109 0.109
(0.104) (0.103) (0.0953)
1(Primary school completed) 0.287∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.0890) (0.0892) (0.0873)
1(Major ethnic group) -0.135 -0.109 -0.109
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Age 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0225)
Age2 -0.00148∗∗∗ -0.00147∗∗∗ -0.00147∗∗∗
(0.000280) (0.000281) (0.000284)
Household size -0.149∗∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.151∗∗
(0.0697) (0.0697) (0.0650)
Household size2 0.00784∗ 0.00807∗ 0.00807∗
(0.00448) (0.00448) (0.00420)
1(Wealth 2nd quartile) 0.287∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.0971) (0.0970) (0.0967)
1(Wealth 3rd quartile) 0.536∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗
(0.0965) (0.0960) (0.0941)
1(Wealth 4th quartile) 1.076∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.113) (0.107)
Population in 2000 (000s) 0.00725 0.00725
(0.00549) (0.00667)
Altitude (meters) 0.000853∗ 0.000853∗
(0.000458) (0.000460)






Population in 1900 (000s) 0.00000992 0.00000992
(0.000897) (0.00147)
Cropland in 1900 (km2) 0.00126 0.00126
(0.00181) (0.00191)
No. colonial railways -0.307∗ -0.307∗
(0.177) (0.164)
N 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046
Mean Dependent Variable 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls No No No Yes Yes
Historical controls No No No Yes Yes
Spatial standard errors No No No No Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level in columns 1 to 4. Standard errors corrected
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individuals. Moreover, BMI increases with age, but at a decreasing rate. The magnitude and signifi-
cance of the coefficient of interest are almost unchanged across all specifications. Once district fixed
effects, individual, and village level controls are included, the OLS estimates indicate that a 50 percent
reduction in the distance from a Protestant medical mission is associated with an increase in BMI by
0.17.40 In columns 1 to 4, robust standard errors are clustered at the primary sampling unit level, which
corresponds to villages in rural areas and to wards in urban areas. Column 5 reports standard errors
corrected for spatial correlation (Conley (2008)).41
3.5.2 Alternative Measures of Health and Proximity
In this paper, BMI and the logarithm of the minimum distance are our preferred variables of interest.
Before proceeding further with our empirical analysis, we demonstrate that our findings are robust to
alternative measures of health and proximity.
Results are confirmed when using height or a self-reported description of current health status to
measure individual health.42 The higher is the distance from a Protestant medical mission, the lower is
the individuals’ height. In particular, doubling the distance is associated with a decrease in height by
about 0.75 centimeters. In addition, we find that an increase in distance from a historical medical facility
is associated with an increase in the probability that an individual describes her health as “moderate" or
worse and with a decrease in the probability that an individual describes her health as “good" or “very
good". Table 3.4 presents the estimated coefficients. Figure C.6 in the Appendix displays the ordered
probit marginal effects.
When considering the logarithm of the distance, instead of the variable in levels, we assume that
40See footnote 39.
41Findings are robust to a change of the specification to a log-log model, where the coefficient can be interpreted as the the
percentage change in BMI following a 1 percent change in the distance from a location of a Protestant medical mission. Results
for this alternate specification are included in table C.2 in the Appendix.
42Height has been widely used in the literature and includes the long-run effect of fetal and childhood nutritional limitations and
disease environment (Fogel (1994), Schultz (2002), Schultz (2003), Weil (2005), and Steckel (2008)).
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Table 3.4: Alternative Measures of Health
Height (cm) Self-reported
Health Status
OLS OLS Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.754∗∗ -0.0627∗∗ -0.129∗
(0.339) (0.0318) (0.0678)
N 7,046 6,995 6,995
Mean Dependent Variable 159.08 2.69 2.69
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward)
level. Column 3 contains the estimated coefficient of the latent model. The estimated coefficient in column 4
suggests that the latent variable increases with the proximity to a Protestant medical mission.
percentage changes in distance from a Protestant medical mission matter more than level changes. We
test against this assumption by estimating a linear model. We do not find evidence of a linear relationship
between the minimum distance from a Protestant medical mission and current individuals’ BMI when
the entire sample is considered. However, the existence of a linear relationship cannot be rejected if only
relatively small distances are considered.43
Our findings are confirmed when we consider non-parametric measures of proximity, such as the pres-
ence of a Protestant medical mission nearby. On average, individuals living less than 5 or 25 kilometers
away from the location of a historical medical mission have higher BMI than individuals who do not (by
about 0.78 and 0.48, respectively). We find that the presence of a medical mission within 50 kilometer
plays a role only when interacted with the logarithm of the minimum distance. For individuals living less
than 50 kilometers away, doubling the distance would decrease their BMI by 0.25. For those living more
than 50 kilometers away, doubling the distance would decrease their BMI by 0.19. Table 3.5 presents
the estimation results.44
43We restrict the sample to individuals living less than 50 kilometers from a historical medical facility. However, the existence of
a linear relationship cannot be rejected if individuals living up to 68 kilometers away are considered.
44To take into account the fact that the minimum distance may not capture actual proximity due to geographic and historical
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Table 3.5: Alternative Measures of Proximity
BMI
Baseline Distance Baseline
sample ≤ 50 km Sample
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (km) -0.00291 -0.0433∗∗∗
(0.00208) (0.00859)
1(Medical mission within 5 km) 0.775∗∗∗
(0.224)
1(Medical mission within 25 km) 0.479∗∗
(0.217)
1(Medical mission within 50 km) 0.0578
(0.161)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.276∗∗∗
(0.0912)
1(Medical mission within 50 km) × -0.0797∗
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) (0.0466)
N 7,046 2,666 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046
Mean Dependent Variable 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level.
3.5.3 Geographical and Historical Selection
As discussed in section 3.3.3, the non-random location of missionary stations may introduce bias in the
OLS estimates presented in table 3.3.45
In columns 1 to 3 of table 3.6, we restrict the estimation sample to areas within 49 kilometers (75th
percentile), 29 kilometers (50th percentile), and 14 kilometers (25th percentile) from a Protestant mis-
characteristics, we interact it with the presence of colonial railways, access to rivers and altitude, alternatively. The interaction
term is not significant in any of the alternative specifications. Results are available upon request.
45Endogenous migration decisions of individuals may also introduce a bias in baseline estimates. While we do not observe the
migration history of survey respondents and their ancestors, we can control for the mass migration occurred after the partition
of India of 1947, and the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971. Our findings are confirmed when we estimate our
specification (3.1) in a subsample that excludes those Indian states that were more affected by these episodes of mass migration
(Assam, West Bengal, and Rajasthan). Results are available upon request.
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sion. Such restrictions represent an attempt to correct for possible differences between regions with and
without Protestant missions. Our coefficient of interest, β remains statistically significant as the sample
size decreases, suggesting that our results are not driven by endogenous missionary location. The esti-
mated coefficients on the logarithm of the distance from a Protestant medical mission are -0.331, -0.272,
and -0.403, respectively. For individuals living within the 25th percentile of the minimum distance from
a Protestant mission, a 50 percent increase in the distance decreases BMI by 0.16. If only individuals
living within the median distance are included, doubling the distance from a medical mission decreases
the BMI by about 0.19, while if only the upper quartile is excluded from the sample, we find that a 100
percent increase in the distance decreases BMI by 0.23.
We then augment our set of controls to include measures of proximity to a Protestant mission - with or
without a medical facility - and a Catholic mission. This alternative specification allows us to address two
issues. First, it provides an additional way of testing whether unobserved heterogeneity across locations
is the main driver of our findings. Common factors may have determined the location decisions of
Protestant and Catholic missionaries, independent of the missionary activities. If these factors were
driving our results, we would find a significant correlation between individual health today and these
additional variables. Second, it allows us to assess whether our previous results are driven by vicinity to
a medical mission or by proximity to other missionary activities. Column 5 to 6 show this is not the case.
Our results indicate that that proximity to a generic Protestant or Catholic mission and current individual
BMI are not correlated. In contrast, our coefficient of interest β remains negative and statistically
significant at the 5 percent level.
3.5.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation
We adopt an instrumental variable approach to deal with measurement error and the possible endoge-
nous selection of Protestant missionaries into building a health facility. Table 3.7 shows the estimation
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Table 3.6: Geographical and Historical Selection
BMI
Distance ≤ percentile Baseline
75% 50% 25% Sample
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.331∗∗∗ -0.272∗ -0.403∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗ -0.216∗∗
(0.120) (0.141) (0.128) (0.102) (0.107)
Distance from Protestant mission (log) -0.000107 0.0347
(0.103) (0.111)
Distance from Catholic mission (log) -0.131
(0.117)
N 5,230 3,476 1,825 7,046 7,046
Mean Dependent Variable 20.54 20.70 20.91 20.42 20.42
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level. Mission distance
percentiles based on all sample statistics. 14 kilometers: 25th; 29 kilometers: 50th; 49 kilometers: 75th.
results.46 Columns 1 to 3 report the estimated coefficients for the first stage regression, without and
with individual, geographic, and historical controls. The distance from a Protestant medical mission is
negatively correlated with the instrument Hospital share50ivd . In all specifications, the coefficient of inter-
est in equation (3.4), λ, is significant at the 1 percent level. Columns 4 to 6 show the 2SLS estimation
results.The first stage F statistics is largely above 10, suggesting that Hospital share50ivd is a non-weak
instrument for our endogenous regressor Hospital distanceivd .
47
The relationship between distance from a medical mission and individuals’ BMI presented in sec-
tion 3.5.1 is robust to the instrumental variable approach: proximity to a Protestant medical missions
increases BMI. Even though the level of significance of β decreases to 5 percent in column 5, the mag-
nitude of the estimated coefficient more than doubles if compared to the OLS estimates in table 3.3.48
46We build our instrument using a 50 kilometer radius. In section 3.6 we show that our results are robust to changes in the radius.
47We report the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics, which is robust to non-iid errors.
48This significant increase in the magnitude of the effect is likely due to measurement error in our measure of distance and
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Table 3.7: IV Estimates
Distance from Protestant BMI
medical mission (log)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hospital share (50km radius) -1.138∗∗∗ -1.012∗∗∗ -0.774∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.238) (0.215)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.769∗∗∗ -0.622∗∗ -0.734∗
(0.249) (0.300) (0.401)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic - - - 29.02 18.03 13.01
N 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046
Mean dependent variable 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Geographical controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Historical controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Distance from Protestant mission (log) No No Yes No No Yes
Distance from Catholic mission (log) No No Yes No No Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level.
When individual and village level controls are included, a 50 percent reduction in the distance from a
Protestant medical facility increases current BMI by 0.43.
3.6 Robustness Checks and Additional Results
We perform a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our findings. In this section, all
specifications are estimated with OLS, and, unless otherwise noted, contain the minimum distance from
a Protestant mission and from a Catholic mission as additional controls.
the consequent attenuation bias of the OLS estimates. The geocoding of Protestant medical missions is based on Google
coordinates for a string containing the names of state, district, and village/city, which may suffer from measurement issues.
While we acknowledge that the increase in the magnitude of the effect may be driven by violations of the exclusion restriction,
in section 3.6 we show that this is unlikely.
103
Chapter 3 Long-Term Effects of Access to Health Care: Medical Missions in Colonial India
3.6.1 Exclusion Restriction
The exclusion restriction for the validity of our IV approach requires Hospital shareKivd to affect current in-
dividuals’ health outcomes only through the proximity to a Protestant medical mission. This assumption
may be problematic as societies with and without medical missionaries might differ along dimensions
other than their likelihood to have a health facility. These differences may affect development and con-
temporary health outcomes independent of the health channel, which would represent a violation of the
exclusion restriction.
We address this concern in three ways. First, we show that, once controlling for the number of
missionary stations, societies involved and not involved in medical activities are not different from each
other. Second, we follow Lewbel (2012) to supplement the model with external instruments and confirm
the validity of our instrument by performing a test of overidentifying restrictions. Finally, we relax the
exclusion restriction as in Conley et al. (2012) and show that the direct effect of the instrument on
individual BMI would have to be quite large to render our IV results insignificant.
Societies With and Without Medical Missionaries. To test whether missionary societies involved
in medical activities are systematically different from those that are not, we exploit information about
295 missionary society active worldwide in 1902.49 Table C.5 in the Appendix compares income, diffu-
sion, and investments of missionary societies outside of India depending on whether they had medical
missionaries or physicians. On average, societies involved in medical activities were founded earlier and
had a larger number of stations worldwide. However, when looking at activities, size and income of
each missionary station affiliated with medical and non-medical societies, no significant difference can
be detected.
49Data are from the Centennial Survey of Foreign Missions. For simplicity, we only focus on “societies directly engaged in conducting
foreign missions" (class 1 societies according to Dennis (1902)).
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Testing Overidentifying Restrictions. If the number of instruments is strictly larger than the
number of endogenous regressors, the validity of instruments can be checked by performing a test of
overidentifying restrictions. While this is not a test for exogenenity of the instruments, but rather that
the additional restrictions imposed by having additional instruments are valid, a rejection of the null
hypothesis would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. In order to achieve overidentification, we
follow Lewbel (2012) and supplement the model with heteroskedasticity based external instruments.50
We estimate the model in equation (3.1) by 2SLS using Hospital share50ivd and the generated variables
as instruments for Hospital distanceivd .
51 Table C.6 reports estimates obtained using only generated
instruments and using both generated and excluded instruments, together with the Hansen J statistic,
its degrees of freedom, and p-value. In both cases, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Plausibly Exogenous Instrument. Following Conley et al. (2012), we relax the exclusion re-
striction and assume that the potential direct effect of the instrument on individual BMI is uniformly
distributed in an interval [0,δ], with δ > 0.52 By varying δ, we identify the threshold at which the
second-stage coefficient on the distance from a medical missions becomes insignificant at the 10% level.
Figure C.7 shows how large the exclusion restriction violation would need to be in order to invalidate
the reduced form results: as long the direct effect of Hospital share50ivd on BMI is smaller than 0.24, our
second stage is still significant at the 10% level.53 To gauge magnitudes, we compare this to the overall
reduced-form effect of our instrument on individual BMI, which is 0.63.54 Therefore, to render our IV
results insignificant, the direct effect of Hospital share50ivd on BMI should be about as large as 40 percent
of the overall effect.
50The Pagan-Hall test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedastic disturbances (χ2(170) = 279.602), so that Lewbel’s
method can be applied. We implement it in Stata using the ivreg2h command (Baum and Schaffer (2012)).
51For simplicity, we center all variables to remove district fixed effects. This allows us to generate 19 additional instruments.
52Standard IV estimation requires that γ= 0 in the following equation y = Xβ + Zγ+ε. Conley et al. (2012) relax the restriction
that γ= 0, and replace it with the assumption that gamma is close to, but not necessarily equal to, zero.
53Figure C.7 is produced using the plausexog code by Clarke (2014) and the local to zero approach (Conley et al. (2012)).




ivdγ1+W g ′vdγ2+W h′vdγ3+
εivd .
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3.6.2 Estimation sample
In section 3.3.2, we discuss the use of BMI as a measure of health status and our decision to restrict
the estimation sample to individuals of age 20 to 60 and with BMI between 15 and 30. Given the non-
monotonic relationship between individuals’ BMI and health status, we expect our results to weaken
when we include individuals in the far right tail of the BMI distribution (i.e., those who would fall into
the obese category, as defined by the WHO). Moreover, as teenagers and elderly may experience changes
in BMI due to biological growth and aging that are not directly related to their health status, we expect
our results to be affected by the inclusion of individuals 15-20 and 60-65 in the sample. Our results are
robust, but weaker, if we extend the estimation sample to individuals of age 15 to 65 and with BMI 18.5
to 30, 15 to 35, and 15 to 45.55 The sample size decreases drastically once we include only people with
BMI above the pre-obesity threshold. As hypothesized, however, the relationship between proximity to
a Protestant medical mission and current individuals’ BMI disappears. Table C.3 in the Appendix shows
the results for these different estimations samples.
3.6.3 Instrument
We test whether our findings are robust to the way we construct the instrumental variable. First, we
find our results from the IV estimation to be robust to variations in the radius used to construct the
instrument. Second, we show that our findings do not change if we construct our instrumental variable
as the sum of societies’ medical shares, defined as in equation (3.3), for all missions, both medical and
non-medical. To this end, we use data from the World Atlas Of Christian Missions (1911) which includes
information about medical and non-medical missions active in 1911 and their affiliated missionary soci-
eties.56 Table C.4 in the Appendix presents the estimation results.
55See footnote 26 for detailed description of the WHO cutoffs.
56We classify a mission to be a medical mission if the presence of a doctor is recorded. Non-medical missions were often affiliated
with societies with relatively low Society hospital share. The correlation coefficient between the two versions of the instrument
is 0.89 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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3.6.4 Proximity to Protestant Schools
Parallel to and in most cases preceding the development of medical activities, Protestant missionaries
invested in several educational, cultural and philanthropic activities. Previous literature stressed the
role of Protestantism in increasing human capital by focusing on its contribution to the advancement of
literacy and education.57
To assess whether the long-term effect is transmitted via an educational, rather than medical, chan-
nel, we control for the minimum distance to different types of educational institutions. Figure C.8 in
the Appendix shows the spatial distribution of Protestant boarding schools, high schools and universities
operating in colonial India in 1902. While there is some overlapping between the locations of medical
facilities and schools, it is far from perfect. We exploit this variation to disentangle the effect of prox-
imity to educational from that related to proximity to medical facilities. To this end, we augment our
empirical specification with the logarithm of the minimum distance between individual i and a Protes-
tant educational institution. As shown in table C.7, we still find a negative and statistically significant
relationship between hospital distance and current BMI. Proximity to Protestant educational institutions
does not seem to play a role, both when excluding (column 4) and including (column 5) the distance
from a Protestant medical mission.
3.6.5 Medical Mission Activities
We investigate whether the effect of proximity to a Protestant medical mission varies with the size of the
medical facility and with the type of medical procedures performed.
First, we interact the logarithm of the minimum distance with an indicator variable equal to one if the
closest medical mission had a total number of patients, treatments and surgeries above the median.58
57See e.g. Cagé and Rueda (2014) and Mantovanelli (2014).
58We collect additional information about activities and characteristics of Protestant medical missions from the Centennial Survey
of Foreign Mission. In particular, for each medical mission we retrieve data about the total number of patients, treatments
and surgeries in 1902 and we use their sum as a proxy for the size of the medical mission. When more than one hospital
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Second, we test the hypothesis that it was surgery that determined the acceptance of Western medicine
among the Indian people by interacting the distance with an indicator variable equal to one if surgeries
were performed at the closest medical mission.59
Table C.8 shows the OLS estimates for these alternative specifications. The estimates indicate that
there is no independent effect on individuals’ health coming from the closest medical mission being
sizable. Proximity to a Protestant medical mission, however, has a larger impact on individuals who live
close to a mission with an above median number of treatments and patients. We show that individuals for
which surgeries were performed at the closest medical mission have, on average, a higher BMI. However,
when an interaction term is included, the independent effect of proximity to surgery disappears. The
effect of proximity to a medical mission is larger when surgery was available. These differences are
however not statistically significant.
3.7 Long-Term Transmission Channels
In this section, we look at the mechanisms underlying the long-term effect of Protestant medical missions
on individual health. We identify three potential channels: infrastructure, health potential (health status
of previous generations, income and nutrition), and health culture (hygiene and health awareness).60
3.7.1 Persistence of Infrastructure
In the previous sections, we omit current access to health care from our baseline specification to avoid
identification issues. We include it now as we want to investigate the independent effects of long-
term and short-term access to health care. We measure short-term access to health care today with the
or dispensary are present in the same village (city), the total number of patients, treatment and surgeries is computed at the
village (city) level.
59Fitzgerald (2001) suggests it was surgery that determined acceptance of Western medicine among the Indian people and their
greater willingness to use the resources of medical missions.
60In section C.2 in the Appendix, we illustrate these transmission channels in the context of a health production function.
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minimum distance (logarithm) from a village with at least one hospital.61 We first assess how proximity
to a Protestant medical mission and access to current health facilities correlate. We then estimate the
following model:
BMIivd = αd + β1Hospital distance
LR
ivd + β2Hospital distance
SR
ivd
+ X ′ivdγ1 +W g ′vdγ2 +W h′vdγ3 + εivd
(3.5)
Our coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. If the only relevant channel was the persistence of health
infrastructure over time, we would expect the coefficient on Hospital distanceLRivd to become smaller in
magnitude and, potentially, insignificant once including Hospital distanceSRivd in the model.
Table 3.8 presents the estimation results. The long-run effect of access to health care facilities on
individuals’ health is not driven by persistence of infrastructure. Our measure of short-term access to
medical facilities is significantly and positively correlated with the distance from a Protestant medical
mission, but it does not seem to independently affect individuals’ health.62 Even when controlling for
current access to health care, the distance from a Protestant medical facility remains significantly and
negatively associated with BMI. The magnitude of the coefficient on Hospital distanceLRivd is practically
unchanged compared to the results in table 3.6.
3.7.2 Health Potential and Nutrition
The cross-sectional nature of the WHS does not allow us to match survey respondents with health out-
comes of previous cohorts. Height as an adult, however, includes the long-run effect of fetal and child-
61Using information from the Village Directory of the 2001 Census of India, we successfully geocoded 4,617 villages in Assam,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal with at least one allopathic hospital and
computed the aerial minimum distance between WHS respondents and the allopathic hospitals. For the sake of simplicity,
we exclude Ayurvedic, Unani and homeopathic hospitals, dispensaries, maternity and child welfare centers, maternity homes,
primary health centers, family welfare centers, T. B. clinics, nursing homes, private and subsidized medical practitioners and
community health workers.
62This findings are in line with Banerjee et al. (2004) and Das and Hammer (2007), which show that health care provision in
India is highly dysfunctional, due for example to the high levels of absenteeism, and not necessarily impacting individuals’
health outcomes in a positive way.
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Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) 0.244∗∗∗ -0.210∗
(0.0518) (0.108)
Distance from allopathic hospital (log) -0.0767 -0.0532
(0.0701) (0.0703)
N 7,046 7,046 7,046
Mean Dependent Variable 2.54 20.42 20.42
District FE No Yes Yes
Individual controls No Yes Yes
Geographical controls No Yes Yes
Historical controls No Yes Yes
Distance from Protestant mission (log) No No Yes
Distance from Catholic mission (log) No No Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward)
level.
hood nutrition and exposure to diseases, together with the genetic height potential. Via the intergenera-
tional transmission of health, access to health care and the health status of individuals in one generation
could affect the height of individuals in the next generation. The results presented in table 3.4 indicate
that proximity to a Protestant medical mission positively affects individual height, providing preliminary
evidence of the fact that the health potential may indeed be an important transmission channel.
We now test whether these results are driven by access to better nutrition. To this end, we augment our
baseline specification to include measures of quality and quantity of available food (expenditure on food
and number of servings of fruit and vegetables consumed per day).63 We also control for total household
expenditure, as a proxy for income. Table 3.9 presents the estimation results. As expected, we find a
positive and significant relationship between household expenditure on food and individual health. The
same holds for the total household expenditure. We still find that the proximity to a Protestant medical
63Expenditure on food includes the value of any food produced and consumed by the household, and excludes alcohol, tobacco
and restaurant meals. Moreover, respondents are asked how many servings of fruit and vegetables they consume per day.
Unfortunately, no information about other aliments is included in the survey.
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Table 3.9: Transmission Channels: Health Potential
Height (cm) BMI
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.653∗∗ -0.628∗ -0.224∗∗ -0.215∗
(0.330) (0.328) (0.113) (0.113)
Fruit & vegetables (servings per day) -0.127 -0.135 0.0121 0.00937
(0.127) (0.121) (0.0431) (0.0421)
Household expenditure on food (log) 0.833∗∗∗ 0.524∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.263) (0.299) (0.0820) (0.0990)
Fruit & vegetables (servings per day) 0.0138 0.0147 -0.00183 -0.00150
× Household expenditure on food (log) (0.0172) (0.0165) (0.00590) (0.00577)
Household total expenditure (log) 0.508∗ 0.180∗∗
(0.267) (0.0875)
N 5,729 5,729 5,729 5,729
Mean Dependent Variable 158.83 158.83 20.47 20.47
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Protestant mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Catholic mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level.
mission has an independent effect on individual health outcomes. Moreover, the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients is not affected, suggesting that the long-term effect of access to health care on
current individual height and BMI cannot be simply explained by better nutrition and higher income.
3.7.3 Health Culture and Practices
The quality of medical missionary medicine increased in the final years of the nineteenth century, es-
pecially after the Bombay Missionary Conference of 1892-93. At that time, European ideas of mod-
ern medicine spread worldwide through the activities of medical missionaries.64 We use data from the
64See Fitzgerald (2001). New scientific discoveries and theories set the foundations of contemporary biomedicine and gained
gradual acceptance in Europe and the United States. The pivotal role of the germ theory of disease in modern medicine is often
described as “the most important single concept for the history of medicine" (Worboys (2000)).
111
Chapter 3 Long-Term Effects of Access to Health Care: Medical Missions in Colonial India
DLHS-3 to investigate whether proximity to a health care facility in the past may have affected individual
habits regarding hygiene, self and preventive care and health awareness.65 The empirical specification
is as follows:






vdγ3 + εivd (3.6)
where Hospital distancevd is now the minimum distance between a DLHS-3 village v and a Protestant
medical mission (logarithm). We focus on outcomes related to hygiene and health practices, and perina-
tal maternal and child care. In particular, Health cultureivd is, alternatively, an indicator variable equal
to one if the respondent treats water to make it safer to drink, if she practices open defecation, or if she
turns to traditional healers when she gets sick. To measure disease awareness, we combine the respon-
dent’s answers to seven questions regarding knowledge about the danger signs of pneumonia and create
an index using a principal component analysis. Finally, to investigate practices related to maternal and
child health, we use indicator variables for receiving or purchasing iron folic acid tablets or bottles dur-
ing the last pregnancy, for receiving a full antenatal check-up (ANC) during last pregnancy, for having a
safe delivery (i.e., assisted by skilled personnel, and for taking the newborn for a check-up after birth).
Table 3.10 presents the estimation results.66 Our measures of hygiene, preventive care and health
knowledge are significantly associated with the distance from a Protestant medical mission. In particular,
living far from a village historically equipped with a Protestant medical mission decreases the probability
of treating water and it increases the probability of practicing open defecation. Interestingly, we do not
find any effect on the use of traditional medicine; the fraction of people reporting to turn to traditional
healers and home treatments when sick is however quite small. Moreover, distance from a Protestant
65See section 3.3 for more details. Table C.9 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the
analysis.
66In columns 1 to 3 we use information from the Household survey, while in columns 4 to 8 we consider responses from the
Ever Married Women questionnaire. Reported are the marginal effects at the average value of the independent variables. As
the number of observations is much larger than the number of fixed effects, the incidental parameter problem associated with
estimating a probit model with fixed effects is not a concern (Greene et al. (2002), Fernández-Val (2009)).
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medical mission is associated with a lower knowledge of the early signs of pneumonia.
The closer to a Protestant medical mission, the better the practices related to maternal and child
health. We find that proximity to a historical medical facility increases women’s probability of taking
iron supplements while pregnant, of receiving a full antenatal check-up, and of having a safe delivery.
Finally, it increases children’s probability of receiving a medical check-up within 24 hours since birth.67
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the long-term effect of access to health care on current individual health
outcomes by focusing on the medical missionary enterprise in India during the second half of the nine-
teenth century. We combine historical information about the location and activities of Protestant medical
missions in colonial India with contemporary individual level data. We show that proximity to the lo-
cation of a Protestant medical mission positively affects current individuals’ body mass index (BMI) and
other individual health indicators, such as height and self-reported health status. We verify that our find-
ings are not driven by other non-medical missionary activities, and show that the vicinity to Protestant
missions without health facilities does not affect current health outcomes. The investigation of potential
transmission channels shows that persistence of infrastructure and current access to health care do not
play a role, while improvements in health potential and changes in health culture and preventive care
are the main drivers of the long-term effect. In particular, we find that proximity to a historical medical
facility improves health habits related to hygiene, health awareness, and perinatal maternal and child
health.
This paper represents a first attempt to analyze the persistence of health in developing countries
and to investigate how exposure to Protestant medical missions may have determined advancements in
67All results are robust to estimating linear probability models and to including the presence of a health facility today in DLHS-3
village v as additional geographic control. Results are available upon request.
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current individual health. In light of the existence of long-run effects, the expansion of healthcare access
becomes an even more critical priority, as it beneficially affects both current and future generations.
In a related project we investigate whether such patterns exist in the African continent. Further work
should focus on explicitly connecting the long-term effect of access to health care, current health status,




















Table 3.10: Transmission Channels: Health Culture and Practices
Hygiene & Health Practices Maternal & Child Health
Pr(Treat Pr(Open Pr(Traditional Knowledge Pr(Iron suppl. Pr(Full ANC) Pr(Safe Pr(Child checked
water) defecate) medicine) pneumonia while pregnant) delivery) within 24hrs)
Probit Probit Probit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0264∗ -0.0321 -0.00992∗∗∗ -0.0170∗ -0.0311∗ -0.0296∗ -0.0376∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0157) (0.0333) (0.00383) (0.00987) (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0186)
N 273,109 275,386 219,033 198,225 198,168 74,017 72,728 71,864
Mean Dependent Variable 0.30 0.66 0.04 0.22 0.81 0.13 0.42 0.39
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Protestant mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Catholic mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DHLS-3 data. Columns 1 to 3 uses information from the Household survey. Columns 4 to 8 uses responses from the Ever Married Women questionnaire. Respondents are ever married women 15-49.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Marginal effects in columns 1 to 3 and 5 to 8.
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Appendix A
Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The
Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty
This Appendix contains seven main sections. Appendix A.1 shows that the recent findings about missing
Indian women at older ages are consistent with the distribution of sex-ratios across ages. Appendix A.2
contains additional tables and figures. Appendix A.3 presents the full empirical analysis of the effect of
the Hindu Succession Act amendments on women’s health and details on the dataset used, the empirical
strategy and the robustness checks. Appendix A.4 discusses a fully specified collective model of Indian
households. While invoking additional functional forms that are not required for the empirical estima-
tion of the resource shares, the fully specified model delivers explicit formulas for household demands
and resource shares that satisfy the identification requirements. Appendix A.5 investigates the sensitiv-
ity of the model estimates. Appendix A.6 uses additional data on singles to empirically test the Pareto
efficiency assumption in this framework. Appendix A.7 relaxes the assumption of equality of poverty
thresholds between genders and simulates gender and gender-age poverty rates in this alternative sce-
nario.
116
Appendix A Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty
A.1 Sex Ratios and Age
(A) Sex Ratio By Age Group (B) Cohort Comparison
(C) Urban vs. Rural (D) Distribution Across States
Note: One must be cautious when comparing aggregate sex-ratios across countries due to different fertility and death rates, and
different age distributions and disease composition (Anderson and Ray (2010)). However, it is interesting to note that the recent
findings about missing Indian women at older ages are consistent with a striking non-monotonic pattern of the distribution of sex-
ratios across ages: compared to developed countries, figures are particularly skewed at post-reproductive ages. Data are from the
United Nations Statistics Division and Census of India. Panel A plots the sex-ratios for India and for selected developed countries
across age groups. Developed countries include US, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and Portugal. This pattern is robust to
changes in the set of developed countries considered. For India the ratio does not decrease substantially with age, with the gap
between India and developed countries actually increasing at post-reproductive ages. The comparison between data from different
census years (1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011) indicates that this pattern is not driven by a specific cohort (panel B). Moreover, the
non-monotonic pattern is common in rural and urban areas (panel C). Finally, with some notably exceptions such as Kerala, this
pattern is confirmed by state level data (panel D).
Figure A.1: The Age Distribution of Sex Ratios
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A.2 Additional Figures and Tables
Note: Local mean smoothing obtained using Epanechnikov kernel regression.
Figure A.2: Women Resource Shares and Total Expenditure
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(A) Households Without Children, Λˆ f (B) Households With Children, Λˆ f
Note: Third order polynomials in the woman’s age. All covariates set to their median values. Nuclear households.
Figure A.3: Predicted Women’s Resource Shares and Age (Reference Households)
(A) Without Children, Λˆ f (B) With Children, Λˆ f
Note: Nuclear households only. Mean predicted women’s resource share among households with woman’s age equal to a =
15, ..., 79. The solid line is a running mean. The dashed lines are the 95 percent pointwise confidence interval for the smoothed
values.
Figure A.4: Average Predicted Women’s Resource Shares and Age (Nuclear Households Only)
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(A) Without Children, Λˆ f (B) With Children, Λˆ f
Note: Nuclear households only. Mean predicted women’s (men’s) resource share among households with woman’s age equal
to a = 15, ..., 79. The solid line is a running mean. The dashed lines are the 95 percent pointwise confidence interval for the
smoothed values.
Figure A.5: Predicted Resource Shares, Age and HSA Amendments (Nuclear Households Only)
(A) Without Children, Λˆ f and Λˆm (B) With Children, Λˆ f and Λˆm
Note: Mean predicted women’s (men’s) resource share among households with women’s (men’s) average age equal to a =
15, ..., 79. The solid line is a running mean. The dashed lines are the 95 percent pointwise confidence interval for the smoothed
values.
Figure A.6: Average Predicted Resource Shares and Age
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(A) Without Children, Λˆ f and Λˆm (B) With Children, Λˆ f and Λˆm
Note: Nuclear households only. Mean predicted women’s (men’s) resource share among households with woman’s (man’s) age
equal to a = 15, ..., 79. The solid line is a running mean. The dashed lines are the 95 percent pointwise confidence interval for the
smoothed values.
Figure A.7: Average Predicted Resource Shares and Age (Nuclear Households Only)
(A) Model Predictions (Unequal Sharing) (B) Equal Sharing
Note: The graphs show the fraction of females or males in each age group living below poverty line. Individuals from all households
in the sample are used for calculations. Per capita expenditures are computed using the model predictions in panel A. In panel B,
I assume that household expenditure is split equally among household members. Per capita expenditures are compared to the 2
US$/day poverty line.
Figure A.8: Poverty Rates By Gender and Age (2 US$/day)
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Age Groups 15-19 to 75-79
Figure A.9: Excess Female Deaths and Excess Female Poverty
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(A) Without Children
(B) With Children
Note: Running means of the actual and counterfactual average women’s resource shares among households with women’s average
age equal to a = 15, ..., 79.




























Table A.1: NSS - CES Descriptive Statistics
Households Without Children < 15 Households With Children < 15
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Obs. Mean Median St. Dev.
Expenditure (Rupees):
Total Expenditure 30,248 7881 6479 5265 57,202 8224 6909 4903
Expenditure On Non-Durable Goods 30,248 7396 6206 4720 57,202 7848 6696 4489
Expenditure On Durable Goods 30,248 485 107 1367 57,202 375 107 1012
Budget Shares:
Food 30,248 35.39 35.50 9.82 57,202 39.12 39.16 9.61
Female Assignable Clothing 30,219 1.41 1.19 1.22 57,157 1.26 1.09 1.04
Male Assignable Clothing 30,219 1.70 1.43 1.44 57,157 1.56 1.30 1.34
Children Assignable Clothing - - - - 57,157 0.67 0.49 0.80
Household Characteristics:
I(HSAA Eligible) 26,846 0.08 0 0.28 47,382 0.14 0 0.35
No. Adult Females 30,248 1.67 1 0.83 57,202 1.69 1 0.86
No. Adult Males 30,248 1.91 2 0.93 57,202 1.67 1 0.90
No. Children Under 15 - - - - 57,202 2.02 2 1.01
Fraction Of Female Children - - - - 57,202 0.45 0.5 0.39
I(Daughter in Law) 30,248 0.11 0 0.32 57,202 0.24 0 0.43
I(Unmarried Daughter) 30,248 0.33 0 0.47 57,202 0.17 0 0.38
I(Widow) 30,248 0.16 0 0.37 57,202 0.14 0 0.35
Avg. Age Men 15 to 79 30,013 39.37 36 13.11 57,153 36.93 36 8.75
Avg. Age Women 15 to 79 30,159 40.98 40 12.09 57,181 34.84 34 8.20
Avg. Age Gap 15 to 79 (Men - Women) 29,948 -1.43 -1.5 12.86 57,134 2.10 3 9.93
Avg. Age Children 0 to 14 - - - - 57,202 7.57 8 3.97
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain) 30,248 0.83 1 0.38 57,202 0.77 1 0.42
I(Sch. Caste, Sch. Tribe or Other Backward Classes) 30,248 0.65 1 0.48 57,202 0.71 1 0.45
I(Salary Earner) 30,248 0.32 0 0.47 57,202 0.29 0 0.46
I(Land Ownership) 30,248 0.90 1 0.30 57,202 0.89 1 0.31
I(Female Higher Education) 30,248 0.14 0 0.35 57,202 0.10 0 0.30
I(Male Higher Education) 30,248 0.24 0 0.43 57,202 0.17 0 0.37
I(Rural) 30,248 0.57 1 0.50 57,202 0.63 1 0.48
I(North India) 30,248 0.28 0 0.45 57,202 0.33 0 0.47
I(East) 30,248 0.19 0 0.39 57,202 0.21 0 0.41
I(North-East) 30,248 0.12 0 0.33 57,202 0.16 0 0.36
I(South) 30,248 0.27 0 0.45 57,202 0.19 0 0.39
I(West) 30,248 0.13 0 0.34 57,202 0.12 0 0.32
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Table A.2: HSA Amendments and Women’s Health: Probit Model
Body Mass Index Pr(Anaemia)
Pr(BM I ≤ 18.5) Severe Moderate Mild
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit Probit Probit
HSAA Exposed -0.0448∗∗∗ -0.00940∗∗∗ -0.0278∗∗∗ -0.0320∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.00188) (0.00810) (0.0112)
N 81,115 56,746 77,530 77,755
Mean Dependent Variable 0.2648 0.0154 0.1559 0.5298
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NFHS-3 data. Married women of age 15 to 49 included in the
sample. All specifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or
Jain, state and cohort fixed effects, and state-religion, state-cohort, and religion-cohort fixed effects.
Individual controls include women’s years of schooling, number of children under 5 in the household,
a household wealth index, and indicator variables for having worked in the past 12 months, for living
in rural areas and for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes.
Mild anaemia includes moderate and severe anaemia, and moderate anaemia includes severe anaemia.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village)
level (3,753). Sampling weights applied.
Table A.3: Predicted Engel Curve Slopes: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Sd. Dev. Median Min. Max.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Without Children < 15 Only
Women Assignable Clothing -0.2623 0.0917 -0.2565 -0.6080 0.0571
Men Assignable Clothing -0.3545 0.1589 -0.3546 -1.3401 0.0159
Food -6.8129 1.6372 -6.8380 -13.9877 -2.4195
Panel B: With Children < 15 Only
Women Assignable Clothing -0.1163 0.0840 -0.0967 -0.5119 0.0922
Men Assignable Clothing -0.1843 0.1213 -0.1780 -0.8767 0.1505
Children Assignable Clothing -0.0678 0.0412 -0.0630 -0.2936 0.1062
Food -6.6591 1.5287 -6.6465 -13.0420 -1.3406
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A.3 Bargaining Power and Health: Details and Robustness Checks
A.3.1 Measuring Women’s Health
Measurement of health has recently evolved to rely on anthropometric and physiologic indicators of
physical development.1 In section 1.3, I use body mass index (BMI) and levels of anaemia as measures
of women’s health. BMI is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. A cut-off
point of 18.5 is used to define thinness or acute undernutrition, and a BMI of 23 or above indicates
overweight or obesity for Asian Indians.2
That the relationship between health status and BMI is non-linear is a well known fact, both at the
individual and at the aggregate level. Wailer (1984) clearly illustrates this non-linearity by showing
a U-shaped relationship between relative risk of mortality and BMI using Norwegian data from the
1970s. In low income countries, however, increases in the caloric intake shifts the lower tail of the BMI
distribution to the right. Fogel (1994, 2004) interprets this shift as an accumulation of the population’s
health human capital stock, which tends to be associated with a decline in mortality. Research work in
the medical literature indicates that individuals with very low BMI (below 18.5) experience substantially
increased mortality risk compared with those with a normal-range BMI (18.5 to 23), especially in relation
to cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.3
Anaemia is a condition in which the number of red blood cells or their oxygen-carrying capacity is
insufficient. Although its primary cause is iron deficiency, it is seldom present in isolation and more
frequently it coexists with a number of other causes, such as malaria, parasitic infection, and nutritional
deficiencies; 90 percent of anaemia sufferers live in developing countries, about 2 billion people in total.
Prevalence of anaemia in South Asian countries is among the highest in the world.4 While girls and
1See Schultz (2009) for more details.
2See Shiwaku et al. (2004).
3See e.g Visscher et al. (2000), Thorogood et al. (2003), and Zheng et al. (2011).
4See Kaur (2014).
126
Appendix A Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty
Table A.4: NFHS-3 Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Median St. Dev.
Body mass index 82,303 21.4232 20.61 4.2226
I(BM I ≤ 18.5) 82,303 0.2648 0 0.4412
I(Severe Anaemia) 78,521 0.0154 0 0.1230
I(Moderate Anaemia) 78,521 0.1559 0 0.3628
I(Mild Anaemia) 78,521 0.5298 1 0.4991
I(HSAA Exposed) 85,881 0.1528 0 0.3598
I(HSAA Eligible) 69,558 0.1095 0 0.3123
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain) 85,881 0.7920 1 0.4059
I(Sch. Caste, Sch. Tribe or Other Backward Classes) 85,222 0.6345 1 0.4816
I(Rural) 85,881 0.5609 1 0.4963
I(Worked in past 12 months) 85,869 0.4023 0 0.4904
Wealth index 85,742 0.2707 0.2015 0.2425
Age 85,881 31.9504 31 8.4235
No. Children Under 5 85,881 0.8075 0 1.0179
Years of Schooling 85,876 5.3261 5 5.1842
Only married women of age 15 to 49 included. The wealth index is constructed by combining information on a
set of household assets (radio, refrigerator, television, bicycle, motorcycle, car, and land) using principal compo-
nent analysis. Three levels of severity of anaemia are distinguished in the 2005 National Family Health Survey:
mild anaemia (10.0-10.9 grams/deciliter for pregnant women, 10.0-11.9 g/dl for non-pregnant women, and
12.0-12.9 g/dl for men), moderate anaemia (7.0-9.9 g/dl for women and 9.0-11.9 g/dl for men), and severe
anaemia (less than 7.0 g/dl for women and less than 9.0 g/dl for men). Appropriate adjustments in these cutoff
points were made for respondents living at altitudes above 1,000 meters and respondents who smoke, since
both of these groups require more haemoglobin in their blood.
women at child-bearing ages are the most affected, there are longer term effects stemming from anaemic
conditions, such as cardiovascular deficiencies, that may affect women’s health at post-reproductive and
older ages.5 Medical studies have demonstrated that anaemia is associated with increased risk of death
among older adults.6
The table includes summary statistics for all the variables included in the empirical analysis.
A.3.2 Robustness Checks
Endogeneity of Treatment. Exposure to the HSA amendments is determined by each woman’s year
of marriage, which may be an endogenous choice. On one hand, if more progressive families waited
5The World Health Organization estimated that about half of the global maternal deaths due to anaemia occur in South Asian
countries, with India alone accounting for half of global maternal deaths (De Benoist et al. (2008)). Maternal short stature
and iron deficiency anaemia increase the risk of death of the mother at delivery, accounting for at least 20 percent of maternal
mortality (Black et al. (2008), Kalaivani et al. (2009)).
6See e.g., Culleton et al. (2006) and Patel (2008).
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until the reform to marry their daughters, the treatment effect estimated by OLS could potentially be
capturing unobserved heterogeneity in early childhood health investment for girls and therefore lead
to upward biased estimates. On the other hand, if women’s access to inheritance rights was seen as
a compensation for a daughter’s weak constitution or proneness to sickness, OLS estimates of β could
underestimate the treatment effect of HSAA.
I address endogeneity concerns in three different ways. First, I exclude from the analysis women
who got married right around the reforms: the year of, before and after. By excluding women whose
marriage could be more easily scheduled before or after the amendment according to their - or their
family’s - preferences, I minimize the risk of results being driven by unobserved heterogeneity across
households. Second, I focus on estimating an intent-to-treat effect using a measure of eligibility to HSA
amendments that exploits variation in women’s year of birth, religion and state. I estimate the intent-to-
treat effect by comparing girls who were 14 or younger at the time of the HSA amendment in their state
to girls who were 23 or older:
yirsc = β˜HSAA Eligiblersc + X
′
irsc γ˜+ α˜r + α˜c + α˜s + α˜rs + α˜rc + α˜sc + ε˜irsc (A.1)
where HSAA Eligiblersc is fully determined by each woman’s religion, year of birth and state, as it is the
interaction between an indicator variable equal to one if a woman was 14 or younger at the time of
the reform in her state and to zero if she was 23 or older and an indicator variable for being Hindu,
Buddhist, Sikh or Jain.7 Finally, I estimate the effect of being exposed to HSA amendments on women’s
health outcome by instrumenting HSAA Exposedirsc with HSAA Eligiblersc .
8 The exclusion restriction
7As in the cohort comparison analysis provided in Heath and Tan (2014), I use 14 and 23 as they are the 10th and 90th percentiles
of women’s age at marriage in the survey. Results are robust to alternative choice of thresholds. Duflo (2001) uses a similar
strategy to estimate returns to education in Indonesia and compares the educational attainment and the wages of individuals
who had little or no exposure to the INPRES program (12 to 17 at time of implementation) to those of individuals who were
exposed all the time they were in primary school (2 to 6 in 1974).
8Heath and Tan (2014) also use an instrumental variable approach to address the endogeneity problem. In the first stage,
however, they instrument woman’s HSAA treatment status by 2,088 fixed effects for each religion-year of birth-state cell.
Moreover, they do not include control variables in their analysis.
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needed for identification is that, once controlling for religion-cohort, cohort-state, and state-religion
fixed effects, being Hindu and younger than 14 at the time of implementation has an effect on women’s
health outcomes only through their actual exposure to the HSA amendment. This assumption seems
plausible. Despite other factors and policies may have differentially affected young Indian women, these
do not vary by religion and are therefore controlled for by the cohort-state fixed effects.
Table A.5 reports the results of the first two strategies used to deal with the possible endogeneity
of treatment. Panel A shows the estimated coefficients for the model in equation (1.1) when women
who got married around the amendments in their state of residence are excluded from the analysis.
Panel B includes the estimation results for the model in equation (A.1). Table A.6 reports the 2SLS
estimates, obtained by instrumenting HSAA Exposedirsc with HSAA Eligiblersc .
9 A comparison between
the magnitude of the coefficients in tables A.5 and A.6 with those in table 1.1 suggests that OLS estimates
over the entire sample are in general downward biased. The overall conclusion is confirmed, indicating
that the endogeneity of time at marriage is not a major concern: HSAA exposure improves women’s
health outcomes. While the marginal effects on the probability of being underweight or mildly anaemic
are not statistically significant, exposure to HSA amendments is found to increase women’s BMI and to
reduce their probability of being severely or moderately anaemic.
I address the limitations of linear probability models by estimating the baseline model over the re-
stricted sample and equation (A.1) over the full sample by maximum-likelihood probit models. More-
over, I estimate a maximum-likelihood two-equation probit model specified as follows:

HSAA Exposedirsc = β1HSAA Eligiblersc + X
′
irscγ1 +αr +αc +αs +αrs +αrc +αs ∗ (c− 1955) + ε1,irsc
yirsc = β2HSAA Exposedirsc + X
′
irscγ2 +δr +δc +δs +δrs +δrc +δs ∗ (c− 1955) + ε2,irsc
(A.2)
9The correlation between the potentially endogenous treatment variable and the eligibility instrument is 0.92 and the very large
F statistics in the first stage provide reassurance against a weak instrument problem.
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Table A.5: HSA Amendments and Women’s Health: Robustness Checks
Body Mass Index Pr(Anaemia)
All Sample BM I ≤ 23 BM I > 23 Pr(BM I ≤ 18.5) Severe Moderate Mild
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Panel A: Restricted Sample
HSAA Exposed 0.392∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗ -0.0183 -0.0240 -0.0127∗∗ -0.0407∗∗∗ -0.0210
(0.136) (0.100) (0.176) (0.0151) (0.00548) (0.0138) (0.0175)
N 74,656 52,308 22,348 74,656 71,249 71,249 71249
Panel B: Unrestricted Sample
HSAA Eligible 0.905∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗ 0.498 -0.00695 -0.0303∗∗∗ -0.0692∗∗ 0.00759
(0.336) (0.227) (0.491) (0.0337) (0.0106) (0.0303) (0.0444)
N 66,146 45,430 20,716 66,146 62,902 62,902 62,902
Mean Dependent Variable 21.42 19.24 26.69 0.2648 0.0154 0.1559 0.5298
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NFHS-3 data. Married women of age 15 to 49 included in the sample. All specifications include a religion
dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, state and cohort fixed effects, and state-religion, state-cohort, religion-cohort
fixed effects, and individual controls. Individual controls include women’s years of schooling, number of children under 5 in the household,
a household wealth index, and indicator variables for having worked in the past 12 months, for living in rural areas and for being part of
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes. Mild anaemia includes moderate and severe anaemia, and moderate anaemia
includes severe anaemia. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level (3,753).
Sampling weights applied. HSAAEx posed = I(Marriage Year ≤ HSAA Year) × I (Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Sikh). HSAA Eligible equal to the
interaction between an indicator variable equal to one if a woman was 14 or younger at the HSAA implementation in her state and to zero if she
was 23 or older and an indicator variable for being Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain. In Panel B the sample exclude women who got married on the
year of the amendment, the year after or the year before.
For ease of estimation, I include state linear trend instead of state-cohort fixed effects. Table A.7 shows
the marginal effects of being exposed to HSA amendments on binary health outcomes, while table A.8
presents the estimation results for the system (A.2). For simplicity, I report only the marginal effect of
HSAA Exposedirsc . The findings are overall confirmed.
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Table A.6: HSA Amendments and Women’s Health: Instrumental Variable
Body Mass Index Pr(Anaemia)
All Sample BM I ≤ 23 BM I > 23 Pr(BM I ≤ 18.5) Severe Moderate Mild
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
HSAA Exposed 1.013∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗ 0.590 -0.00777 -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0775∗∗ 0.00849
(0.374) (0.246) (0.570) (0.0374) (0.0118) (0.0337) (0.0494)
N 66,146 45,430 20,716 66,146 62,902 62,902 62,902
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 18,774.1 17,664.2 3,147.4 18,774.1 18,057.3 18,057.3 18,057.3
Mean Dependent Variable 21.42 19.24 26.69 0.2648 0.0154 0.1559 0.5298
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NFHS-3 data. Married women of age 15 to 49 included in the sample. All specifications include a religion
dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, state and cohort fixed effects, and state-religion, state-cohort, religion-cohort
fixed effects, and individual controls. Individual controls include women’s years of schooling, number of children under 5 in the household,
a household wealth index, and indicator variables for having worked in the past 12 months, for living in rural areas and for being part of
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes. Mild anaemia includes moderate and severe anaemia, and moderate anaemia
includes severe anaemia. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level (3,753).
Sampling weights applied.
Table A.7: HSA Amendments and Women’s Health: Robustness Checks (Probit)
Body Mass Index Pr(Anaemia)
Pr(BM I ≤ 18.5) Severe Moderate Mild
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Panel A: Restricted Sample
HSAA Exposed -0.0406∗∗ -0.00768 -0.0372∗∗∗ -0.0211
(0.0171) (0.0490) (0.0120) (0.0179)
N 74239 51748 70975 71210
Panel B: Unrestricted Sample
HSAA Eligible -0.0619 -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0602∗∗∗ 0.00717
(0.0394) (0.00322) (0.0232) (0.0455)
N 65,762 45,361 62,737 62,900
Mean Dependent Variable 0.2648 0.0154 0.1559 0.5298
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NFHS-3 data. Married women of age 15 to 49 included in
the sample. All specifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist,
Sikh or Jain, state and cohort fixed effects, and state-religion, state-cohort, religion-cohort fixed
effects, and individual controls. Individual controls include women’s years of schooling, number of
children under 5 in the household, a household wealth index, and indicator variables for having
worked in the past 12 months, for living in rural areas and for being part of Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes. Mild anaemia includes moderate and severe anaemia,
and moderate anaemia includes severe anaemia. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level (3,753). Sampling weights applied.
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Table A.8: HSA Amendments and Women’s Health: Bivariate Probit
Body Mass Index Pr(Anaemia)
Pr(BM I ≤ 18.5) Severe Moderate Mild
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BiProbit BiProbit BiProbit BiProbit
HSAA Exposed 0.0023 -0.0081∗∗∗ -0.0321∗∗ -0.0185
(0.0193) (0.0014) (0.0126) (0.0225 )
N 66,146 62,902 62,902 62,902
Mean Dependent Variable 0.2648 0.0154 0.1559 0.5298
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NFHS-3 data. Married women of age 15 to 49 included in the
sample. All specifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh
or Jain, state and cohort fixed effects, and state-religion, religion-cohort fixed effects, state specific
linear trends, and individual controls. Individual controls include women’s years of schooling,
number of children under 5 in the household, a household wealth index, and indicator variables
for having worked in the past 12 months, for living in rural areas and for being part of Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes. Mild anaemia includes moderate and severe
anaemia, and moderate anaemia includes severe anaemia. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level (3,753). Sampling weights
applied.
Falsification Tests. In order to assess the validity of my identification strategy, I perform two
different falsification tests. First, I compare health outcomes of younger and older women, who could
not be exposed to HSA amendments as they were too old at the time of implementation. In particular,
I estimate the specification in equation (A.1) with the main regressor being the interaction between an
indicator variable equal to one if a woman was 23 to 30 years old at the time of the HSA Amendment
in her state and to zero if she was 30 or older, and an indicator variable for being Hindu, Buddhist,
Sikh or Jain. If there was a difference in trends between the reformed and non-reformed states, I would
find a statistically significant and positive coefficient on the newly defined interaction term. This could
cast doubt on the validity of the identification strategy discussed above. Second, I estimate the effect
of HSA Amendments on men’s health outcome. I combine data on BMI, anemia level and demographic
characteristics for adult males with information about women’s eligibility within a household and I
estimate the model in equation (A.1) with the dependent variable now being males’ health outcomes.
If there was a general increasing trend common to Hindu individuals, both men and women, in the
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reforming states, the estimated treatment effect would be positive and significant for men as well.10
Table A.9 contains the estimation results. For simplicity, the table reports only a subset of the health
outcomes considered above. Columns 1 to 4 show the estimation results for the model in equation (A.1)
with the main regressor now being the interaction between an indicator variable equal to one if a woman
was 23 to 30 years old at the HSAA implementation in her state and to zero if she was 30 or older, and
an indicator variable for being Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain. I find no significant effect on women’s
BMI, on their probability of being underweight nor on their probability of being anaemic, providing
reassurance in favor of the validity of the empirical exercise. Columns 5 to 8 report the estimation
results for the model in equation (A.1) when males’ health outcomes are considered and the individual
controls include males’ schooling and an indicator variable for having worked in the past 12 months.11
The estimated coefficients and marginal effects are not statistically different from zero, suggesting no
violation of the identification assumptions.
10While an increase in men’s health could be rationalized by a change in expenditure patterns induced by the increase in women’s
bargaining power - for example for food and medical expenses -, evidence of it may cast doubt on the validity of the identifica-
tion strategy.
11HSAA Eligible still refers to eligibility of the woman. Males’ health outcomes are taken from the NFHS-3 men surveys; each
woman is then matched to a male respondent in her household. For simplicity, I retain information about only one male




























Table A.9: Falsification Tests
Women Men
BMI Pr(Anaemia) BMI Pr(Anaemia)
All Sample BM I ≤ 23 Pr(BM I < 18.5) Moderate All Sample BM I ≤ 23 Pr(BM I < 18.5) Moderate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
I(Control cohorts) × 0.382 -0.325 0.0163 -0.0457
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain) (0.493) (0.353) (0.0376) (0.0425)
HSAA Eligible -0.197 -0.0291 0.0413 -0.0193
(0.329) (0.236) (0.0443) (0.0277)
N 56,760 38,853 56,760 53,756 33,711 25,074 33,711 31,557
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NFHS-3 data. Married women of age 15 to 49 included in the sample. All specifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman
is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, state and cohort fixed effects, and state-religion, state-cohort, religion-cohort fixed effects, and individual controls. Individual controls include
women’s years of schooling, number of children under 5 in the household, a household wealth index, and indicator variables for having worked in the past 12 months, for living
in rural areas and for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes. Mild anaemia includes moderate and severe anaemia, and moderate anaemia
includes severe anaemia. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level (3,753). Sampling weights applied. I(Control
cohorts) is equal to one is a woman was 23 to 30 at the HSAA in her state and to zero if she was 30 or older.
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Expenditure Patterns. The improvement in women’s ability to inherit property introduced by the
HSA amendments, and the consequent increase in their lifetime unearned income, could have an effect
both on women’s bargaining power and on household expenditure behavior. In order to assess whether
I am indeed capturing the effect of a change in bargaining power, rather than a change in income and
wealth, I investigate how exposure to HSAA by the wife of the head of the household affects expenditure
patterns. To this aim, I use expenditure data from the 2011-2012 NSS Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Firstly, I analyze the relationship between HSAA exposure and total expenditure, and expenditures on
durable and non-durable goods, respectively. If HSA amendments determined an increase in overall
expenditure, claiming existence of a causal link between women’s intra-household bargaining power
and their health would be problematic. I then analyze the effect of exposure to HSA amendments on
food expenditure shares. My motivation is twofold. On one hand, this type of analysis may provide
additional evidence of the effect of exposure to the reforms on the household expenditure levels: if
HSAA exposure increased household total expenditure, we would expect the budget share of food to
decrease as a consequence of the standard view that, being a necessity, food has an income elasticity
less than one. On the other hand, it allows to test whether modeling Indian household in a unitary
fashion is a sensible choice. Rejection of the unitary model - which assumes that the household acts
as a single decision unit maximizing a common utility function - would provide support to the decision
of modeling Indian household in a collective fashion.12 Exogenous changes in distribution factors, i.e.,
factors affecting bargaining power but not preferences, are frequently used in the literature to test for
the pooling of resources by household members. In the spirit of Attanasio and Lechene (2002, 2010),
I investigate the effect of HSAA exposure on food budget shares. Any significant effect would provide
evidence against the unitary model.
The empirical specification is as in equation (A.1), where yirsc is the logarithm of total household i
12There is a large consensus in the literature that a model should account for household members having different preferences
and for the intra-household distribution of powers. However, evidence against the unitary model does not automatically imply
evidence in favor of the collective model.
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Table A.10: HSA Amendments and Expenditure Patterns
Expenditure (log) Food Budget
Total Non Durables Durables Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
HSAA Eligible 0.0400 0.0322 0.299 1.250∗
(0.0406) (0.0394) (0.199) (0.722)
Total Expenditure (log) -7.231∗∗∗
(0.220)
N 65,090 65,090 65,090 65,090
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NSS 68th Round Consumer Expenditure data. All spec-
ifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain,
state and cohort fixed effects, and state-religion, state-cohort, religion-cohort fixed effects, and
household controls. Household controls include women’s and men’s highest education, house-
hold size, head of household’s age and indicator variables for land ownership, for living in
rural areas, for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes,
and for the presence of a salary earner in the household. Budget share on food includes ex-
penditures on cereals, cereals substitutes, pulses and products, milk and products, egg, fish
and meat, vegetables, fruits, and processed food. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level (3,753). Sampling weights
applied. Budget shares are multiplied by 100.
expenditure, of expenditure on non-durable goods, of expenditure on durable goods, or the budget share
devoted to food or other selected commodities, respectively. Now, HSAA Eligiblersc is the interaction
between an indicator variable equal to one if the wife of the head of the household was 14 or younger at
the time of the HSA Amendment in her state and to zero if she was 23 or older, and an indicator variable
for being Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain. X ′irsc is a vector of controls for household i, of religion r, living
in state s, with the wife of the head of the household born in year c. As standard in the literature, when
looking at the effect of HSAA exposure on food budget shares, I condition the model on the logarithm
of total expenditure. Due to data availability, I only estimate an intent-to-treat effect. Standard errors
are clustered at the first sampling unit level (2001 Census villages in rural areas and 2007-2012 Urban
Frame Survey blocks in urban areas).
Table A.10 reports the estimation results of the effect of HSAA eligibility of the wife of the head
of household on expenditure patterns. All specifications include individual controls and religion-state,
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state-cohort and cohort-religion fixed effects. Column 1 to 3 show the estimated coefficients of the intent-
to-treat effect on the logarithm of total expenditure, expenditure on non-durable goods and durable
goods respectively. Expenditure data refer to the month prior to the survey interview. I find no sta-
tistically significant effect on expenditure levels. Columns 4 report the estimation results of the model
in equation (A.1) where the outcome variable is the budget share on food. I find that HSAA eligible
households devote more resources to food, which is in line with the findings in Attanasio and Lechene
(2002, 2010) on the effect on PROGRESA transfers to women in Mexico. These results represent an
empirical rejection of the unitary model of the household and of the income pooling hypothesis. In such
a framework, HSAA eligibility could not significantly affects how expenditure is allocated to goods, as
in unitary households “only household income matters for choice outcomes and not the source of the
income" (Browning et al. (2014)).
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A.4 A Fully Specified Collective Model of Indian Households
The empirical estimation of resource shares assumes Engel curves for the private assignable goods to
be linear in ln y and requires resource shares to be independent of y . However, it does not invoke
restrictions on other goods’ demand functions. I here provide a fully specified household model that
delivers linearity of Engel curves and resource shares that are independent of y . h = (h1, ..., hK) is the
vector of observed quantities of goods purchased by each household, while x t = (x1t ..., x
K
t ) is the vector
of unobserved quantities of goods consumed by an individual of type t = f , m, c.
Assume each household member of type t, t = f , m, c, has utility given by Muellbauer’s Price Inde-
pendent Generalized Logarithmic (Piglog) model. In this framework, the indirect utility functions can














with Ft(p) = pt exp (−a′ ln p˜), for some constant vector a with elements ak summing to one. Let p˜
contain the prices of all goods except the prices of the private assignable goods for adult females, adult
males and children, p f , pm, pc . The assumption of assigning the same utility function to members of
the same type is data driven and constrained by the number of different assignable goods that can be
observed. For simplicity, consider the transformation ψt(v + Ft , p˜) = exp (v+ Ft), which not depending
upon p˜ makes the individual Engel curves for all goods to be the same as those of the private assignable
goods. While this assumption is not invoked in the estimation of the system of Engel curves in equation
(1.6), it simplifies the derivation of the full model. Let Gt(p) = Gt(pt , p˜), which makes explicit the
assumption that the, for example, the price pm of the good that is assignable to the father does not
appear in the woman’s utility function, and hence does not appear in G f (p f , p˜). The indirect utility
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exp (pt exp(−a′ ln p˜)) (A.4)
Each household utility function can be characterized as a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function,
U˜ , featuring the relative weights of the utility functions of its members:
U˜(U f , Um, Uc , p/y) =
∑
t∈{ f ,m,c}
µt(p/y)[Ut + ξt(p/y)] (A.5)
where µt(p/y) is the Pareto weight and ξt(p/y) are externality functions capturing the extent to which
one’s consumption affect the other member of the household. µt and ξt must be homogeneous of
degree zero, so that µt(p/y) = µt(p) and ξt(p/y) = ξt(p) (Dunbar et al. (2013)). Pareto weights are
traditionally interpreted as measures of intra-household bargaining power. The larger the value of µt ,
the greater is the weight that type t members’ preferences receive in the household program.
Let A be the matrix defining the extent of joint consumption in each household and characterizing
the consumption technology function. In other words, the consumption technology function converts
purchased quantities by the household, h, in private good equivalents, x . While the general framework
allows for a non-diagonal A, I here assume it to be diagonal. Non-zero off diagonal elements of A may
arise when the extent to which one good is shared depends upon other goods, e.g.„ if leisure time is
a consumption good, then the degree to which a motorcycle use is shared may depend on the time
involved. A private good is defined as a good with its corresponding diagonal element of A equal to 1,
and all off-diagonal elements in that row or column are equal to 0. Each household solves the following
program:
139
Appendix A Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty
max




µt(p)Ut subject to h= A(F x f +M xm + C xc)
y = h′p (A.6)
where ξ(p) =
∑
t∈{ f ,m,c}µt(p)ξt(p) and F , M and C are the total number of adult women, adult men
and children in the household, respectively. Let λt the resource share for each individuals of type t,
such that λt =
∑
k
Ak pk x tk
y
. This program can be decomposed in two steps: 1) the optimal allocation of
resources across members and 2) the individual maximization of their own utility function. This results
follows directly from the second welfare theorem, as any Pareto efficient allocation can be implemented
as an equilibrium of this economy, possibly after lump sum transfers between members. Conditional on




k x kt = λt y . Substituting the indirect utility functions Vt(A
′p,λt y) in
the program above simplifies the optimization problem to the choice of optimal resource shares subject








′p,λt(p/y)y) subject to Fλ f (p/y) +Mλm(p/y) + Cλc(p/y) = 1
(A.7)












subject to Λ f +Λm +Λc = 1 (A.8)
with µ˜t(p) = µt(p)exp (At pt exp(−a′(ln p˜+ ln A˜))). The first order conditions of the Lagrangean are as
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Λ f +Λm +Λc = 1
(A.9)
with ν being the Lagrange multiplier. Explicit formulas for resource shares can be derived from the
solution of the system of equations above. For individuals of type t = f , m, c, the overall resource shares
are defined as
Λt(p/y) = Λt(p) =
µ˜t(p)∑
t∈{ f ,m,c} µ˜t(p)
(A.10)
Assuming equal sharing among individuals of the same type, individual resources shares for type t
household members are defined as
λt(p) =
µ˜t(p)/T∑
t∈{ f ,m,c} µ˜t(p)
(A.11)
with T = F, M , C . As required for identification, these explicit formulas for the resource shares do not
depend on y .
Each household member chooses x t as the bundle maximizing Ut subject to the constraint
∑
k Ak p
k x kt =
λt y . The individuals’ demand function for good k, k = 1, ..., K , can be obtained by Roy’s identity to equa-
tion (A.4), with prices equal to Apk and income equal to λt y:
x kt (λt y, A
′p) =− ∂ Vt(λt y, A
′p)/∂ Apk





















ln(λt y)− ln Gtλt y (A.12)
for each good k and any individual t. Using the consumption technology function, the household de-
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Equation (A.12) can be rewritten as:
x kt (λt y, A
′p) = λt yαkt +λt yβ kt ln(λt y) (A.14)
The overall demand of good k from individuals of type t generated from the solution of the decentralized
optimization problems is given by:
T x kt (λt(p)y, A
′p) = Λt yαkt +Λt yβ kt (ln y + lnΛt − ln T ) (A.15)
and the corresponding budget share is:







t (p)(ln y + lnΛt(p)− ln T ) (A.16)
where T = F, M , C , t = f , m, c, and Λt = Tλt .
An Engel curve represents the relationship between a budget share and total expenditure, holding











t (ln y + lnΛt − ln T )] (A.17)




= Λtαt +Λtβt(ln y + lnΛt − ln T ) (A.18)
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A.5 Robustness Checks
Table A.11: Determinants of Women’s Resource Shares: Expenditure On Non-Durables
Adult Women’s Resource Share
All Households
With & Without With Children Withou Children
Children < 15 < 15 Only < 15 Only
(1) (2) (3)
NLSUR NLSUR NLSUR
No. Adult Women 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0574∗∗∗
(0.00415) (0.00413) (0.00965)
No. Adult Men -0.0230∗∗∗ -0.0195∗∗∗ -0.0340∗∗∗
(0.00299) (0.00310) (0.00671)
No. Children -0.00645∗∗∗ 0.000965
(0.00206) (0.00194)
Fraction of Female Children 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(0.00531) (0.00456)
I(Daughter in Law) 0.0101 0.00721 0.0276
(0.00622) (0.00593) (0.0184)
I(Unmarried Daughter above 15) -0.00380 0.00723 0.00606
(0.00670) (0.00659) (0.0167)
I(Widow) -0.0206∗∗∗ -0.0337∗∗∗ -0.0156
(0.00780) (0.00830) (0.0184)
I(HSAA Eligible) 0.00766∗∗ 0.00862∗∗ 0.0201∗∗
(0.00369) (0.00430) (0.00924)
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain) -0.0393∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗ -0.0179
(0.00908) (0.00684) (0.0156)
I(SC, ST, Other Backward Caste) 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗
(0.00757) (0.00763) (0.0126)
I(Salary Earner) -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.00902
(0.00444) (0.00409) (0.0101)
I(Land Ownership) 0.00805 0.0126∗ -0.0333∗
(0.00814) (0.00752) (0.0195)
I(Female Higher Education) 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.0333∗∗
(0.00809) (0.00748) (0.0162)
I(Male Higher Education) 0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗
(0.00539) (0.00581) (0.0127)
I(Rural) -0.0319∗∗∗ -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0404∗∗∗
(0.00646) (0.00567) (0.0120)
Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79) -0.0153 -0.109∗∗∗ 0.0209
(0.0385) (0.0405) (0.0842)
Avg. Age Women 15 to 79 -0.677 -0.618 -1.886
(0.565) (0.646) (1.256)
(Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79))2 -0.207∗∗ 0.0918 -0.443∗∗
(0.104) (0.111) (0.206)
(Avg. Age Women 15 to 79)2 1.218 1.686 3.739
(1.356) (1.613) (3.017)
(Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79))3 0.0655 0.507 -0.527
(0.485) (0.599) (0.880)
(Avg. Age Women 15 to 79)3 -0.579 -1.497 -2.210
(1.046) (1.307) (2.334)
Avg. Age Children 0 to 14 -0.0196 -0.0274
(0.0451) (0.0558)
I(North) -0.0803∗∗∗ -0.0869∗∗∗ -0.0858∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0146) (0.0241)
I(East) -0.0190 -0.0240 -0.0405
(0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0262)
I(North-East) 0.00953 0.0633∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0224) (0.0293)
I(South) -0.0208 -0.0193 -0.0427
(0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0263)
Constant 0.402∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.0812) (0.0872) (0.173)
N 73,709 47,198 26,546
LL -584,345.9 -378,427.1 -190,331.4
No. Parameters 318 318 188
p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NSS 68th Round Consumer Expenditure data. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the first sampling unit level. Women’s age and age differences are divided by 100 to ease
computation. West India is the excluded region.
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Table A.12: Determinants of Women’s Resource Shares: Food Engel Curve Excluded
Adult Women’s Resource Share
All Households
With & Without With Children Without Children
Children < 15 < 15 Only < 15 Only
(1) (2) (3)
NLSUR NLSUR NLSUR
No. Adult Women 0.0380∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0618∗∗∗
(0.00558) (0.00461) (0.00951)
No. Adult Men -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0331∗∗∗
(0.00395) (0.00357) (0.00644)
No. Children -0.00235 0.00377
(0.00281) (0.00238)
Fraction of Female Children 0.0133∗ 0.0133∗∗
(0.00731) (0.00539)
I(Daughter in Law) 0.0123 0.00859 0.0220
(0.00838) (0.00700) (0.0175)
I(Unmarried Daughter above 15) -0.000271 0.0101 -0.00609
(0.00906) (0.00782) (0.0165)
I(Widow) -0.00533 -0.0362∗∗∗ -0.0239
(0.0104) (0.00959) (0.0177)
I(HSAA Eligible) 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0224∗∗
(0.00432) (0.00505) (0.00978)
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain) -0.0174 -0.0186∗∗ -0.0106
(0.0109) (0.00802) (0.0150)
I(SC, ST or Other Backward Caste) 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0682∗∗∗ 0.0589∗∗∗
(0.00905) (0.00851) (0.0125)
I(Salary Earner) -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0169∗
(0.00613) (0.00489) (0.00972)
I(Land Ownership) -0.00557 0.00916 -0.0191
(0.0116) (0.00919) (0.0182)
I(Female Higher Education) 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗
(0.0111) (0.00880) (0.0155)
I(Male Higher Education) 0.0174∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0796∗∗∗
(0.00703) (0.00651) (0.0121)
I(Rural) -0.0381∗∗∗ -0.0312∗∗∗ -0.0398∗∗∗
(0.00916) (0.00675) (0.0115)
Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79) 0.0153 -0.127∗∗∗ 0.00661
(0.0513) (0.0471) (0.0785)
Avg. Age Women 15 to 79 -0.441 -0.727 -2.089∗
(0.724) (0.768) (1.139)
(Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79))2 -0.170 0.112 -0.455∗∗
(0.140) (0.134) (0.193)
(Avg. Age Women 15 to 79)2 0.625 2.005 4.094
(1.709) (1.927) (2.693)
(Avg. Age Diff. (Men 15 to 79 - Women 15 to 79))3 -0.0328 0.576 -0.758
(0.653) (0.689) (0.784)
(Avg. Age Women 15 to 79)3 -0.0359 -1.796 -2.541
(1.299) (1.567) (2.047)
Avg. Age Children 0 to 14 0.0260 -0.0392
(0.0636) (0.0668)
I(North) -0.0719∗∗∗ -0.0972∗∗∗ -0.0779∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0232)
I(East) -0.0121 -0.0226 -0.0170
(0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0252)
I(North-East) 0.00140 0.0588∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0247) (0.0296)
I(South) -0.0225 -0.0302∗ -0.0517∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0181) (0.0244)
Constant 0.381∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.102) (0.160)
N 73,642 47,159 26,518
LL -31,1134.4 -19,5918.9 -85,244.5
No. Parameters 264 264 184
p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NSS 68th Round Consumer Expenditure data. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the first sampling unit level. Women’s age and age differences are divided by 100 to ease
computation. West India is the excluded region. 144
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Table A.13: Determinants of Women’s Resource Shares: Restricted Samples
Adult Women’s Resource Share
F = M = 1, C = {0,1} Married Couples
With & Without With Children Without Children With Children
Children < 15 < 15 Only < 15 Only < 15 Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NLSUR NLSUR NLSUR NLSUR
I(Child) -0.0417
(0.0516)
I(Child is Female) 0.0367 0.0435∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0199)
I(Daughter in Law) -0.0458 -0.0478 0.152
(0.225) (0.153) (0.140)
I(Unmarried Daughter above 15) -0.0784 -0.0206 -0.0713
(0.144) (0.184) (0.0602)










Fraction of Female Children 0.0151∗
(0.00798)
I(HSAA Eligible) 0.0252∗ 0.0344∗ 0.000849 0.0292∗∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0184) (0.0136) (0.00797)
I(Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain) 0.000261 -0.0586∗ 0.0198 -0.00572
(0.0297) (0.0332) (0.0152) (0.0115)
I(SC, ST or Other Backward Caste) 0.0419 0.0764∗∗ -0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0307) (0.0139) (0.0143)
I(Salary Earner) -0.00464 -0.0232 -0.00511 -0.0224∗∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0214) (0.0135) (0.00737)
I(Land Ownership) 0.0285 0.0120 0.0324∗ -0.00435
(0.0310) (0.0259) (0.0168) (0.0116)
I(Female Higher Education) 0.00935 -0.0189 -0.0324 0.0217
(0.0424) (0.0369) (0.0209) (0.0149)
I(Male Higher Education) -0.0103 0.0619∗∗ 0.0361∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0291) (0.0166) (0.0108)
I(Rural) -0.0789∗∗ -0.0687∗∗ 0.00408 -0.0348∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0276) (0.0114) (0.00965)
Age Diff. (Man 15 to 79 - Woman 15 to 79) 0.0115 0.0987 -0.00672 0.0458
(0.198) (0.213) (0.0910) (0.0643)
Age Woman 15 to 79 0.0343 -0.861 -2.600∗∗ -1.435
(2.206) (2.069) (1.110) (1.275)
(Age Diff. (Man 15 to 79 - Woman 15 to 79))2 -0.0621 0.428 -0.198 -0.114
(0.481) (0.666) (0.197) (0.231)
(Age Woman 15 to 79)2 0.125 2.569 5.039∗∗ 3.483
(5.255) (5.209) (2.510) (3.351)
(Age Diff. (Man 15 to 79 - Woman 15 to 79))3 -0.162 -0.219 -0.675 0.844
(1.383) (1.795) (0.564) (1.247)
(Age Woman 15 to 79)3 -0.262 -2.408 -3.413∗ -2.474
(4.010) (4.185) (1.795) (2.837)
Age Child 0 to 14 0.0221 -0.0295 -0.227∗∗
(0.429) (0.295) (0.0970)
I(North) -0.0809∗ -0.132∗∗ 0.113∗∗ -0.0992∗∗∗
(0.0472) (0.0545) (0.0500) (0.0226)
I(East) 0.000901 0.000255 0.0258 -0.00730
(0.0509) (0.0604) (0.0488) (0.0237)
I(North-East) 0.0133 0.0477 0.0474 0.0310
(0.0625) (0.0645) (0.0678) (0.0285)
I(South) -0.00921 -0.00950 -0.208∗∗∗ 0.0291
(0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0468) (0.0250)
Constant 0.359 0.519∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.268) (0.165) (0.160)
N 11,138 4,168 6,975 32,511
LL -92038.4 -32982.8 -47746.4 -274537.9
No. Parameters 294 294 172
p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. NSS 68th Round Consumer Expenditure data. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors
clustered at the first sampling unit level. Woman’s age and age differences are divided by 100 to ease computation. West India is the excluded
region.
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A.6 Testing the Collective Framework
The theoretical framework presented in section 1.4 relies on households satisfying the assumptions
regarding joint consumption and Pareto efficiency. Testing for these assumption in this context is equiv-
alent to checking the validity of the Browning et al. (2013) (hereinafter, BCL) structure of household
demand functions. BCL is a model of household demands, which are connected via the structural model
to singles’ demands. In my application, as in Dunbar et al. (2013), I do not impose the BCL assump-
tions regarding comparability of preferences of single versus couples. For this test, however, I consider
imposing this additional assumption. I consider a couple a household with one adult man and one adult
woman, independently on their actual marital status. I follow Dunbar et al. (2013) and I use additional
data on singles to provide validation of these structural assumptions.13 The BCL framework can be
summarized as follows: 
W couplet = λt(αt + βt lnλt) +λtβt ln y
W alonet = at + bt ln y
(A.19)
for t = f , m. The restrictions imposing similarity of Engel curves required for identification constrain
bm = b f = βm = β f . These restrictions imply two testable implications: 1) since λt cannot be negative,
the slopes of men’s and women’s private assignable have the same sign; 2) the slopes of household
demands must be proportional to those of singles’ demands, with factors of proportionality that sum to
1.
To test implication 1, I compare the predicted slopes with respect to log-expenditure for men’s and
women’s clothing obtained by estimating the model using observations for nuclear households without
children only (see table A.13, column 3). Less than 1% of the predicted slopes are positive, both for
women and for men. Moreover, the restriction that the slopes of men’s and women’s private assignable
have the same sign is satisfied all the times. There are no households in which the slopes are of opposite
13For more details, see Dunbar et al. (2013) on-line Appendix, section A.5.1.
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signs. To test implication 2, I combine a sample of 8,428 nuclear households without children with a
sample of 5,918 singles from the NSS survey and estimate a linear SUR regressions of the men’s and
women’s clothing budget share on the log of total expenditure and all demographic variables except
those relating to other household members. I interact all regressors with a dummy for couples. The sum
of the men’s and women’s ratios of slopes in couples versus single households is equal to 1.02 and not
statistically different from 1.
That the BCL’s assumptions on joint consumption and Pareto efficiency cannot be rejected provides an
empirical validation of the theoretical framework of this paper.
A.7 Simulation: Gender Specific Poverty Lines
It is standard among the development practitioners to assume poverty lines to be the same for men
and women. While section 1.5.2 constrains poverty thresholds to be the same across genders, I here
relax this assumption: while I fix the male poverty lines to the World Bank thresholds of $US 1.25/day
and $US 2/day, I allow female poverty lines to be only proportional to that of males, with a factor of
proportionality equal to δ. This exercise is equivalent to allowing women to have lower (or higher) basic
expenditure needs relative to men. For δ = 1, female and male poverty lines are the same and equal to
the World Bank thresholds; for δ < 1, the female poverty threshold is lower than that for males, while
for δ > 1 the poverty line for women is higher than for men.
I simulate gender and gender-age specific poverty rates in these alternative scenarios. In lights of
the evidence of excess female poverty presented in section 1.5.2, the simulation exercise allows me
to address concerns about that fact that women’s needs need not be equal to men’s and answer the
following questions: How much lower should the poverty threshold for women be to obtain equal
poverty rates across genders? Alternatively: How much higher should men’s basic requirements be
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to rationalize excess female poverty? I define δ∗ as the value of δ that equalizes poverty rates across
genders, i.e., the fractions of women and men living in poverty.
Figure A.11 shows the results for extreme poverty ($US 1.25/day), while figure A.12 presents the
simulation results for average poverty ($US 2/day). When all age groups are pooled for the calculations
(panels A), the simulation exercise indicates that female poverty lines equal to $US 1.08/day and $US
1.57/day would deliver extreme and average poverty rates that are equal across genders. The graphs
displays the gender specific poverty estimates against the factor of proportionality δ. When gender-age
specific poverty rates are taken into account (panels B), the simulation exercise indicate that at post-
reproductive ages the female poverty threshold would need to be as low as less than 90 cents/day (70
percent of males) to equalize extreme poverty rates across gender and as low as $US 1.2/day to make
the female and male average poverty rates the same. The graph shows the values δ∗ equalizing female
and male poverty rates in all thirteen 5-year age groups, from 15-19 to 75-79.
Investigating whether setting gender specific poverty lines makes sense from a policy perspective and
whether men and women differ in their basic expenditure needs at different ages goes far beyond the
scope of this paper. Future work, however, should focus on disentangling how much of excess female
poverty is caused by discrimination and gender inequalities, and how much is driven by gender specific
necessities and requirements, which may vary over the life cycle.
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(A) Poverty Rates (B) δ∗
Figure A.11: Equalizing Male and Female Poverty (1.25 US$/day)
(A) Poverty Rates (B) δ∗
Figure A.12: Equalizing Male and Female Poverty (2 US$/day)
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Appendix B
Women’s Empowerment and Family Health: A
Two-Step Approach
B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Correlations: “NO say" Responses and Woman’s Power (bR)
















own health care 1.00
large hh purchases 0.43 1.00
visits to family 0.40 0.54 1.00
purchases to daily life 0.45 0.51 0.49 1.00
“NO say" Index 0.72 0.81 0.78 0.79 1.00
Woman’s Power (bR) -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.11 1.00
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Table B.2: Women’s Health, OLS Estimates
Weight (kg) Body Mass
Index
Pr(BMI≤18.5) Pr(Anemic) Avg. Birth
Space
(months)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Woman’s Power (bR) -0.415 -0.811 0.0287 0.102∗∗ 30.33∗∗∗
(1.475) (0.593) (0.0611) (0.0506) (3.110)
Observations 16,513 16,498 16,498 15,525 14,003
Mean Dependent Variable 48.24 20.89 0.30 0.16 35.11
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Estimates are obtained using the NFHS-3 data. All specifications include state,
cohort (woman), state-religion, and cohort-religion fixed effects, and state time trends. The sample includes married
women of age 15 to 49 included in nuclear households with up to 4 children. All specifications include a religion
dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, number of children below 15, the fraction of female
children, woman’s years of education, a household wealth index, indicator variables for owning a BPL card, for living
in rural areas, and for being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes, for having worked
in the past 12 months. Anemia includes mild and moderate anemia. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (2,500
repetitions). Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level.
Table B.3: Men’s Health, OLS Estimates
Weight (kg) Body Mass Pr(BMI≤18.5) Pr(Anemic)
Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Woman’s Power (lnbR) 1.188 0.818 0.00630 -0.0274
(2.149) (0.696) (0.0802) (0.0608)
Observations 8,536 8,533 8,533 7,789
Mean Dependent Variable 56.85 21.13 0.24 0.10
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Estimates are obtained using the NFHS-3 data. All specifications
include state, cohort (woman), state-religion, and cohort-religion fixed effects, and state time trends.
The sample includes married men of age 15 to 54 included in nuclear households with up to 4 children.
All specifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain,
number of children below 15, the fraction of female children, man’s age and years of education, a
household wealth index, indicator variables for owning a BPL card, for living in rural areas, and for
being part of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes, for having worked in the
past 12 months. Anemia includes mild and moderate anemia. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses
(2,500 repetitions). Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level.
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‘
Table B.4: Children’s Health, OLS Estimates
Weight (kg) Height (cm) Pr(Any Vaccine) Pr(BCG) Pr(DPT) Pr(Polio)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman’s Power (bR) -0.322 -1.422 -0.0443 -0.223∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.0541
(0.404) (1.535) (0.0546) (0.0746) (0.0779) (0.0559)
Observations 10,993 10,967 12,000 11,944 11,884 11,985
Mean Dependent Variable 10.67 83.94 0.91 0.78 0.75 0.91
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Estimates are obtained using the NFHS-3 data. All specifications include state, cohort
(woman), state-religion, and cohort-religion fixed effects, and state time trends. The sample includes married women of age 15
to 49 included in nuclear households with up to 4 children. All specifications include a religion dummy, equal to 1 if a woman
is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain, number of children below 15, the fraction of female children, woman’s years of education, a
household wealth index, indicator variables for owning a BPL card, for living in rural areas, and for being part of Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes, for having a mother who worked in the past 12 months. Bootstrap standard
errors in parentheses (5,000 repetitions). Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit (village) level.
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Appendix C
Long-Term Effects of Access to Health Care:
Medical Missions in Colonial India
C.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure C.1: Protestant missions locations as of 1910 (Statistical Atlas of Christian Missions)
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Figure C.2: Page from the Centennial Survey Survey of Foreign Missions
Figure C.3: Status of Indian railways network as of 1891 (Constable’s Hand Atlas of India)
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Figure C.4: Catholic missions locations as of 1911 (Atlas Hierarchicus)
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Figure C.5: Instrumental Variable: An Illustrative Example
Note: Consider the case of two individuals (i and j) and three Protestant medical missions as-
sociated with three different missionary societies: Canadian Presbyterian Mission (CPM, with
Society Hospital Share = 21.74%), American Baptist Missionary Union (ABMU, 23.08%), and Wes-
leyan Missionary Society (WMS, 2.59%). K is the buffer radius (in kilometers). For individual i,




Appendix C Long-Term Effects of Access to Health Care: Medical Missions in Colonial India
Figure C.6: Self-reported Health: Ordered Probit Marginal Effects
Figure C.7: Estimated β by Direct Effect of Instrument
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Figure C.8: Protestant Medical Missions and Schools
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Table C.1: Missionary Societies and Hospital Shares
Society Origin Society hospital share
Canadian Presbyterian Mission Canada 21.74%
Church of England Zenana Missionary Society England 3.08%
Cambridge Mission to Delhi England 0.00%
Church Missionary Society England 8.87%
English Baptist Missionary Society England 0.87%
English Presbyterian Church Mission England 69.23%
Friends’ Foreign Missions Association England 22.22%
London Missionary Society England 19.39%
Society for the Propagation of Gospel England 1.60%
Society of St John the Evangelist England 0.00%
Wesleyan Missionary Society England 2.59%
Zenana, Bible and Medical Missions England 0.00%
Basel Evangelical Missionary Society Germany 7.14%
Independent Independent 58.82%
Poona and Indian Village Mission India 0.00%
Ranagat Medical Mission India 0.00%
Bethel Santhal Mission India 0.00%
Presbyterian Church of Ireland Missionary Society Ireland 21.05%
Church of Scotland Mission Scotland 21.05%
Edinburgh Medical Missionary Society Scotland 66.67%
Free Church of Scotland Scotland 26.83%
United Presbyterian Church of Scotland Scotland 7.83%
American Board for Commissioners of Foreign Missions United States 29.59%
American Baptist Missionary Union United States 23.08%
Free Baptist Foreign Missionary Society United States 0.00%
Methodist Episcopal Missionary Society United States 18.66%
Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions North United States 42.34%
Woman’s Union Missionary Society United States 14.29%
Welsh Calvinist Methodist Foreign Missions Society Wales 0.00%
Society hospital share is the ratio between each society’s number of medical missions and total missions outside
India. Only societies included in the estimation sample. Data from the Centennial Survey of Foreign Mission
(1902).
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Table C.2: OLS Estimates (Log-Log Model)
BMI (log)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.0119∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗
(0.00240) (0.00447) (0.00416) (0.00413) (0.00416)
1(Female) -0.00653∗ -0.00673∗ -0.00673∗
(0.00358) (0.00359) (0.00387)
1(Married) 0.00448 0.00467 0.00467
(0.00472) (0.00472) (0.00436)
1(Primary school completed) 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗
(0.00409) (0.00410) (0.00403)
1(Major ethnic group) -0.00561 -0.00446 -0.00446
(0.00482) (0.00482) (0.00484)
Age 0.00723∗∗∗ 0.00720∗∗∗ 0.00720∗∗∗
(0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00103)
Age2 -0.0000689∗∗∗ -0.0000685∗∗∗ -0.0000685∗∗∗
(0.0000129) (0.0000129) (0.0000130)
Household size -0.00697∗∗ -0.00703∗∗ -0.00703∗∗
(0.00314) (0.00314) (0.00293)
Household size2 0.000371∗ 0.000380∗ 0.000380∗∗
(0.000203) (0.000203) (0.000190)
1(Wealth 2nd quartile) 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗
(0.00443) (0.00443) (0.00440)
1(Wealth 3rd quartile) 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0250∗∗∗ 0.0250∗∗∗
(0.00439) (0.00437) (0.00430)
1(Wealth 4th quartile) 0.0497∗∗∗ 0.0499∗∗∗ 0.0499∗∗∗
(0.00507) (0.00510) (0.00483)
Population in 2000 (000s) 0.000358 0.000358
(0.000249) (0.000307)
Altitude (meters) 0.0000359∗ 0.0000359∗
(0.0000203) (0.0000204)






Population in 1900 (000s) -0.00000119 -0.00000119
(0.0000397) (0.0000639)
Cropland in 1900 (km2) 0.0000555 0.0000555
(0.0000825) (0.0000862)
No. colonial railways -0.0142∗ -0.0142∗
(0.00810) (0.00749)
N 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046
Mean Dependent Variable 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05 3.05
District FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls No No No Yes Yes
Historical controls No No No Yes Yes
Spatial standard errors No No No No Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level in columns 1 to 4. Standard errors corrected for spatial correlation
in column 5.
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Table C.3: Robustness Check: Estimation Sample
Age BMI
15-65 18.5-30 15-35 15-45 25-45
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.173∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.248∗ -0.239∗ 0.325
(0.105) (0.108) (0.129) (0.134) (0.288)
N 7,883 4,966 7,155 7,174 699
Mean dependent variable 20.36 20.80 20.60 20.65 27.95
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Protestant mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Catholic mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
In column 1, only individuals with BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. In column 2 to 5, only
individuals of age 20 to 60 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level.
Table C.4: Robustness Check: Instrument
Distance from Protestant BMI
medical mission (log)
10km 30km 50km
(med. only) (med. only) (all miss.)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hospital share 10 km (medical only) -2.103∗∗∗
(0.527)
Hospital share 30 km (medical only) -1.319∗∗∗
(0.343)
Hospital share 50 km (all missions) -0.143∗∗∗
(0.0430)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.445∗ -0.584∗∗ -0.771∗
(0.265) (0.275) (0.406)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic - - - 15.93 14.77 10.99
N 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046
Mean dependent variable 4.02 4.02 4.02 20.42 20.42 20.42
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level.
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Table C.5: Robustness Check: Societies With and Without Medical Missionaries
Non-Medical Medical Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Date of Organization 1876 1857 19∗∗∗
(5.44)
No. Missionary Stations 44.50 220.34 -175.84∗∗∗
(-4.45)
Income from Home Sources per Station (US$) 1,195.42 1346.60 -151.18
(-0.64)
Income from the Foreign Field per Station (US$) 224.18 181.44 42.74
(0.43)
No. Missionaries per Station 1.65 1.58 0.07
(0.28)
No. Native Christians per Station 412.14 117.19 294.95
(0.85)
No. Churches per Station 0.52 1.02 -0.50
(-1.34)
No. Sunday Schools per Station 0.52 1.49 -0.97
(-1.67)
N 203 92 295
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The table compares societies operating worldwide in 1902
depending on whether they had medical missionaries. Societies compared are those also present in
India. The number of missionary stations includes principals and all other substations.
Table C.6: Robustness Check: Test of Overidentifying Restrictions
Generated Generated and
Instr. Only Excluded Instr.
(1) (2)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.4838∗ -0.5759∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.214)
N 7046 7046
Hansen J Statistics 16.3 16.4
Degrees of Freedom 18 19
P-value 0.573 0.632
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All variables are centered to remove district fixed
effects. 19 additional instruments are generated using the residuals from the first stage
regression (Lewbel (2012)).
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Table C.7: Additional Results: School Proximity
BMI
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.227∗ -0.193∗ -0.204∗ -0.216∗
(0.120) (0.113) (0.107) (0.122)
Distance from Protestant boarding school (log) 0.0249 0.0280 0.0914
(0.110) (0.123) (0.141)
Distance from Protestant high school (log) -0.0748 -0.123 -0.0883
(0.110) (0.119) (0.124)
Distance from Protestant university (log) -0.0547 -0.0441 -0.0603
(0.128) (0.173) (0.167)
Distance from Protestant mission (log) 0.0353 0.0405 0.0322 -0.00421 0.0408
(0.111) (0.112) (0.110) (0.113) (0.114)
Distance from Catholic mission (log) -0.134 -0.117 -0.124 -0.161 -0.120
(0.117) (0.115) (0.117) (0.114) (0.116)
N 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046
Mean Dependent Variable 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Protestant mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Catholic mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward) level.
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Table C.8: Additional Results: Medical Mission Activities
BMI
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(No. treatments and patients ≥ median) 0.265 0.900
(0.178) (0.564)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.194∗
(0.108)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.147
× 1(No. treatments and patients ≥ median) (0.135)
1(Surgery at closest Protestant medical mission) 0.377∗∗ 0.645
(0.179) (0.582)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.251∗∗
(0.112)
Distance from Protestant medical mission (log) -0.046
× 1(Surgery at closest Protestant medical mission) (0.143)
N 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046
Mean Dependent Variable 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Protestant mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance from Catholic mission (log) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only individuals of age 20 to 60 and BMI 15 to 30 are included in the estimation sample. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village (ward)
level.
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Table C.9: Descriptive Statistics (DLHS-3)
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Household Survey
1(Water Treatment) 485,219 0.30 0.46
1(Open Defecation) 485,533 0.66 0.47
1(Traditional Medicine) 458,569 0.04 0.19
Distance from Protestant medical mission 465,092 89.26 106.09
Distance from Protestant mission 485,540 49.93 100.41
Distance from Catholic mission 485,540 79.09 105.37
Household size 485,540 5.36 2.62
Age of head of household 485,537 46.43 14.39
1(Hindu) 485,539 0.77 0.42
1(Primary school completed by head of hh) 287,838 0.80 0.40
1(Wealth 1st quartile) 485,537 0.26 0.44
1(Wealth 2nd quartile) 485,537 0.27 0.44
1(Wealth 3rd quartile) 485,537 0.23 0.42
1(Wealth 4th quartile) 485,537 0.24 0.43
Village population (Census 2001) 485,540 2299.22 4272.09
Population in 1900 485,540 131.74 228.70
No. colonial railways 485,540 0.35 0.86
Cropland in 1900 (km2) 485,540 35.91 32.91
Altitude (meters) 485,540 385.67 533.22
No. rivers/water sources 485,540 1.90 2.00
Latitude 465,092 24.24 5.16
Longitude 465,092 81.59 6.41
Panel B: Ever Married Women Survey
Pneumonia Knowledge Index 441,168 0.22 0.24
1(Iron supplements during last pregnancy) 441,168 0.81 0.39
1(Full ANC during last pregnancy) 157,503 0.13 0.34
1(Safe delivery) 157,488 0.42 0.49
1(Child received check-up within 24 hrs from birth) 154,556 0.40 0.49
Distance from Protestant medical mission 422,332 87.85 100.11
Distance from Protestant mission 441,168 49.95 94.53
Distance from Catholic mission 441,168 78.05 99.11
Household size 441,168 6.36 3.12
Woman’s age 441,168 31.45 8.62
1(Hindu) 441,166 0.78 0.41
1(Primary school completed) 441,123 0.38 0.49
1(Wealth 1st quartile) 441,168 0.28 0.45
1(Wealth 2nd quartile) 441,168 0.27 0.44
1(Wealth 3rd quartile) 441,168 0.21 0.40
1(Wealth 4th quartile) 441,168 0.24 0.43
Village population (Census 2001) 441,168 2307.91 4212.86
Population in 1900 441,168 137.47 233.89
No. colonial railways 441,168 0.37 0.88
Cropland in 1900 (km2) 441,168 37.39 32.88
Altitude (meters) 441,168 357.25 487.81
No. rivers/water sources 441,168 1.87 1.97
Latitude 422,332 24.26 5.05
Longitude 422,332 81.29 6.20
DLHS-3 data. The wealth quartiles are based on a wealth index computed as the first principal
component that combines information about a set of household assets: number of rooms in dwelling,
and asset ownership, such as refrigerator, scooter, radio, and bike. Population, altitude, number of
colonial railways and cropland data are extracted in 5 km-radius buffers around the DLHS village
locations. Elevation data are available at the 30” × 30" grid cell; original population in year 1900 and
cropland data are available at the 5’ × 5’ resolution. Latitude and longitude are in decimal degrees.
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C.2 Long-Term Transmission and Health Production Function
To illustrate the three transmission channels, it may be useful to consider individual health as being
determined by a set of inputs as follows:
H =H (P, I , D) (C.1)
where P is health potential, I are health inputs and D are exogenous environmental conditions. These
may depend on local observable characteristics, i.e. D = D(W ). We define ASR as current access to health
care and ALR as long-term access to health care, i.e. access to health care of previous generations. Since
access to health care and health status of one generation can leave their mark on the health potential of
the following cohorts (Bhalotra and Rawlings (2011), Coneus and Spiess (2012)), we consider individual
health potential to be determined by ALR and by socio-economic individual characteristics, i.e. P =
P (ALR, X ). Moreover, health inputs may depend on current access to health care, health culture C ,
such as hygiene and health awareness and health promoting practices, and socio-economic individual
characteristics, i.e. I = I (ASR, C , X ). In particular, health culture may be shaped by current and past
access to health care: C = C (ASR, ALR). On one side, proximity to health facilities today may directly
affect health culture and stimulate the diffusion of healthy practices. On the other side, health and
hygiene awareness may have been bequeathed by the family or the social environment and therefore
depend on the access to health care of previous generations. An individual’s health production function is
therefore a function of long-term access to health care, access to health care today, socio-economic and
demographic individual characteristics and local environmental conditions. Assuming a simple Cobb-
Douglas production function and conditioning on observable characteristics at the individual and at the
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village level, individual health is produced as follows:
H =H (ALR, ASR) = κ(ALR)β1(ASR)β2 (C.2)
which we estimate empirically in section 3.7.1. We assume κ to be additively separable in district level
and individual idiosyncratic components, i.e. κivd = αd + εivd .
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